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CHAPTER ONE

General Grounds for International Air
Carrier's Liability

1-1. Introductory note

The Warsaw Convention 1929, officially referred to as the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air,

1

established and elaborated,

as one of its major tenets, the principle of the air carrier's
liability for damage caused to passengers, baggage and goods,
and also for damage caused by delay.

2

The Warsaw Convention emerged in a world of differences
among the countries engaging in all humanities as to the rules
governing liability for accidents reflecting of the carriage of
goods and passengers by air. 3 The parties to the Warsaw
Convention desired to limit carriers' liability for catastrophic
aircraft disasters which might otherwise threaten the financial
security of the infant industry.4 Other objectives were to achieve
uniformity in an air carrier's liability and documentation for

1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat.3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 449 U.S.C. § 1502
(1998) (adherence of United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
The various instruments comprising the Warsaw Convention are reprinted and collected in the
International Air Transport Association's Essential Documents on International Air Carrier
Liability (1999) [hereinafter lATA, Aviation Documents].
2 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
3 See id. pmbl.; see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497-99 (1967). (noting the intention of the Warsaw
fonvention to create, among other things, uniform regulations regarding liability of air carriers).
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (discussing the relative youth of the
~irline industry and the goal of the Warsaw Convention to limit air carrier liability in instances
mvolving accidents).
.

2

transportation, to avoid conflict involvement in the problems of
the laws in order to protect the fledgling international
transportation business, and to facilitate transactions between
countries around the world.

5

The rules of the Warsaw Convention are being applied all
over the world and have demonstrated their reliability and
usefulness. The passenger knows that, wherever and whenever
he flies, there is a certain degree of uniformity in the rules
governing the carrier's liability, while the carrier, being aware of
the extent of his liability, can make arrangements to insure
himself against possible losses. It is therefore appropriate to
examine the nature and the development of the legal grounds on
which the air carrier's liability rests, and their impact on
everyday practice. The following will be devoted to these
important matters.
As time went by and aviation began expanding on a large
scale, the Warsaw Convention had to be amended or added to on
a number of occasions in order to be kept up to date. The
amendments and/or additions are the following:
1. The Hague Protocol of 1955. 6 It was added in order to adapt
5

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, pmble. (relating the aims of the Warsaw Convention); see
also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-99 (discussing the goals of the Warsaw
fonvention).
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, Sept. 28,1955,478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter
3

the Warsaw Convention to the demands of modem transport.
The Protocol entered into force on 1 August 1963, the ninetieth
day after ratification by 30 countries.
2. The Guadalajara Convention of 1961 for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air
Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Carrier. 7 This
amendment took the form of a Supplementary Convention
because it was concluded to deal with an entirely new
subject-matter, namely chartering. It has been in force since 1
May 1964.
3. The Montreal Agreement of May 1966. 8 This IS a private
agreement concluded between lATA carrIers and the United
States Civil Aeronautics Board, and the so-called 'Malta
Agreement', which is a private agreement between a number of
air carriers, mostly from Europe.
4. The Guatemala Protocol of 8 March 1971.9 This Protocol
was also meant to be an amendment to the Warsaw Convention.
The Hague Protocol].
7 Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person other than the Contracting Carrier,
puadalajara, 18 September 1961. [hereinafter cited as Guadalajara Convention].
Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol
(1966), Civil Aeronautics Board Agreement No. 18,900, approved by Exec. Order No. 23,680, 31
Fed. Reg. 7,302 (1966) [hereinafter Montreal Interim Agreement], reprinted in lATA, Aviation
pocuments, supra note 1, at 139.
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Done at the
Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Mar. 8, 1971 [hereinafter Guatemala Protocol], reprinted in lATA,
Principal Instruments of the Warsaw System 3-47 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter Principal
Instruments].
.
4

However, it has yet to come into force.
5. Another four amending Protocols were concluded at Montreal
on 25 September 1975. 10
Moreover, there have been unilateral efforts to modify the
Warsaw liability scheme. These primarily include the Japanese
Initiative of 1992, 11 the European Community Regulation, 12
and the lATA lntercarrier Agreement. 13 These unilateral efforts
10 Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, Sept. 25, 1975,
reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 48-50; Additional Protocol No.2 to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed
at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Sept.
25,1975, reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 51-53; Additional Protocol No.3 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by
Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept.
1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 Mar. 1971, Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Principal Instruments,
supra note 9, at 54-57; Additional Protocol No.4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929 as
Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, Sept. 25, 1975 [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol No.4), reprinted in Principal Instruments, supra note 9, at 2-47.
11 See Nanaeen K. Baden, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention, 61 1. Air L. & Com
437,453-56 (1996). (discussing Japanese airliners' agreement to abandon liability limits imposed
by the Warsaw Convention). This initiative preceded the modem IATAAgreements and the
Montreal Convention of 1999. See id. It constitutes an agreement among ten Japanese carriers to
establish a two-tiered liability scheme with absolute liability of up to 100,000 SDRs and presumed
liability for damages in excess of this limit. See id. A major impetus behind this agreement was the
1985 crash of a Japanese Airline, which killed five-hundred twenty-nine people. See id.; Bin
Cheng, Air Carriers' Liability for Passenger Injury and Death: The Japanese Initiative and
Response to the Recent EC Consultation Paper, 18 Air & Space L. 109 (1993) (discussing the
importance and circumstances of the Japanese initiative).
12 See Council Regulation 2027/97,40 OJ. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter EC Regulation); see also
Berend Crans & Onno Rijsdijk, EC Aviation Scene, 21 Air & Space L. 193 (1996) (reviewing the
EC Regulation in the context of the European Community). The EC Regulation resulted from the
Commission of the European Union's concern over the voluntary nature of the lATA initiative. See
Crans & Rijsdijk, supra. The EC Regulation not only set forth a two-tiered liability system like the
IATA and Japanese initiative, but also provided that it was mandatory for all European Union
countries and required up-front payments to the family of a victim in case of death. See EC
Regulation, supra. In The Queen v. The Secretary of State For the Environment, Transport and the
Regions, the regulation was challenged before the High Court of Justice in the United Kingdom as
constituting an impermissible change to the Warsaw Convention without the consent of the
signatory states. The Court held that the Regulation in suspense because it conflicts 'with the
Warsaw Convention and impedes the performance by member states who are parties to it.' 1
~loyd's Rep. 242 (Apr. 21, 1999).
3 See IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA), available at
http://www.iata.org/legalllist_intercarrier.htrn [hereinafter lIA), reprinted in IATA, Aviation

5

finally led to the adoption of the Montreal Convention 1999/

4

which was spearheaded by the International Civil Aviation
Organization ("ICAO") and signed by more than 50 countries at
an International Conference on Air Law in Montreal, Canada in
May 1999. With the ratification by the thirtieth signatory state,
the United States, the Convention became effective as of
November 4, 2003. This is a landmark movement of modem
civil

aviation

law.

Rather than amending the

Warsaw

Convention, the Montreal Convention replaces the system of
liability established under the previous treaty regime.

15

However, the entry into force of Montreal does not stop the
development and further refinement of the Warsaw analysis,
much of which still provides sound guidance on the
development of the Montreal framework. This is especially true
in the analysis of its coverage.
The basic Convention of Warsaw and its subsequent
amendments and the Montreal Convention will now be

Documents, supra note 1, at 51; Agreement on Measures to Implement the lATA Intercarrier
Agreement (MIA), available at http://www.iata.orgllegal!lisUntercarrier.htm. reprinted in lATA,
55
Aviation
Documents' supra note 1,
at .
14
Convention For the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, opened for
signature on 28 May 1999, available at http://www.dot.gov/otlogc!Convention.pdf [hereinafter
~ontreal Convention 1999J, reprinted in lATA, Aviation Documents, supra note 1, at 17.
See Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 2004); Schopenhauer v.
COmpagnie Nationale Air France, 255 F. Supp. 2d 81,87 (E.D.NY 2003); see also Modernization
Qfthe Warsaw System - Montreal 1999, J.C. Bactra, 65 J. Air. L. & Com.429, 433 (2000); Letter
.QfSubmittal of Strobe Talbott (June 23, 2000), reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 1999 WL
33292734.
6

considered in their chronological order.

1-2. The Warsaw Convention 1929

The Warsaw Convention was the product of international
conferences held in 1925 and 1929. 16 At the 1929 conference,
the Comite International Technique d 'Experts Juridiques
Aeriens (C.I.T.E.J.A.), a committee of government-selected
experts previously appointed to establish a set of rules for
international air carriage, presented a draft convention.

17

Underlying this draft were the principles upon which the
liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention were founded.
According to the Rapporteur of the 1925 Conference:
"The Commission asked itself which liability regime had to be adopted: risk or fault.
The general feeling is that, whilst liability towards third parties must see the
application of the risk theory, by contrast, in the matter of the carrier's liability in
relation to passengers and goods, one must admit the fault theory.,,18

Further,

the

Convention's

formation

involved

the

convergence of principles of carrier liability under both the civil
and common law systems. Under common law, the carrier is
subjected to a heightened duty of care. While not absolute, it
16

See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498 (providing the background of the Warsaw
Convention)
17
•
~ee John J. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of
Aenal Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), 3 J. Air L. & Com. 27, 32, 36 (1932) (describing the work of
~e CITEJA on the Warsaw Convention) .
See Georgette Miller, Liability in International Air Transport: The Warsaw System in Municipal
C°urts 63 (1977) (quoting Conference Intemationale (Paris, 1925) Rapport Pittard Annexes, p.
60).
7

requires the carner 'to use the greatest amount of care and
foresight

which

IS

reasonably

necessary'

19

under

the

circumstances. Thus, failure to exerCise this care is negligent.
Carriers are not liable for the assaults or torts of third parties
absent notice and failure to protect the injured passenger.

20

In

contrast, under the civil law system, a carrier's duty to
passengers is a strict contractual duty to safely transport. 21 The
only exception to this contractual liability is if the damage or
loss is due to a cause that is not attributable to the carrier.

22

Under the principle of force majeure, a carrier is not liable for
loss or damage if the occurrence is unforeseeable, insuperable,
and extraneous to the carrier's business and activities,23 and
includes 'fait ou faute d'un tiers' (act or fault of a third party) so
long as all three conditions are met. 24
A primary and fundamental purpose of the Convention was

to establish uniform rules governing claims arising out of
Id. at 52.
See Milone v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 91 F.3d 229,231 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
(quoting Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834,840 (D.C. 1993))
(holding that a common carrier 'has a duty to protect its passengers from foreseeable harm arising
from criminal conduct of others.'); see also Kelley v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 37 F. Supp. 2d
233,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). (holding that a railroad is not liable for assault of a passenger by an
employee unless it is proven that the railroad 'knew or should have known the assailant was the
~e of person who might commit an assault.').
See Miller, supra note 18, at 54 (describing the presence of a contractual duty to transport
f200ds ~nd passengers safely under French law).
23 See Id. (describing the exception to contractual liability, 'cause etrangere,' under the civil code).
See id. at 54-55 (listing instances where a carrier is not liable for failing to deliver passengers
~rd goods safely under the concept of force majeure in French law) .
. See id. at 55 n.41 (noting the requirement that all three conditions must be met in order for
hability to be excluded in situations involving 'fait ou faute d'un tiers').
19

20

8

international air transportation and limit the liability of air
carriers. 25 At the time, the air transportation industry was in its
infancy,26 and there were substantial differences among the
world's countries as to liability rules governing air transportation
accidents. 27 Many countries' civil laws allowed carriers to
contractually (i.e. by ticket) disclaim liability for injury or
death. 28 Importantly, while uniformity was an essential goal to
the Convention, the objectives also included the desire to protect
29
the fledgling air transportation business from disaster. The
primary concern was air accidents, such as crashes or other
large-scale incidents in the plane's operation, which could lead
to disastrous financial consequences.

30

There was also the

See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc ., 872 F.2d 1462, 1467 (11 th Cir. 1989). (discussing the
background of the Warsaw Convention and its aims); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at
498-99 (outlining the drafter's goals for the Warsaw Convention).
26 See 1 Lee S. Kreindler, Aviation Accident Law sec. 10.01 [2], at 10- 6 (Blanca 1. Rodriguez ed.,
1996) (describing the state of the aviation industry in 1929); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
3, at 498 (characterizing the aviation industry as being on the verge of becoming a conunon mode
of transportation).
27 See 1 Stuart M. Speiser & Charles F. Krause, Aviation Tort Law § 11.4, at 635-36 (1978 & Supp.
1999) (stating the twin goals ofthe Convention to be establishing uniformity in law and limiting
~~e liability of air carriers in accidents).
See HUlbert Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law 1-11 (1954 ) (discussing
~Ftations on liability in civil aviation law).
See generally Jonathan L. Neville, The International Air Transportation Association's Attempt
to Modify International Air Disaster Liability: An Admirable Effort with an Impossible Goal, 27
Ga. 1. Int'l & Compo L. 571, 573-74 (1999). (citing Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention:
Cutting the Gordian Knot and the 1995 Intercarrier Agreement, 22 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 67,
68-69 (1996)) (noting the problem that liability posed to the relatively young airline industry in
~e event of an airline disaster).
See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402, 1405 (1st Cir. 1971) (discussing the aims of the
Warsaw Convention, particularly preventing liability claims from severely harming air carriers in
the event of a disastrous accident); see also James N. Fincher, Watching Liability Limits Under the
Warsaw Convention Fly Away, and the lATA Initiative, 10 Transnat'l Law 309,310 (1997) (noting
the concerns surrounding the potential fmancial ramifications that an air disaster could have had
~ the airline industry); cf. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 499 (observing that the
arsaw Convention's aim of establishing liability ceilings was an effort to attract capital to the

25

9

concern that insurance would otherwise become too expensive
for carriers, and tickets too costly for most passengers. At the
time, the air carrier industry was financially weak and faced
possible, if not inevitable, bankruptcy from a single disaster. 31 It
was crucial for the Convention to limit air carrier liability and
allow the air transportation industry to grow and obtain the
necessary capital by placing uniform limits on possible
disastrous c1aims. 32 This could be done by identifying, at the
outset, what liability the carrier could incur. 33
Also underlying the Convention's goal of limiting a
carrier's liability was the understanding that liability of the air
airline industry).
31 See generally Kreindler, supra note 26, sec. 10.01[2], at 10-6 (citing Dunn v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc ., 589 F.2d 408, 410-11 (9th Cir. 1978)) (discussing early issues and problems with
the aviation industry).
32 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 498-500 (maintaining that a central goal of the
Convention was to uniformly restrict the potential liability of the airline in the event of passenger
injuries or fatalities); see also D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention
136 (Martinus Nijhoff ed., 1937) (stressing that the airliners' motive to enter into the Convention
was in limiting their own liability). Moreover, the airliners sought to exclude domestic flights,
non-commercial flights, and 'carriages performed not for reward by individuals or groups' from
the Convention altogether. Id. at 142; Kriendler, supra note 26, sec. 11.01[2] nA (citing Dunn, 589
F.2d at 410-11). (providing the example of Dunn, a federal case in which the defendant airline was
forced to pay a substantial penalty to an injured passenger). Airlines were fully aware of the
possibility that a major lawsuit could destroy capital investment, and thus sought to limit their
fotentialliability through the Convention. See Kriendler, supra note 26, sec. 11.01 [2] nA.
3 See Id, supra note 17, at 30 (citing Report of 1925 International Conference of Private Air Law)
(reporting the establishment of two commissions by the First International Conference of Private
Air Law in 1925, created to report on general questions of private air law and the liability of air
carriers); see also Andrea Buff, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw Convention:
Does the lATA Intercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the Convention?, 20
Fordham Int'l L.J. 1768, 1774 nA2 (1997). (citing Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message
from the President of the U.S. Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, S.
Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., at 3-4 (2d Sess. 1934), reprinted in 1934 U.S. Aviation Rep. 239,
242) (contending that limited liability would attract investors and insurance underwriters to the
airline industry); Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 243 (explaining that the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention was to give carriers the advantage of knowing when and to what extent their liability
would be engaged).
10

carrier would be 'less rigorous' than that for other carriers

34

and

that the carrier was not assuming responsibility for the safety of
the passenger absent fault. It was also understood and intended
that the carrier would not assume responsibility for risks
associated with travel in genera1.
Convention's

35

Reduced to its essentials, the

limited liability scheme

imposed presumed

liability upon the carrier for injury resulting from aviation
accident, set monetary limits on any damage recovery, and
allowed exoneration where the carrier exercised due diligence.

36

Since the Convention was imposing liability upon the carrier for
aircraft accidents, it placed the burden of proof regarding due
diligence on the carrier, as it was believed that, in most crashes
or major incidents, the carrier would be the most knowledgeable
as to cause.

37

If the cause could not be determined, then the

34 See Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 233,236 (stating that the '[t]he liability ofthe air carrier must
be submitted to rules less rigorous than those imposed on other carriers.').
35 See id. (justifying the 'less rigorous' enforcement of airline liability with the belief among
representatives at the Convention that airline passengers, unlike passengers traveling on the more
traditional modes of transportation, accepted the increased risks accompanied with flying). The
argument for decreased airline liability was further strengthened by the contention that an airline
could not overcome a presumption of fault where the airplane is involved in an accident, or
disappears in the sea. See id. at 237; Miller, supra note 18, at 63 (admitting that 'anyone using an
aircraft does not ignore the risks inherent in a mode of transportation which has not yet reached
~~e point of perfection that one hundred years have given to the railways.').
See Goedhuis, supra note 32, at 38 (explaining that 'a system of liability must be arrived to
which the injured party is relieved from the burden of proof without this resulting in declaring the
~;rrier liable when it has committed no fault.').
See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 21,37,252 (R.
Homer ed. & D. Legrez transI., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes] (noting that a showing
of due diligence will lessen the extent to which the air carrier would be liable); Goedhuis, supra
note 32, at 217-18, 230 (discussing the generally accepted rule of placing the burden of proof on
the carrier).

11

carrier would be liable. 38 Indeed, it was the placement of the
burden of proof on the carrier that served as the justification for
modest liability limits.
Based on these notions, the Warsaw liability scheme that
emerged in 1929 allowed a passenger to recover damages for
any injury or death if the following were established:
(a) the claimant was a passenger of an international flight;39
(b) the claimant suffered an 'accident';40
(c) the accident occurred aboard the international flight or in the
course of embarking or disembarking the international flight;41
(d) the accident caused the passenger to suffer 'death or
wounding ... or any other bodily injury. ,42
While the first one is rare in dispute, the other three are of
primary concern to this dissertation.
The two main defenses were contributory negligence on the
part of the claimant and carrier exoneration where the carrier
undertook 'all necessary measures' to avoid the accident. 43
Finally, the monetary limit could be broken by showing that the

38

See Lawrence B. Goldhirsch, The Warsaw Convention Annotated: A Legal Handbook (Kluwer
~9000) (providing a translation and analytical connnentary for the Warsaw Convention).
40 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17.
See id. art. 17.
41 See id.
42 Id.
43 S
ee 1'd. art. 20(1).
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carrier engaged in 'willful misconduct,'44 or where the carrier
failed to deliver the ticket.45 The monetary limit was 125,000
francS (approximately U.S. $8,300).46 Although the Convention
barred carriers from undermining the Convention rules by

exculpatory contract language, carriers could agree to a higher
limit of liability with the passenger 'by special contract.,47

1-3. The Hague Protocol 1955

In 1955, a Diplomatic Conference at the Hague proposed
the adoption of a Protocol to amend the Warsaw Convention of
1929. Although the Convention was, at the time, considered to
be one of the best agreements dealing with matters of private
intemationallaw, some practical and legal problems had become
evident as aviation expanded rapidly between 1929 and 1955,
necessitating a number of improvements in the original text.
The most conspicuous of all amendments, however, was
that the limit of liability for passengers was increased twofold,
bringing the ceiling limit for compensation up to 250,000 francs
(approximately U.S. $16,600).48 It also added a provision
44

See Id.
. art. 25.

46

See id. art. 22.
See id.
See 1·d . art. 22(1).
See The Hague Protocol, supra note 6, art. Xl. .

45

47
48
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allowing recovery of litigation expenses according to local
law.

49

A very important modification was made in Article 25. In
the original version of the Warsaw Convention, Article 25
stipulated that the carrier cannot have recourse to the provisions
limiting or excluding his liability in the event of damage
resulting from "willful misconduct or by such default on his part
as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct".
The authentic text of the Convention is in the French
language, where the words 'dol' and 'faute ... equivalente au dol'
are used. The English and French texts, however, do not cover
exactly the same concept considering that 'dol' is characterized
by the intention to inflict a specific injury on another person,
whereas in the case of "willful misconduct" the perpetrator must
be aware of his misbehaviour and the potential damage which
may ensue without having necessarily intended to inflict a
specific injury. The definition of "willful misconduct" is wider
than that of 'dol', since it may include cases where no wrong
has intentionally been committed.
See 1·d. art. XIII. The United States did not adopt The Hague Protocol due to its continued
dissatisfaction with the amount of the Protocol's limits. See Matthew R. Pickelman, Draft
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air: The Warsaw
Convention Revisited for the Last Time, 64 J. Air L. & Comm. 274,284 (1998).

49
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In civil law countries there is a strong tradition to treat
'gross negligence' as equivalent to 'dol'.50 In France, however,
the prevailing attitude since 1957 is that the fault equivalent to

'dol 'is the 'jaute inexcusable '(inexcusable fault).51
In common law countries the courts have emphasized the
specific character of "willful misconduct", which is entirely
different from negligence and goes far beyond it, however gross
or culpable the negligence may have been. 52
It should be noted that the term of "willful misconduct" has

caused a confusion of terminology which in turn has led to
varying interpretations by a number of national courts. In the
case of Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines 53 willful
misconduct has been defined as follow:
"Willful misconduct, as the court correctly charged,
depends upon the facts of a particular case, but in order that an
act may be characterized as willful there must be on the part of
the person or persons sought to be charged, a conscious intent to
do or to omit doing the act from which harm results to another,
50

See H. Drion, Limitation of Liabilities in International Air Law, thesis Leiden (the Netherlands,

1(54), para. 179.

See, e.g., Sontag et al. v. Air France et al. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (Ire Ch.), 8
January 1971; [1971] RFDA 176; IATA CALR, No.391. cf. Bornier v. Air-Inter, Tribunal de
Grande Instance de Paris (Ire Ch., 2me Sect.), 27 April 1979; [1979] RFDA 340; Air Law, Vol. IV
979), p. 168.
5~ See G Miller, Liability in International Air Transport (1977), at p. 194 et seq.
Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (1 st Dep.),
16 December 1952; [1952] USAvR 486; IATAACLR, No.12.

P
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or intentional omISSIon of a manifest duty. There must be a
realization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a
disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct. The
burden of establishing willful misconduct rests upon plaintiff."
In Hennessy v. Air France54 it was observed that the pilot's
excessive confidence in his own competence and the soundness
of his equipment must in no way be considered as constituting
gross negligence.
In the case of Gallais v. Aero-Maritime

55

the French court

found that flying too close to the earth's surface was the cause of
the accident and that this low flying constituted "willful
misconduct" according to Anglo-Saxon law, the more so
because the fault was equivalent to 'dol' in French law. On that
ground the carrier was held liable for damages to the heirs of the
deceased in accordance with Article 25 of the Warsaw
Convention.
A recent Spanish case centering on willful misconduct is
Quimica v. Danzas. 56 Here one of the Parcels to be transported
from Barcelona to Moscow had gone missing. The carrier
54

Hennessy v. Air France, Tribunal Civil de la Seine (Ire Ch.), 24 April 1952; [1952] RFDA 199.

AffIrmed: Cour d'Appel de Paris (Ire Ch.), 25 February 1954; (1954) RFDA 45; lATA ACLR,
No.21.
55

Gallais v. Aero-Maritime, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, 28 April 1954; [1954] RFDA 184 [1955] JALC 99.
Esteve Quimica SA v. Danzas SA Espanola, Tribunal Supremo (Sala do Civil), 6 June 1998,
NO.625/1998.
.
56
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invoked the limitation of his liability; the consignee tried to
break the limits by alleging willful misconduct of the carrier.
The Supreme Court held that the lower court had rightfully ruled
that in this case there had been no willful misconduct by the
carrier. It was only a matter of negligence, as Danzas had not
actively caused the loss, nor had the actual loss been foreseeable
considering the material facts.
In view of all these varying interpretations the Hague
Protocol 1955 replaced Article 25 by a new Article stating that
the limits laid down in the Warsaw Convention will not apply if
it is proved "that the damage resulted from an act or omission of
the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would
probably result".57
The advantage of this new rule is that the elements of both
'dol' and 'willful misconduct' are included, while at the same
time 'omission' has been included as a ground for unlimited
liability. In the event of such negligence the claimant is required
to prove that the employee has committed the act within the
scope of his employment.

~~~ also Bin Cheng, "Willful Misconduct: from Warsaw to the Hague and from Brussels to
Pans , Annals of Air and Space Law (1977), Vol. II, pp. 55-102.

57
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1-4. The Guadalajara Convention 1961

When the Warsaw Convention was drafted in 1929, charter
flights played a relatively small part in international air traffic.
No definition of the term 'carrier' was adopted in the
Convention, because it was considered undesirable to hamper
the development of aviation by doing so.
After the Second World War, the number of charter
arrangements increased significantly, which made it urgent to
draw up new rules designed specifically for the purpose. These
rules were laid down in this Supplementary Convention

58

rather

than in a protocol, since it was not a matter of revising old rules;
they extended into an entirely new area not covered by the
Warsaw Convention.
This convention distinguishes between the carner who
concludes the agreement, and the carrier who actually carries it
out wholly or partly, each with his own obligations of liability.
From an analysis of Article III, para. 2, it may be conclude that
the carrier who actually performs the carriage is not liable to the
same extent as the carrier who concludes it. The carrier who
actually performs the carriage can never be held liable for an
S8

See J.w.F. Sundberg, 'The Guadalajara Convention Live from Cyprus', Air Law, Vol. I (1976),
pp.83-98.
.
18

unlimited sum; his liability is restricted to the limits specified in
the Warsaw Convention. On the other hand, his acts, and those
of his employees, may result in unlimited liability for the
contracting carrier.

1-5. The Montreal Agreement 1966

The Montreal Agreement was concluded between a number
of airline companies and the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
United States. It heralded the beginning of a revolutionary
movement aimed at changing the fault liability of the carrier into
a risk liability, a development which eventually led to the
adoption of the Guatemala Protocol of 1971; the four Montreal
Protocols of 1975; and more recently the new Montreal
Convention of 1999.
The Montreal Agreement was intended as a temporary
solution to the impasse caused by the American denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention on 15 November 1965. The Chief cause
of the American move was the 125,000 francs limit, prescribed
for the benefit of the carrier. The United States did not consider
this sum to be commensurate with the compensation paid in
cases involving domestic transport within the USA, where
19

unlimited liability is usually applied. The Hague Protocol had
not been ratified by the USA because even its limits were not
thought to be satisfactory.
According to Article 39, paragraph 2 of the Warsaw
Convention the denunciation would become effective six
months after notification, which would have been on 15 May
1966. 59 The ICAO had already called a meeting to discuss a
revision of the liability limits. This meeting, which took place in
February 1966, produced a resolution requesting the ICAO
Council to convene a diplomatic conference for the purpose of
discussing various proposals concerning maximum liability. In
the meantime, however, lATA carriers had drafted the Montreal
Agreement, which was approved by the United States
Government. Consequently, on 4 May 1966, the United States
requested that its notification of denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention be cancelled. 60
The Montreal Agreement is applicable to all international
flights in which a point within the United States is an agreed
stopping place, point of departure or destination, but only
59

See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 39 (allowing for any of the High Contracting Parties
to denounce the Convention by giving notice to the Polish Government). Denunciation is to take
fJace six months thereafter. See id.
See Nicolas M. Matte, Treatise on Air-Aeronautical Law (1981), pp. 454-471, and D. Cohen,
'Happy Birthday: Agreement CAB 18900: A Critical Review of the Montreal Interim Agreement
and the Authority for its Implementation', Air Law, Vol, VII (1982), pp. 74-91.
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insofar as passengers are concerned. 61 It is not a Protocol
attached to the Warsaw Convention, but a private agreement
between the air carriers and the US Civil Aeronautics Board, as
explained earlier. The United States sought limits of $100,000
per passenger, an amount that other countries believed was
excessive. 62 The two sides finally reached a compromise: the
maximum liability of the carrier has been fixed at US$75,OOO
(US$58,OOO excluding legal fees and costS)63; it is up to the
passengers to take out additional insurance.
Furthermore, in case of death or injury of a passenger, the
carrier can no longer avail himself of the liability limitation
clauses contained in Article 20, para. 1 of the Warsaw
Convention stating that the carrier will not be liable if it proves
that it and its agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible to take such measures. The
plaintiff no longer has to prove that the carrier was at fault, but
only the extent of the injury sustained. 64 Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention concerning unlimited liability in cases of
willful misconduct or gross negligence remains applicable.
61
62

See Waiver of Warsaw Convention Liability Limits and Defenses, 14 C.F.R. sec. 203 (1999).
See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 586-87.
See J.C. Batra, Modernization of the Warsaw System--Montreall999, 65 J. Air L. & Com. 429,
430 (2000). (noting that the compromise is not a convention nor a protocol to the Warsaw
~nvention, but a bilateral agreement).
See Special Notice of Limited Liability for Death or Injury under the Warsaw Convention, 14
C.F.R. sec. 221.175 (1999).
'

63
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1-6. The Guatemala Protocol 1971

The Guatemala Protocol of 1971

65

was signed on 8 March

1971, by 21 nations, including the United States. It is further
addition to the Warsaw system.
However, few states have ratified the Protocol to date. The
Protocol has not yet entered into force 66 because (1) the
ratifications of 30 nations are required and, (2) the scheduled air
traffic of five ratifying states, on aggregate and expressed in
passenger-kilometers, must represent at least 40 per cent of the
1970 total of international scheduled air traffic of the ICAO
member States. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Guatemala
Protocol deserve our close attention because they would have
meant a definite step forward.
The Guatemala Protocol contains some fundamental
modifications, but they affect only the rules of transportation of
passengers and their baggage. Its main feature is a shift of
principle, in that the fault liability at present attaching to the
65
66

Guatemala Protocol, supra note 9.
See Id, art. 14. In order for the protocol to take effect, it needed ratification from thirty
countries, five of which would have to comprise forty percent of international air travel ofICAO
member nations. See id. art. 20(1); see also Frederico Ortino & Gideon R.E. Jurgens, The lATA
Ag~eements and the European Regulation: The Latest Attempts in the Pursuit of a Fair and
Umform Liability Regime forInternational Air Transportation, 64 J. Air L. Com. 377, 384 (1999).
~xPlaining how the U. S. failure to ratify the Protocol effectively defeated the Protocol, given the
.
. S. share of the market).
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carrier will be changed into a risk liability. Accordingly, the
carrier will be liable also in cases where he bears no fault or
blame, for instance in the event of death or injury resulting from
hijacking

0

sabotage. There is, however, an important provision:

carrier liability with regard to passengers and baggage can never
exceed the sum of 1,500,000 francs (about US$100,000)67, not
even when it is proved 'that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, his servants, employees or agents, done
with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result' .68 This limit has been made
mandatory: the 1,500,000 francs are a maximum limit, a limit
not to be exceeded. 69 This amount is, however, subject to
periodical review.
The case for the introduction of fixed limits in the Warsaw
System becomes apparent if one considers the enormous
increase in the risks run by air carriers. Not only has the volume
of air traffic increased sharply, entailing more likelihood of
collisions especially around airports, but also the size of the
aircraft, so that the number of passengers involved in accidents
IS

67
68

now many times higher than was ever dreamt of in 1929.
.

See Id. art. 8.
69 Seeid.art.10
.
M. For a different point of view, see W.J. Hickey Jr., 'Breaking the Limit - Liability for Willful
Isconduct under the Guatemala protocol' [1976] JALC 603-622.
23

Finally, another innovation to be introduced by the Protocol
needs mentioning: Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is to be
amended in such a way that it will become possible to file a suit
in the state of domicile or permanent residence of the claimant if
the defendant carrier has a place of business in that state and is
subject to its jurisdiction.

7o

1-7. The Four Montreal protocols 1975

Four' Additional Protocols' amending the Warsaw System
were adopted by a Diplomatic Conference held in Montreal in
1975.

71

Montreal Protocols No.1, 2, 3 & 4 emerged primarily due
to unstable gold prices in United States dollars.

72

The French

franc was replaced by Special Drawing Rights (,SDR,).73 In
addition, The Hague and Guatemala provisions (absolute
liability with an unbreakable limit, a settlement inducement
clause,

and

a

supplemental

compensation

plan)

were

mcorporated. Although Protocol No.4 primarily concerned the
70
71

See supra note 9, art. 12.
See supra note 10.
. S~e David I. Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Terrific: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability
Lmutations Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 451. Air L & Comm. 653, 677-78

72

~}980).
F The SDR w~s created by the International Monetary Fund and is based on the currencies of
~ance, the Umted Sta~es, Germany, England, and Japan. See Learning Network, Special Drawing
ghts, at http://www.mfoplease.comlCe6/bus/A0846206.html.
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simplification of rules pertaining to cargo liability, it changed
Article 25's willful misconduct term to an 'act or omission' of the
carrier or its agents committed 'with intent to cause damage or
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would result' as the
proof needed to escape the liability limit. 74 Moreover, it
amended Article 24 by clarifying how the Convention precluded
passengers from bringing actions under local law when they
could not establish air carrier liability under the Treaty.75
After the thirtieth ratification, Montreal Protocol No.4 at
last entered into force on 14 June 1998 (i.e., 23 years after its
initial conclusion). Shortly before, on 15 February 1996,
Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 had also become effective. Thus
Protocol No.3 is the only one of the four not to have this status;
it is very questionable whether it will ever enter into force.

1-8. The Montreal Convention 1999

The complicated situation ansmg from the numerous
Protocols caused the Montreal Diplomatic Conference to adopt a
resolution requesting the ICAO Legal Committee to prepare a
consolidated text covering the whole area of the Warsaw System,
74
75

See Montreal protocol No.4, supra note 10, art. 25.
See Guatemala Protocol, supra note 9, art. 24.
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so as to create a measure of uniformity between the Warsaw
Convention and its amendments. 76 This consolidated text
eventually turned out as the Montreal Convention of 1999,
which became effective as of November 4, 2003 and will
replace the Warsaw Convention System among the contracting
states.
Under the Montreal Convention, the carrier is strictly liable
for the first 100,000 SDR77 , but which can be wholly or partly
exonerated by the contributory negligence of the passenger;78
The carrier is not liable for damages in excess of 100,000 SDR
if the carrier proves that the damage was not caused by its
negligence or other wrongful act or omission or that the damage
was solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or
omission of a third party.79 For damages above 100,000 SDR (if
approved), there is no monetary limit on the amount of
recoverable compensatory damages for passenger bodily injury
or death.
Other notable provisions include: automatic review of the
SDR limit every five years;80 the passenger's option of filing
See the Minutes and Documents of the International Conference on Air Law (Montreal, 1975);
~fAO Doc. 9154-LCI174-1 and 174-2.
See supra note 14, art. 21 (1) (describing the system of compensation for death and injury under
~~e 1999 Convention).
79 See id. art. 20 (allowing defendants to assert affmnative defenses).
80 See id. art. 21(2)(a)-(b).
See id. art. 24(1) (listing term limits of liability review).

76
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suit where he or she has a principal place of business and
permanent residence;81 mandatory advance payment obligation
upon carrier in a sum to meet the passengers' 'immediate
economical need'; 82 preemption over claims arising out of
international air travel;83 inflationary adjustment based on the
Consumer Price Index (,CP!'); the right of carriers to stipulate to
higher limits;84 and the right of carriers to have recourse against
third parties.

85

The centerpieces of all these reform efforts have been the
low liability limits, the time consuming and expensive litigation
surrounding claimants' attempts to break the liability limits by
showing willful misconduct on the part of the carrier, and the
belief that the compensatory scheme should allow a passenger to
be compensated according to his or her own country's laws.
However, interestingly, the crucial Article 17 (also the most
concern of the present dissertation, will be discussed in length of
the following Chapters), which governing personal injury claims
under the Warsaw System and the new Montreal Convention
1999 remains the same as it did when the Warsaw Convention

was originally enacted in 1929.
33(2) (providing jurisdictional requirements for actions to bring damages).
See id. art. 28.

81
82

.
See Id.
art.

83
84

See id. art. 29 (setting forth the Montreal Convention as a basis for air carriage claim).

8S

See id. art. 25.
See id. art. 37.
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1-9. But remember insurance

Insurance provides relief for a whole range of liability risks
currently associated with modem society. The purchase of
adequate insurance is a major element in risk management of the
air carriers, since the high market value of aircraft and the great
financial risks involved in aviation. One new wide body aircraft
may cost in the area of US$200,OOO,OOO. The aggregate
liabilities arising out of a major air carrier's liability can be
heavy. Liability reserves for accidents can be in the area of
US$750,OOO,OOO or more.
Ivamy in his Dictionary of Insurance Law defines aviation
insurance as "a type of insurance" covering:
(i)

Loss of or damage to an aircraft;

(ii)

Third party liability;

(iii)

Liability to passengers.

While several important aviation insurance centers exist in
USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland; London is
the most important center of the market. "London Aircraft
Insurance Policy,,86 is a world wide standard policy of aviation
AVN 1e, 21.12.98. (AVN and its number denotes a specific standard clause used in the London
market which may be included in the contract. Various market policy forms, endorsements and

86
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insurance. Most law mentioned thereafter in this chapter comes
from UK law, which applies, to much of the activity of the
market.
In the UK the market consists of:
(i)

Incorporated insurance companies which may be
owned by:
(a)

various shareholders or holding companies;

(b)

a State or other authority.

(ii)

Pools or groupS of insurers trading together under
the same manager.

(iii)

Lloyd's syndicates.

The insurance industry in the UK is regulated by the
Insurance Companies Act 1982 (,,1982 Act") and the Lloyd's
Acts 1871-1982.
The 1982 Act applies mainly to companIes although the
Lloyd's syndicates must also comply with certain of its
provisions. It requires companies and Lloyd's syndicates to
comply with rules on maintenance of solvency margins, auditing
and filing of accounts and other regulatory requirements. It also
applies certain EC Directives.
Subject to the 1982 Act, the Lloyd's Acts 1871-1982

~~ and other clauses are found in Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters Association book Standard
OIICY Forms, Proposal Forms and Clauses Etc. "LAUA Book". The Association expressly makes
no recommendation as to whether or when use of the forms and clauses is appropriate.)
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currently control Lloyd's including the functioning of its council
and the Syndicates. The 1982 Act also regulates insurance
companies whose principal places of business are in other States
both within and outside the EU, and who carryon business in
the UK. Schedule 2 to the 1982 Act classifies four types if
insurance business as falling within "aviation" business:
accident, aircraft, goods in transit and aircraft liability.
The last question is whether insurance is compulsory

III

aviation. The answer is that there is no direct obligation

III

aviation insurance law to arrange for adequate insurance. It
would clearly be unreasonable, however, for an air carrier to fail
to maintain adequate insurance. The Montreal Convention
1999 87 regulates that airlines must maintain adequate insurance.

1-10. The definition of insurance

In order to understand the law of insurance it is necessary
to distinguish it from other contracts. A contract of insurance is
any contract whereby one party assumes the risk of an uncertain
event,88 which is not within his control, happening at a future
87
88

See supra note 14.
c1~ar that the uncertain event need not be adverse to the other party, though in cases other
an certam endowment and annuity policies, such as aviation insurance, it will be. See Gould v.
;urtis [1913] 3 K.B. 84, qualifying the defmition given in the leading case of Prudential
nsurance Co. v. I.R.C. [1904] 2 K.B. 658.

th It IS
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time, in which event the other party has an interest, and under
which contract the first party is bound to pay money or provide
its equivalent if the uncertain event occurs. Several aspects of
this definition merit closer attention:
First, legal entitlement. There must clearly be a binding contract,

and the insurer must be legally bound to compensate the other
party. A right to be considered for a benefit which is truly only
discretionary is not enough.

89

Secondly, uncertainty. Uncertainty

IS

a necessary feature of

insurance. In most cases, the question is whether or not the
event insured against will occur. If it is bound to happen, then
when will it happen?
Thirdly,

insurable interest.

Insurable interest is a basic

requirement of any contract of insurance unless it can be, and is,
lawfully waived. As a general level, this means that the party to
the insurance contract who is the insured or policyholder must
have a particular relationship with the

subj~ct-matter of the

msurance, whether that be a life or property or a liability to
which he might be exposed. The absence of the required
relationship will render the contract illegal, void or simply
unenforceable, depending on the type of insurance. This
89

Medical Defence Union v. Department of Trade [1979] 2 All E.R. 42l.
31

principle was brought several hundred years ago to stop abuse
and/or gambling.
For example, in the case of property insurance such as an
aircraft hull, the insured must show he has a present right to a
legal or equitable interest in the aircraft or right under a contract.
A hirer (bailee) of an aircraft has an insurable interest in his
liability to the person who hires out the aircraft (bailor) for its
loss or damage.

Fourthly, control. It seems essential that the event insured
against be outside the control of the party assuming the risk.
However, no case law has been directly considered on this point.

Fifthly, provision of money s worth. There seems no reason in
principle why it should be necessary for the insurer to have to
undertake to pay money on the occurrence of the uncertain event,
and there is clear authority that the provision of something other
than money is enough, provided that it is of money's worth.

9o

1-11. Proper law of insurance contract

In the English marine hull insurance case of Amin Rasheed

90

Department o/Trade and Industry v. St Christopher s Motorists' Association Ltd. [1974] 1 All
E.R.395.
32

Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Ins Co,

91

Lord Diplock said:

"Contracts are incapable of existing in a legal vacuum. They are
mere pieces of paper devoid of all legal effect unless they were
made by reference to some system of private law which defines
obligations assumed by the parties to the contract."
In respect of direct insurance of aviation risks, choice of
law is left to the parties. In reinsurance the parties are also free
to choose their law under the UK Contracts Act 1990, or the
underlying governing law if not the UK law.
In the absence of choice by the parties the court seised of
the case will have to decide according to its own rules as to the
proper law of the contract.

1-12. Law and practice in the London market

As we already know, aviation risks are substantial. Liability
insurance can be offered to major airlines by the market
sometimes in the area of "US$2,000,000,000, Combined Single
Limit anyone accident". This means that insurance cover is
provided up to that figure in respect of all liabilities arising out
of one accident, thus covering passenger, cargo and third party
91

[1984] AC 50.
33

,

;~

'i

liability. Liability insurance has to provide for the possibility of
a mid-air collision between wide-bodied aircraft full of
passengers over an urban area or installation such as a nuclear
power station.
Therefore, most aviation risks are shared by insurers. In
some States 100 per cent of a major risk may be insured within
that State, for example where the insured is a State enterprise
and the insurer is a State insurance company; however, a
substantial part of such risk will probably be reinsured on the
market. A few risks can be insured with one insurer in one State
which will require no reinsurance, for example certain minor
general aviation risks.
Insurers working in the market both insure and reinsure.
One important role should bear in mind is "insurance brokers".
Risks may only be placed with Lloyd's underwriters by
approved

Lloyd's

brokers.

Brokers

who

are

not

Lloyd's-approved brokers are restricted to placing risks with
msurance companies only. The insurance broker is an
intermediary used to place business in the market. Whether the
broker is the agent of the insured or of the insurer is determined
by domestic law. In the UK the broker is generally the agent of
the insured.
34

English law on insurance contract/policy interpretation and
contractual validity is mostly established by case law. While the
Marine Insurance Act 1906 applies to marine insurance only, it
codifies many common law principles also applicable to other
types of insurance including aviation.92

,
I

II

I

t

1-13. Duty of disclosure

III

In English law a contract of insurance is classified as a
contract of "utmost good faith". The Latin phrase "uberrima

fides" is used to describe the relationship between the insurer
and the insured. This means that the proposer seeking insurance
must disclose all facts relevant to the risk to the prospective
insurers. Such disclosure may be done on the slip, in a proposal,
or by some other document.
Section 18( 1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides
that: "The assured must disclose to the insurer, before the
contract is concluded, every material circumstance which is
known to the insured, and the insured is deemed to know every
cIrcumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to
be known by him."
92

I

i

Highlands Ins Co v. Continental Ins Co [1987]1 Lloyd's Rep 109.
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Scrutton LJ stated in the English case of Rozanes v.
Bowen 93 that "It is the duty of the assured ... to make a full

disclosure to the underwriters without being asked of all the
material circumstances ... that is expressed by saying that it is a
contract of the utmost good faith---uberrima fides". In simple
words, this means that "it is the insured's duty to disclose, not
the insurer's duty to ask".
A material fact is "one which would influence the
judgement of a prudent insurer in deciding whether to assume
the risk, and if so at what premium and on what terms and
conditions" .94
In Lambert v. Co-operative Ins Soc Ltd,95 the English
Court of Appeal held that the duty of disclosure on renewal was
the same as when applying for the original policy; and that the
rules on disclosure in marine insurance were the same as rules in
other forms of insurance.
There are four situations which the insured need not
disclose to the insurer:
(1)

Any fact that reduces the risk (only in legal theory).

(2)

Any fact that the insurer already knows or can be

93
94

[1928] 32 L1 L R 98.
Container Transport International Inc v. Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Assoc (Bermuda) Ltd
~I984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 476, CA.
[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 485.
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presumed to know:
(i)

public knowledge;

(ii)

common notoriety or knowledge in that particular
type of insurance;

(iii)

previous claims in the same insurer (English law is
open to doubt as to this point, the author's view is
that the insured does not have to disclose the
previous claims to the same insurer).

(3)

Any fact regarding which the insurer waives knowledge.
For instance, the insured tells the insurer there is a problem,
but the insurer did not ask for more details, then the court
will assume the insurer did not want to know the fact.

(4)

Any fact which deal with by a term/clause in the insurance
policy. For aviation insurance policy there is an implied
warranty that the aircraft is airworthy when it aviates. In
this circumstance, the insurer does not need the insured to
disclose the aircraft is not airworthy, because if so, the
warranty has been breached, and there is no insurance
covered at all.
Failure under English law to disclose material facts which

could have been ascertained by reasonable inquiry will render
the policy voidable by the insurers. Should an insurer decided to
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end the insurance contract/policy, the end is from the beginning.
Margo points out that while the duty of disclosure usually

terminates when the contract is made, the policy may include a
continuing obligation on the insured during the policy period to
notify any material change in the circumstances or nature of the

II!

risks which are the basis of the contract, though it is always a

I

difficult task to define the meaning of "the change of the nature

I

I

of the risks".
There are different approaches of disclosure around the
world, the main ones as the follows:
(1)

USA. Nearly all US states adopt that there is only

non-disclosure if it is fraudulent non-disclosure. The
burden of proving that it was fraudulent is only on the

[ ~

insurer. In practice, it was very difficult to prove
fraudulent, so most cases in the US there is no duty of
disclosure.
Australia and Belgium. The insured only has to disclose

what a reasonable insured would concern to be a material
fact.
France, Switzerland, Finland and Spain. The insured's

obligation is to answer the questions be asked by the
msurer. Special attention pay to Spain is that during the
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insurance policy period, the insured has to disclose any
increase of the risks to the insurer, which is the only rule
around the world harder than the UK "change of nature of
the risks" rule.
France, Denmark, Finland and Ontario (Canada). These

(4)

countries adopt the Proportionality Rule. For example, if
innocent non-disclosure of x% information, then the
insured will lose x% claim.
(5)

South Africa. In Mutual and Federal Ins Co Ltd v.
Oudtshoohorn Municipality,96 the Appellate Division of

the Supreme Court of South Africa held that while
affirming the basic duty on the part of the insurer and
insured to disclose facts material to the risk, the term
uberrima fides (utmost good faith) is an "alien, vague and

useless expression without any particular meaning in
South African law".

1-14. Misrepresentation under English law

Section 24 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that
"if the insured has made a false or inaccurate representation as
96

[1985] (1) SA419, 433A, cited by Margo.
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to material fact and which induced the insurers to enter into the
contract, the policy will be voidable at the instance of the
insurers. The insurer may waive the requirement to disclose
material circumstances and misrepresentation by the insured.
The non-disclosure or misrepresentation must induce the
insurer to enter into the contract; if it does, the insurer may elect
to avoid the policy and return the premium and until him so
elects, the policy remains in effect, but is voidable.
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1-15. Policy, "the slip" and "cover note"

In present dissertation, "Policy" means a written policy of
insurance, when prepared, which constitutes the contract and
replaces any other written document such as the slip.
"The slip" means a piece of paper which a broker writes
down the details of the risk and the principal terms and
conditions of the insurance cover required by the prospective
insured. These terms and conditions include the risk to be
insured, period of cover, fleet details, the identity of the insured,
the standard clauses, and a reference to the wording to be used
in the policy, premium and commission. In a simple case, the
97

P
.
an AtlantiC Insurance Co Ltd v. Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 581, HL.
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broker selects the insurer and offers the risk to him. When the
termS have been negotiated the contract is concluded and the
policy is issued.
Once the contract has been concluded, the broker may issue
a "cover note" to the insured with details of the insurance which
should reflect what is shown on the slip. The slip is the contract,
the cover note is not.
Where, for whatever reason, there is a conflict between
policy and slip, then it may be necessary to apply to the court for

cc

-

rectification of the policy.

1-16. Reinsurance

The insurer often "lays off' the risk of insurance by
reinsuring part or sometimes all of the risk with other insurers
("reinsurers"). Reinsurers are either Lloyd's underwriters or
special reinsurance companies, two best known reinsurance
companies are Munich RI and Swiss RI.
In practice, such as most aviation insurance, if an insurer
cannot arrange the reinsurance, he will not take the original
Insurance since the high value nature of the business.
Types of reinsurance include the following:
41
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(1)

Reinsurance of a single direct insurance, known as
facultativelback to back/one off reinsurance;

(2)

Reinsurance of a series of risks, known as Treaty
Reinsurance, which made In advance, cover a certain
period of time for certain types of risks or certain amount
of money or combined together;

(3)

Reinsurance of reinsurers, known as a retrocession
agreement. 98
Other forms of laying off the risk include "excess of loss",

being the loss reinsured from a bundle of insurance contracts
above a certain aggregate sum retained by the insurer. Excess of
loss can also relate to only one underlying contract of insurance.
The contract of insurance and the contract of reinsurance are
separate contracts between separate _parties. The reinsurance
may apply the same proper law as the original insurance or its
own proper law. While the London market applies English
contractual rules to an insurance contract, reinsurance contracts
concluded in the market may nevertheless apply the law of the
underlying policy, thus possibly raising a conflict of law
question.
Sometimes in the case of aircraft financing, the underlying

----------------98 H'

19h1ands Ins Co v. Continental Ins Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep 109.
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policy may contain a "cut through" clause which in tum should
be reflected in the reinsurance policy. This requires hull
reinsurers to pay direct the original insured finance company
their entitlement of the hull moneys. Without this arrangement
the finance company as assured would be entitled to claim only
against the original insurers. However, cut-through clauses are
usually subj ect to the domestic law of the original insurance
which sometimes forbids such clauses.
In the case of facultative reinsurance it is quite possible to
have a full insurance policy and then a full form reinsurance
policy. However, often reinsurance is done by way of use the
"same terms and conditions clause", which means make
reinsurance contract subject to same terms and conditions of the
original contract. Are there any limits to operate this clause? The
answer is yes. First, a clause should not be brought down if
which will cause conflicts with the reinsurance contract; 99
second, a clause should not be brought down if which is not
appropriate for reinsurance. 100
Subject to any express provision in the contract, English
law imposes on the reinsured the burden of proving that the
reinsurer is liable to indemnify him.
99--------

Widows Fund v. National Mutual Life ofAustralasia [1914] AC 634.
Home Insurance Co. of New York v. Victoria-Montreal Fire Insurance Co. [1907] AC 59.

100 Australian
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In reinsurance the alternative claims handling procedures
are:
Follow the fortunes/settlements clause, also referred to as

(1)

"Full RI". Which leaves the original insurer free to handle
the claims of the original insured subject to any contractual
obligations imposed by the reinsurance contract. There are
three limits to this clause: 101
(i) this clause applies as long as the case was settled In
honest and business like way;
(ii) the reinsurer does not have to pay "ex gratia" payment
(payout of the policy);
(iii)if the insurer settled the claim and the reinsurer followed
the settlement, then later on turns out that the
insured is guilty of fraud, but the insurer acted in
honest and business like way, the reinsurer has to try
to recover the money from the insured, not the
Insurer.
(2)

Claims cooperation clause (used by EU countries). This

provides that it is a condition precedent to reinsurers'
liability that:
(i) the insured shall upon knowledge of any loss which may
101-------

Insurance Co. ofAfrica v. Scar [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep 541.
44

gIve nse to a claim under this policy advise
reinsurers within seven days; and
(ii) the reinsured shall furnish reinsurers with all information
available and shall cooperate with reinsurers in any
adjustment and settlement (AVN 21).
Claims control clause (used by non-EU countries). It is a

(3)

condition precedent to reinsurers' liability that:
(i) the reinsured shall, upon knowledge of any loss or losses
which may give rise to a claim, advise reinsurers
within 72 hours; and
(ii) furnish reinsurers with all information available and the
reinsurers shall have the right to appoint adjusters,
assessors and/or surveyors and to control all
negotiations,

adjustments

and

settlements

m

connection with such loss or losses (AVN 25).
(4)

Reinsurance and underwriting claims control clause. This

has

more

stringent

provISIOns

additionally

gIVIng

reinsurers the sole right to appoint adjusters, assessors, or
surveyors and/or lawyers and to control all negotiations,
adjustments and settlements in connection with the loss.
No amendment of the original policy shall be binding on
reinsurers without their prior agreement (AVN 41).
45

But the question of which clause has priority has no easy
answer.

In

the

Scar

102

case,

both

"Follow

the

fortunes/settlements clause" and "Claims cooperation clause"
are in the reinsurance contract, the English Court of Appeal held
that "Claims cooperation clause" is more powerful than "Follow
the fortunes/settlements clause". But why? The Court did not
give any persuasive reason, the result can be easily on the
contrary. A hint can be traced that Fox LJ stated: "that does least
violence to the language", the true meaning of his statement is
that, in simple words, "it is a nightmare!"
In practice, which clause should be adopted in the
reinsurance contract depends on the reinsurance premium and
the market conditions.

1-17. Deductible

The deductible is that part of the liability or hull risk which
is retained and paid for by the insured with the insurance cover
being provided only when the liability or loss has reached a
certain amount. Deductibles on hulls can be substantial and the
prospective insured can buy insurance cover for this deductible
102

See note 15, supra.
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exposure.

1-18. Premium and commission

The price paid by the insured for insurance is called the
premium. The amount of the premium should normally be
included in the contract of insurance. It may be included on the
slip. Sometimes the premium may remain "TBA", i.e. "to be
agreed".

..

..•

III

Method of payment depends on the terms of the contract
and market practice. The effect of late or non-payment of the
premium will be dealt with expressly in the insurance contract
or by the governing domestic law.
Premiums for hull insurance are calculated often as a fixed
sum or percentage of the total value of the aircraft. In the case of
passenger liability, the premium can be assessed on an amount
per passenger seat or in the case of airlines on the basis of the
revenue passenger miles flown by the airline. The policy may
require an additional premium to be paid on increase of risk or
for reduction of the premium on certain occasions.
Where the broker is the agent of the insured, his
commission may be deducted from the premium, usually before
47

it is paid. In the London market a Lloyd's broker is liable to the
syndicates for the payment of premium on default by the
insured.

1-19. Subrogation

Subrogation based on the concepts of equity and fairness,
stop the insured to get double indemnity. It is now an implied
term of an insurance contract. This doctrine is widely
recognized and applied in the international community, each
State has its own domestic law on subrogation.
Subrogation in the English law of insurance is "a doctrine
in favour of underwriters or insurers in order to prevent the
insured from recovering more than a full indemnity; it has been
adopted solely for that reason".
It was stated in Castellain v. Preston

1
03:

"Once the insurers

have indemnified the insured under the policy they step into his
shoes in relation to any rights of recovery which may be
available to the insured against third parties."
The English common law doctrine of subrogation applies
to indemnity insurance which includes hull and liability
103--------

[1883] 11 QBD 380.
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insurance. It does not apply in the case of personal accident or
life insurance.
Subrogation takes place automatically when insurers have
admitted and paid the insured's claim. The right is exercisable in
the name of the insured. Conceptually, an insurer cannot bring a
legal action against a third party in his own name because no
legal connection between the insurer and the third party. For
example, if insurers indemnify an airline against passenger
liability claims, they will take over the right of the airline and by
use of the airline's name to make a claim against a third party
such as a manufacturer.
However, if there has been an express assignment of rights
by the insured to insurers then it is very likely that any action
will have to be started by insurers in their own names, since a
fierce and arduous subrogation action in the name of the insured
against a defendant with whom it does business regularly is not
always welcome to the insured.
The insured has an implied duty to assist insurers and not
to prejudice their position. An insured should not take any step
III

respect of a third party which would prejudice the insurer's

subrogation rights.
The principles of subrogation may cover not only the
49

insurer stepping into the shoes of the insured to make a recovery
against a third party, but also the exercise of the insurer of a
right to recover from the insured moneys received by the latter
from the third party in respect of an insured loss already paid by
insurers. In the latter case in English common law the moneys
would be held on trust for the insurers.
Aviation insurance policies often contain a clause setting
out the insurer's rights of subrogation. The court concerned
must apply the applicable domestic law rules of construction in
interpreting an express subrogation clause when the question of
subrogation is already regulated either by the Civil Code, as in
the civi11aw countries, or by legal precedent, as in the common
law countries.
In the case of a major hull subrogation the duties of the
insured to assist its insurers may be extensive and costly, for
example the provision of witnesses, and the production of
evidence and technical

information.

It may save both

misunderstanding and time if these questions are dealt with
expressly in the policy.

1-20. London Aircraft Insurance Policy AVN 1C
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The London Aircraft Insurance Policy AVN 1C is a world
wide standard policy. This policy has four Sections which list
below:
Section I, Loss of or damage to aircraft;
Section II, Legal liability to third parties (other than passengers);
Section III, Legal liability to passengers;
Section IV, (A) General Exclusions applicable to all sections, (B)
Conditions Precedent applicable to all sections, (C) General
Conditions applicable to all sections, and (D) Definitions.
Section III, Paragraph 1, is the most concern of the present
dissertation (Chapter 3, section 3-7, infra), which provides:
"The Insurers will indemnify the Insured in respect of all sums which the Insured
shall become legally liable to pay, and shall pay, as compensatory damages (including
costs awarded against the Insured) in respect of
(a) accidental bodily injury (fatal or otherwise) to passengers whilst entering, on
board, or alighting from the Aircraft and
(b) loss of or damage to baggage and personal articles of passengers arising out of an
Accident to the Aircraft.
Provided Always that (i) before a passenger boards the Aircraft the insured shall take
such measures as are necessary to exclude or limit liability for claims under (a) and (b)
above to the extent permitted by law; (ii) if such measures include the issue of a
passenger ticketlbaggage check, the same shall be delivered correctly completed to
the passenger a reasonable time before the passenger boards the Aircraft.
In the event of failure to comply with these documentary precautions in proviso (i) or
(ii), the liability of insurers under this section shall not exceed the amount of legal
liability which would gave existed had the proviso been complied with."

Some issues within this Section merit closer examination:
First, if "entering" and "alighting" are more limited than "the
COurse of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking"
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, questions may arise on
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the extent of cover if a passenger is injured when crossing the
apron. Furthermore the proviso to paragraph 1 uses the words
"boards the Aircraft". It is hoped that any arbitrator will take a
realistic approach.
Secondly, with regard to baggage and personal articles
referred to in paragraph 1(b) an accident to aircraft is required
while it is not so in the case of the passenger injury cover. In the
policy definitions, "accident" is defined as meaning "anyone
accident or series of accidents arising out of one event".
However, what are the criteria to be an "accident"? In one early
English case 104 it was held that an accident is "an unlooked for
mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed".
The wording suggests that if a passenger entering an aircraft
stumbles on defective embarkation steps, breaking his ankle and
his spectacles, the insured's liability for the ankle but not for the
spectacles will be covered, unless the breaking of the ankle can
be construed as an accident to the aircraft, which is unlikely.
Thirdly, the Policy provides no cargo liability cover which
can be added by agreement.
Fourthly, the proviso requiring Issue of tickets/baggage
checks covers two situations: (a) where the Warsaw Convention
104

Fenton v. J Thorlev & Co Ltd [1903] AC 443.
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or similar provisions in respect to "non-international" carriage
apply; (b) where the Warsaw Convention or such provisions do
not apply. The need to issue a passenger ticket/baggage check
for Warsaw Convention carriage in order to limit liability (the
Montreal Convention gets rid of this prerequisite). To the extent
that a special contract has removed limits of liability for death or
injury then this provision ceases to be of significance as no
doubt the insured will have advised the insurers of the special
contract concerned. However, failure to issue a ticket where
death or injury liability limits have been waived may still result
in an unintentional unlimited liability in respect of baggage or
delay. This could prove expensive for the insured where the
baggage of the oil-rig worker includes an essential drilling
component.
One arbitration case105 concerns not only failure to issue a
ticket where a similar policy requirement applied but also the
question of insurer's agreement by way of policy endorsement
to an increased limit of liability by way of special contract. Such
Increase would have been dealt with in the ticket which was not
issued. The arbitrator held that the insurer's liability extended to
the increased limit.
~-------------N Re Keenair Services Ltd and Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd (Arbitration Re Policy
oA. 8203/218, 29 July 1983).
'
53

In respect of non-Warsaw Convention situations, there may
be some States where it is still possible to limit or exclude
liability in respect of death or bodily injury by contract.
However, this is a diminishing possibility.
Fifthly, the exclusions apply to directors or employees
acting in the course of their employment. Thus the insured is
unlikely to be covered in respect of the death of an in-house
accountant when traveling as a passenger from London to Paris
106
for a meeting with insured's local handling agents.
The
transport of corporate employees is an element in distinguishing
"public transport" and "aerial work" under the ANO.107
Sixthly, Section III is not subject to the Noise and Pollution
and other Perils Exclusion Clause.

1-21. The legal reality in China

Finally, for the concern of the author, in China, aviation
insurance law is very new. Frankly, this area is almost blank.
China is a civil law system country, there is no statute named as
"aviation insurance law" or any other similar title; even in the
106
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See Fellowes (or Herd) and Another v. Clyde Helicopters Ltd (HL, 1997).
UK Air Navigation (No 2) Order 1995 or replacement Order.
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general insurance law, "aviation insurance" contains no mention
at all; in the Chinese Civil Aviation law, there is only one
reference to Article 184, which provides: "Chinese courts should
apply international conventions which China has ratified." From
the perspective of this dissertation, however, which provides no
means to interpret an international convention. The only thing
we have in practice is the "Regulations" issued by the Civil
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), which is the
governmental authority for civil aviation in China. However,
still, this is no contribution as to interpret an international
convention such as the Warsaw Convention or the Montreal
Convention. This situation creates uncertainty, for Chinese
courts, airlines, lawyers, no one is clear what exactly the law is.
To clarify the uncertainty, the proposed dissertation will
concentrate on a comparative analysis of the different
approaches to interpret a multinational convention, especially
the different versions of the crucial Article 17 which governing
personal injury claims. And which version China could
appropriately adopt having regard to Chinese legal reality. By
studying this, the author hopes to be able to make a meaningful
Contribution to the development of Chinese aviation insurance
law.
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CHAPTER TWO

What Constitutes "ACCIDENT" Under the
Warsaw - Montreal System

56

2-1. Introduction

Since 1929, an international aIr carrier's liability for
personal injury and cargo damage has been governed by the
Warsaw Convention. After the Convention's inception, various
issues have emerged regarding the scope and interpretation of
the Convention, especially in light of the modernization and
expansion of air travel. As a result, the Convention has recently
undergone significant changes and reform efforts aimed at
modernizing the liability scheme. The traditionally low liability
limits have been raised, converted into an international market
standard, and tied to inflation. The concept of willful
misconduct to break the monetary limits has been eliminated
with an essentially no-fault based system in place for damage
claims under the new and higher limits, with a pure fault based
system for claims over the established limits. The reforms also
have introduced notions of up-front payments, arbitration, and
mandatory insurance as well as expanded the possible forums to
assert claims.
Despite these changes, however, the fundamental standard
of liability for death and injury claims under the crucial Article
17 remains unchanged, which provides:
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"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."

Accordingly, if a passenger would process a personal injury
claim against an international air carrier, the very first thing the
passenger has to establish is there was an "accident" within the
meaning of the Article 17. But what exactly the word "accident"
means, the Warsaw Convention and the new Montreal
Convention do not define.
It is fairly universal that the goal in the interpretation of

any instrument is to effectuate the intent of the parties.

108

Treaty

interpretation IS no different. According to the Vienna
Convention,109 'a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its obj ect and purpose.' 110 The basic
rules include the need to uphold the purposes of the treaty and
give meaningful effect to the signature or intent behind the
See Choctaw Nation ofIndians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,431-32 (1943) (describing the
reliance on facts surrounding the treaty, along with parties' understanding and intent, as
~po~ant factors in treaty interpretation).
VIenna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. The United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention. See Chubb &
~ons v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 2000). It nonetheless is used as a guide to
mtemational treaty interpretation as it is a codification of customary international law. Id. (citing
Maria Fran Kowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts,
~I~ Va: J. Int'l L. 281,286 (1988).
VIenna Convention, supra note 109, art. 32; see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)
(emphasizing that interpretation of a treaty requires one to commence 'with the text of the treaty
and the context in which the words are used.'). In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,
534 (1991), the Court interpreted Article 17's 'bodily injury' requirement and held that it does not
encompass mental injuries.
.

108

~ourt's
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treaty. 111 Upon examination of the treaty's text and the context
in which the words are used,112 particularly with respect to
uncertain or ambiguous areas, one can resort to the 'history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties.' 113 Notions of liberality and good
faith 114 are also commonly invoked, as is the interpretation of
sister signatories' courtS.

115

According to the U. S. Supreme

Court, as the 'travaux preparatoires' of the Warsaw Convention
are published and are generally available to litigants, courts will
frequently refer to these materials to resolve ambiguities in the
text. 116

With

Article

17,

III

particular,

the

'travaux

preparatoires,' context, and post-ratification conduct are crucial,
given that the article is 'stark and undefined.' 117
Notably, the draft convention initially presented to the
Warsaw delegation by CITEJA made air carriers liable 'in the
case of death, wounding or any other bodily injury suffered by a
traveler,' 'in the case of loss, damage or destruction of goods or
baggage,' or 'the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or
111

See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 531 (describing the need to consider signatory conduct in interpreting
parties'
intent) .
112
113 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 397 (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53-54 (1963)).
114 See Choctaw, 318 U.S. at 432.
115 See Vienna Convention, supra note 109, art. 32.
. See Saks, 470 U.S. at 404 (emphasizing the importance of opinions and the conduct of
~}~atories in interpreting treaties).
117 See id. at 400.
S J~ice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries
ustamed Within a Terminal, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 369, 388 (1976).
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baggage.' The liability scheme did not textually include any
requirement of causation and made no mention or reference to
'accident.' Liability was likewise the same for personal injuries
and damage to goods or baggage.

118

Pursuant to this initial draft,

Article 22 permitted the carrier to avoid liability by proving it
had taken reasonable measures to avoid the damage.

119

The minutes to the Convention establish that the term
'accident' itself was never discussed, but simply appeared in
final form as revised by the drafting committee at the
Convention.

120

While there is no information as to why or when

this occurred, the wording remains exactly the same today as it
was then. Notably, the term 'accident' previously appeared in an
early draft convention prepared by CITEJA directed toward
liability of carriers for damage or injury caused to 'person or
objects' on the ground. 121 Under this draft, liability was imposed
118 See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 264-265 (R.
Homer ed. & D. Legrez transl., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes], (listing liability of the
~~er as adopted by CITEJA in May 1928).
120 See Warsaw Convention, art. 22.
. See 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 118, at 267 (using the term 'accident' in discussing the
l~~bility of third party carriers).
See John 1. Ide, The History and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee
of Aerial Legal Experts (C.I.T.E.J.A.), at 46,31. Air L. & Com. 27, 32, 36 (1932) (describing the
work of the CITEJA on the Warsaw Convention). CITElA was charged with writing a draft
convention, which would then be addressed at the international conference. See id. at 31 . At the
First Session of CITElA on May of 1926, members identified and divided a set of problems to
~tudy among four Commissions within the CITEJA group. See id. at 32 . The problems were
Identified as follows:
First COmmission: (1) Nationality of aircraft; (2) aeronautical register; (3) ownership,
~o-ownership, construction, and transfer; (4) vested rights, mortgages, privileges and seizure.
1 ec~nd Commission: (1) Category of transport (commercial transport, touring, etc.); (2) bill of
oadmg; (3) liability of carrier towards consignors of goods and towards passengers; (4) jettison of
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where the injury or damage was 'caused by aircraft,,122 which is
referenced in the draft as an 'accident' .123 Further, liability was
limited to the value of the aircraft, and the carrier could not be
held liable where the damage was caused 'by any person on
board the aircraft' who acted 'intentionally by some act which
had nothing to do with the operation of the aircraft and without
the operator or his staff being able to prevent the damage.,124
Finally, the draft allowed the monetary limits to be exceeded if
the 'damage was caused by his fault.,125 This history is
informative, as the use of 'accident' by CITEJA was limited, tied
to aircraft operation and modified by concepts of fault.

.'111
:i

One can hardly disagree with the U. S. Supreme Court's
description of Article 17 as 'stark and undefined.,126 The plain or
ordinary meaning of 'accident' or, 'l'accident', is certainly similar
under both English and French usage, and references an
unexpected, fortuitous, or untoward event or happening. What it
includes within its ambit, however, remains in question, as the

cargo and general damage; and (5) renting of aircraft. Third Commission: (1) Damage and liability
toward third parties (landing, collision, and jettison); (2) limits of liability (contractual limitation,
abandonment); and (3) insurance. Fourth Commission: (1) Legal status of commanding officer
and crew; (2) accidents to the crew and insurance; (3) status of passengers; (4) law governing acts
~~mrnitted aboard aircraft. Id. at 33.
123 Id. at 46, art. 1.
124 Id. at 47, arts. 5-6.
125 Id. at 46, art. 2(b).
126 Id. at 47, art. 8.
See Cousins, supra note 117, at 388.
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context in which it is used is what gives the term meaning.

127

Since the initial elimination of the international carrier's due
diligence defense, beginning in 1966, the meaning and intent of
'accident' has been under great strain. Moreover, it is now clear
that the Convention provides the exclusive remedy for claims
arising out of international air travel. This has further intensified

as to disturbances or incidents arising out of modern air travel.

c(

2-2. "Accident" is an "unexpected or unusual event or

..

the debate over the scope and meaning of Article 17, especially

happening external to passenger"

Then how to define the word "accident" in the Warsaw
Convention Article 17. The leading US case is Air France v
Saks,128 which also has a world-wide effect. In this landmark
case, the US Supreme Court defined "accident" as an
"unexpected or unusual event or happening external to
passenger", and this definition has been readily adopted by other
countries with virtually no analysis.
Air France v Sak/

29

See Maximov, 373 U.S. at 53-54 (commenting that words used in treaties are to be interpreted
on the context in which they are used).
129 470 U.S. 392, 105 S. Ct. 1338,84 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1985).
See id.

127

?2~sed
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-.....

Ms. Saks was a passenger on an international flight
between France and Los Angeles, California.

13o

As the aircraft

descended, Ms. Saks felt extreme pressure and pain in her left
ear 131 and suffered permanent deafness as a result. 132 It is
important to note, however, that she did not base her claim on
abnormal operation of the aircraft, but conceded that the cabin
depressurization was functioning properly at the time.
Despite this

fact,

Ms.

Saks

claimed that the

133

normal

pressurization changes during descent caused her deafness and
constituted an accident under Article 17.

134

She argued that

"accident" should be defined as a "hazard of air travel," and that
her injury had indeed been caused by such a hazard.
The District Court ruled that Ms. Saks could not recover
under Article 17, as she could not demonstrate some
malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's operation.
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.

136

135

On

The Court held that a

showing of a malfunction or abnormality in the aircraft's
operation was not a prerequisite to liability under the
130
131
132

See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
See id
Id. .

133

See id. (stating that 'all the available evidence, including the post flight report, affidavits, and
passenger testimony, indicated that the aircraft's pressurization system had operated in the usual
manner')
134
' ..
135 See Id, at 395.
Id.
136
See Saks, 724 F.2d at 1384.
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Convention.137 According to the Ninth Circuit, an accident is
defined as 'an occurrence associated with the operation of
aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards
the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked ... ,138 Thus, under this definition, a normal cabin
depressurization qualifies as an accident. Central to the Ninth
Circuit's analysis was its reliance on the 'history and policy' of
Annex 13 to the Convention on International Aviation and the
Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966, which, according to the
Court, allowed 'accident' to be equated with 'occurrence.,139
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth
Circuit's decision. The court stated that Air France is liable to
the passenger under the terms of the Warsaw Convention only

if

the passenger proves that an "accident" was the cause of her
injury.140 The narrow issue presented is whether respondent can
meet this burden by showing that her injury was caused by the
normal operation of the aircraft's pressurization system. The
proper answer turns on interpretation of a clause in an

137

See id. at 1396 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit based its decision on the Montreal
view, which imposes absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by
jWerent risks in travel).
139 Id, at 1385.

~greement's

140

Id.

I See MacDonald v. Air Canada. 439 F.2d 1402 (CAl 1971); Mathias v. Pan Am World Airways,
~ 53 F.R.D. 447 (WD Pa.1971). See also Shawcross & K. Beaumont, Air Law VII(147) (4th ed.

84); D. Goedhuis, National Airlegislations and the Warsaw Convention 199 (1937).
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international treaty to which the United States is a party.141 The
general rule is a court should rely on the text of the Convention,
the negotiating history of the Convention, the conduct of the
parties to the Convention, and the weight of precedent in foreign
and American courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that Article 17 imposes
liability for injuries to passengers caused by an "accident,"
whereas Article 18 imposes liability for destruction or loss of
baggage caused by an "occurrence." This difference in the
parallel language of Articles 17 and 18 implies that the drafters
of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean
something different than the word "occurrence," for they
otherwise logically would have used the same word in each
142
artic1e.
And the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which
caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the

passenger's injury. In Article 17, the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention apparently did make an attempt to discriminate
between "the cause and the effect"; they specified that air
carriers would be liable if an accident caused the passenger's
141

See Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States. 318 U.S. 423, 431-432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 677-678,
87 L.Ed. 877 (1943). (Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to
ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
~~gotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.)
In See. Goedhuis, supra note 139, at 200-201; M. Milde, The Problems of Liabilities in
temational Carriage by Air 62 (Caroline UniV.l963).
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injury. The text of the Convention thus implies that, however we
define "accident," it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy
the definition rather than the occurrence of the injury alone.

143

Finally, the court concluded that liability under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is
caused by "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger." Thus, when the injury indisputably
results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, it has not been
caused by an accident, and Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
cannot apply. The court admonished that this definition should
be flexibly applied after assessment of all the circumstances
surrounding a passenger's injuries, that the inquiry should
address 'the nature of the event which caused the injury rather
than the care taken by the airline to avert the injury;' and that the
passenger need only prove 'that some link in the chain was an
unusual and unexpected event external to the passenger.' 144
Further, the Court considered the inquiry to be 'an objective one,
which does not focus on the perspective of the person
experiencing the injury.d 45
143

American jurisprudence has long recognized this distinction between an accident that is the

cause of an injury and an injury that is itself an accident. See Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
~ 291 U.S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 78 L.Ed. 934 (1934).
145

See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393.
Id, at 392.
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]§eng v El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. 146

Recognizing the Supreme Court m Saks, the

appellate

court in Tseng stated that not every identifiable incident or
occurrence during a flight is an accident within the meaning of
Article 17 even if the incident or occurrence gives rise to an
injury. The appellate court thus declared, "accident" does not
include the normal operation of the aircraft or the procedures
followed by the airline personnel in the normal course of air
travel, although they may cause illness in a passenger, noting the
Supreme Court's statement in Saks that an injury has not been
caused by an accident when indisputably results from the
passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and
expected operation of the aircraft. The court explained that the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not aim to impose close
to absolute liability for an individual's personal reaction to
routine

operating

procedures,

measures

that,

although

inconvenient and embarrassing, are the price passengers pay for
airline safety.
Australia followed the US Supreme Court's interpretation
of "accident" in the Warsaw Convention Article 17. In the case

146

C 122 F.3d 99, 147 A.L.R. Fed. 783 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 155, 119 S.
t. 662, 142 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1999).
.
67

of povey v Qantas Airways Ltd 147, the High Court of Australia
held that "accident" is a concept which invites two questions:
first, what happened on board (or during embarking or
disembarking) that caused the injury of which complaint is
made, and secondly, was what happened unusual or unexpected.
The UK also agrees the US definition of "accident". In the
case of Chaudhari v British Airways plC,148 the UK Court of
Appeal determined that a passenger, who was already suffering
from a left-sided paralysis and who was injured when he fell as
he tried to leave his seat, did not suffer an "accident" that fell
within Article 17 of the Convention. Leggatt LJ emphasized that
the word "accident" focused attention on the cause, rather than
the effect of the accident, and should be contrasted with Article
18 of the Convention (covering loss and damage to baggage)
which refers to the "occurrence" which caused the damage. The
word "accident" was not to be construed by reference to the
passenger's peculiar condition, but was properly to be defined as
something external to the passenger.
Canada also followed this approach, in the case of Quinn v.
Canadian Airlines Int'l Ltd. 149 , Canadian court relying on Saks'
147
20
2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005), affinning QANTAS Ltd v. Povey, 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA
~3), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (RCA 2004) and Affirmed by, 2005
148 1460709 (RCA 2005).
149 [1997] Times 7May 1997 (Apr. 16, 1997).
[1994] 18 O.R.3d 326.
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holding that turbulence was not considered an accident under
the Warsaw Convention.
The only doubt as to this worldwide standard interpretation
of "accident" in the Warsaw Convention is the "external"
requirement. Prior to the decision of the US Supreme Court in
Saks, a number of courts expressed the view that an "accident,"
as that term is used in Article 17, must be an unexpected or
unusual happening without requiring the event to be external to
the passenger. 150 And the Australia Povey case expressed this
concern as well. The concurring opinion in Povey noted that the
US Supreme Court insisted that the "accident" must be external,
however, there is not a lot of textual support in the Warsaw
Convention for this conclusion. On the contrary, the text of
Article 17 uses the word "accident" as the necessary cause of the
"damage so sustained." Thus, arguably, if such "damage" were
sustained by an internal "accident" (should that be possible) so
long as it happened "on board the aircraft" or "in the course of'
the specified "operations," that would be enough. In the
concurring opinion's view, the happening or event in such
special and temporal circumstances would be sufficient to attract
the liability of the carrier.
~---------------

R See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also
-.!!l!man v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 142 Misc. 2d 445, 471 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup 1983).
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Even in the Saks, why an event must be "external" to
qualify as an "accident" has not been clearly reasoned. For the
author's view, this prerequisite of Article 17 accident arises from
the court's desire to reduce the trouble of proof, since under the
modem science, it is extremely difficult to prove "internal
accident" which connects to the air travel, such as the DVT
cases, infra.

2-3. Interpret "accident" under the pressure of the Warsaw
Convention's exclusivity

After the US Supreme Court In Saks, provided a rather
narrow definition of "accident,,,151 the plaintiffs were able to
bring state law claims separate from a Warsaw Convention
claim. As a result, the plaintiffs often argued for a narrow
definition of "accident" so as to avoid the dollar limits on a
carrier's liability as well as the two-year limitations period under
the Warsaw Convention and, conversely, carriers generally
argued for a broad definition of accident to take advantage of the
Warsaw Convention's limits on liability. When the Supreme

See McCarthy, 56 F.3d at 316, (this restraint is entirely understandable as Article 17 provides
or strict liability and there are sound policy reasons to confme that liability to the letter of the text,
narrowly construed.)

151

fi

70

Court decided EI Al Israel Airlines v Tseng

l52

, which made the

Warsaw Convention's exclusivity significant, the parties traded
arguments. Airlines typically argue for a narrow definition of
"accident" because if an incident is not an accident, there is no
other basis for recovery. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, try to get a
broader definition of accident applied to encompass their
particular situation.

153

Since recovery for personal injury if not

allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is not
available at all, 154 courts usually interpret the meaning of
"accident" in a broad fashion after Tseng.
Given that the fundamental purpose of the Warsaw
Convention was to provide a uniform system of rules, the
delegates certainly believed the Convention would have a
substantial preemptive scope. The issue was to what extent the
Convention would have preemptive power, given that the
Convention incorporated express reference to local law in many
of its provisions. 155 Indeed, the Convention expressly provided
for resort to local law, based on the forum's choice of law rules,
on such issues as recoverable damages,156 contributory or
152
153

525u.s. 155.

See Louie v. British Airways, Ltd., 2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003).
See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996) (holding that Article 17 of
the Convention permits compensation only for legally cognizable harm recognized under domestic
law).
154
155

156

See Warsaw Convention, arts.

17-19

(prQviding carrier liability for damages relating to
71

.
comparatIve
neg l'1gence,
procedure,

159

157

award of costs,

158

Issues of

calculation of the limitation period,

definition of willful misconduct.

160

and

161

The original text of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
provides as follows:
"1. In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
Convention.
2. In cases covered by article 17, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also
apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the right
to bring suit and what are their respective rights."

The Montreal Convention 1999, Article 29 provides:
"In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only
be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this
Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive,
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable."

By adding ' ... whether under this Convention or in contract
or in tort or otherwise ... [and] .. .In any such action, punitive,
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be
recoverable.' the drafters made the preemptive scope of the

pgsonal. injury, checked baggage, and transportation delay).
See Id. art. 21 (stating that the court to which a claim was submitted may exempt carriers from
liability in accordance with their own law where a carrier proves that damage was caused in whole
?5rg in par: by the injured party).
See Id. art. 22 (setting forth maximum amounts of liability for recoverable damages, and
providing that the form of payments be governed by the law of the court to which the claim was
submitted)
159
.
.See id. art. 28 (establishing that procedural questions be determined by the law of the court to
~~ch the claim was submitted).
See id. art. 29 (providing a two year statute of limitations to be calculated according to the law
?6~the court to which the claim was submitted).
r ~~e Warsaw Convention, art. 25 (stating that provisions which exempt or limit a carrier's
lIabIlity are not available to carriers who have demonstrated willful misconduct as defined by the
aw of the court to which a claim was submitted).
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Conventions expressly clear that the Conventions preclude
passengers from bringing actions for bodily injury, delay in
cargo or baggage damages under local law, provide an exclusive
remedy even in instances where the international passenger
could not establish liability under the Conventions.
Before the adoption of the Montreal Protocol No.4 (came
into force in 1998 world widely, and became effective in the US
in March of 1999), which similar to the Montreal Convention
1999 Article 29, Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention created a
court split on whether the language and/or purpose of the
Convention precluded a claimant from resorting to local law
remedies. 162 The debate was resolved in January 1999 by the
Supreme Court in EI Al Israel Airlines, Inc. v. Tseng 163 and the
U. S. Senate's adoption of the Montreal Protocol No.4 in March
of 1999. 164
Prior to Tseng, courts in both the United Kingdom and
162

See Krvs v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515,1518 n.8 (11th Cir. 1997)(recognizing
a circuit split on whether the Warsaw Convention preempts state law). Compare Abramson v.
Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that the Warsaw Convention does not
preclude passengers unable to recover under the Warsaw Convention from pursuing state law
remedies), and Beaudet v. British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062, 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(en~merating the number of cases which exemplify the divergence of views over whether a
clalffiant's failure to satisfy terms under the Convention precludes a claimant's recovery under state
law), with Fishman v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that all state
law claims falling within provisions of the Warsaw Convention are preempted by the Convention),
and Potter v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Warsaw
Convention created an exclusive remedy for claims resulting from personal injury accidents
~~oard an aircraft, precluding resort to state claims).
164 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
S See 144 Congo Rec. S11059 (Sept. 28, 1998). The Protocol entered into force in the United
tates on March 4, 1999.
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Canada found the Warsaw Convention to be exclusive. In the
case of Sindu v. British Airways, PLC,165 the English court
stated that the purpose of Article 17 is 'to prescribe the
circumstances, that is to say the only circumstances, in which a
carrier will be liable in damages to the passenger for claims
arising out of his international carriage by air.' In the case of
Naval-Torres v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

166

, the Canadian court

stated that claims under the Warsaw Convention are exclusive.
The court read Article 24's reference to 'cases covered under
Article 17' to mean those cases within the Convention not
covered by Article 18 (baggage) and Article 19 (delay), rather
than distinguish between incidents of personal injury that are or
are not within the provisions of the Convention.
El Al Israel Airlines. Inc. v. Tseng

167

In Tseng, the US Supreme Court made it clear that recovery
for personal injury suffered 'on board an aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking,' if not
allowed under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, is not
available at al1. 168 The Court's emphasis on the Convention's
'comprehensive scheme of liability rules' and goals of
165
166
167
168

[1997] 1A.c. 193,207.
[1998] 159 D.L.R. 4th 67, 76.
See Supra note 163.
See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
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uniformity169 enabled it to conclude that allowing air carriers to
be subject to 'distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the
individual signatory nations' would be an unreasonable
construction of the Convention.

170

The Court also based its

opinion on the consideration that a nonexclusive interpretation
of liability under the Convention might encourage plaintiffs to
attempt to opt out of the Convention's liability scheme where
local laws provided maximum limits of liability above those
available under the Convention.

l71

The Supreme Court made clear, however, that the exclusive
effect of the Convention was not all-encompassing, by stating
that 'the Convention's preemptive effect on local law extends no
further than the Convention's own substantive scope.' 172 As
such, a carrier is subject to liability under local law for injuries
arising outside of the air transportation or 'any of the operations
of embarking' or 'disembarking.'
Then Warsaw Convention Articles 17 and 24 have a
symbiotic relationship. That is, whether or not an event is an
accident can conclusively determine whether the claimant will
169

See id. at 169, (stating that it would be difficult to conclude that delegates to the Convention
to subject air carriers to non-uniform local laws, given the textual emphasis on
~lformity and the vast scope of the Conventions liability rules).
171 Id, at 171.
172 Id.
See id. at 172 (citing Brief for the United Sta~es as Amicus Curiae 16).
.

mt~nded
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have any remedy at all. 173 After Tseng, and the adoption of the
Montreal Protocol No.4, only a limited number of courts have
addressed the parameters of the Convention's exclusivity. Under
the instruction of Tseng and the terms of the Convention, the
Convention precludes any resort to alternative law, where the
injury arose out of the international flight or out of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking, regardless of whether
the event constitutes an accident.

174

The few courts that have

addressed the scope of the Convention's exclusivity since Tseng
generally have done so in a relatively broad fashion.
Courts have been mindful of Tseng's admonition that to
allow parties to pursue claims covered by the Convention would
'encourage artful pleading by plaintiffs seeking to opt out of the
Convention's liability scheme when local law promised recovery
in excess of that prescribed by the Convention.' So long as the
underlying event arises out of or occurred during the aIr
transportation or process of embarking or disembarking, the
courts were careful not to allow the Convention to be
circumvented. 175 As two recent decisions held in separate
17~3- - - - - - - -

See Asher v. United Airlines, 70 F. Supp. 2d 614,617 (D. Md. 1999) (asserting that plaintiffs
W'~t establish the incident as an 'accident' in order to recover damages under the Convention).
C See .id, (noting that the Supreme Court found that 'the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw
tr onvention... is to achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air
I7~Sportation).

See Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
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scenanos, 'the precipitating cause of 'the accident' cannot be
artificially separated from its results in order to avoid the
Warsaw Convention.' 176 In Choukroun v. American Airlines
Inc./ 77 for instance, various state claims such as false arrest,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and negligence arose
out of the diversion of the flight and the plaintiffs removal as a
result of a purported smoking incident. The event at issue took
place during the flight and, regardless of whether it constituted
an 'accident' or the fact that the arrest and prosecution came later,
was not sufficient to elude the Convention's exclusivity. 178
Courts have found a wide range of claims to be preempted,
including claims for breach of contract, negligence, false arrest,
false

imprisonment,

civil

rights,

malicious

defamation, deceit, assault, and battery.
statutory

claims

of

discrimination

179

have

prosecution,
Even federal
been

found

preempted. 180 Contract claims found preempted include those
176

See Laor, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 347; Cruz, 193 F.3d at 531 (holding that fraud and deceit claims
were preempted, as 'the relationship between the occurrence that [caused the] injuries is so closely
related to the loss of luggage itself as to be, in a sense, indistinguishable from it.'). In Choukroun,
the issue was whether the incident was an 'accident', as plaintiff did not assert a claim under the
Convention and any such claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations under the
Convention. See Choukroun v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 98-12557-NG (D. Mass. Aug. 2,2000)
~~fder granting defendant's motion for summary judgment).
178 See id.
Id.
179
See Asher, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 619 (preempting claims for defamation, false arrest and assault
under state law, based on disturbances over seat assignments and detention by airline service
employees); Herrnano, 1999 WL 1269187, at *5-6 (holding that defamation and other willful or
~~gk1ess acts were preempted under Warsaw).
(h S~e Turturro v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
olding that a discrimination claim under Air Carrier Access Act was preempted).
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arising out of damages for delays, 181 loss of luggage,182 or
failure to transport due to removal or diversion.

183

The only

means of escaping the Convention's preemptive scope is to
establish that the claim arises out of an event that did not take
place during the transportation or the process of embarking or

bark·mg. 184
·
d1sem
The US Supreme Court's decision in Tseng, the adoption of
Montreal Protocol No.4, and the came into force of the Montreal
Convention

of

Warsaw-Montreal

1999

all

system

expressly
provides

indicate

an

that

exclusive

the

remedy

supplanting resort to local law remedies. The issue that emerges
is what effect the exclusivity will play in the Court's
interpretation

of the

liability rules

of the

Convention,

particularly Article 17. 185 Given that claimants will have no
lSI See Perralta v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. C 98-1252, 1999 WL 193393, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 1999) (stating that a breach of contract claim for delay resulting in the loss of a business
deal was governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention); Minhas v. Birnan Bangladesh Airlines,
1999 WL 447445, at **2-3 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999) (stating that claims arising from delay due to
'bumping' were governed by the Warsaw Convention); Daniel v. Virgin At!. Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d
986,989 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that passengers' inconvenience as a resulting delay was a
legally cognizable harm under the Convention); Obuzor v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, No. 98
~IV: ?224, 1999 WL 223162, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16,1999) (holding that the Convention imposes
~~b111ty upon carriers for damages caused by delay in transportation of passengers).
See Spanner v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C 97-2972, 1998 WL 196466, at **2-3 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 22, 1998) (holding that the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable to a loss of luggage because
of the liability provision, Article 18( 1), which requires that a loss of baggage take place during air
transport); see also Cruz, 193 F.3d at 530 (stating that a common law claim for fraudulent denial
?s;lost luggage was preempted by the Warsaw Convention).
1 See Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (describing a passenger's detainment and deportation during
I~rover).

See id. at 968 (holding that plaintiffs causes of action are governed by Articles 17, 18, and 19,

~d must be established to support preemption under the Convention).

Noteworthy is the remaining question of whether a state law claim can be asserted where there
was no accident, but the injury was caused by the willful or intentional conduct of the carrier. See
78

remedy for personal injuries suffered during international flights,
or in the course of operations of embarking or disembarking, if
they cannot establish an 'accident' or 'bodily injury,' courts may
be more inclined to broadly apply the Convention's liability
prerequisites. Indeed, the Court in Tseng could have arguably
foreshadowed such a

result when it stated, in dicta, that it

disagreed with the lower court's conclusion, which was not
before the Supreme Court, that the routine security search to
which Ms. Tseng was subjected was likely an 'accident.,186

Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. EI Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, 14 Am.
U. Int'l L. Rev. 1245, 1273 (1999) (arguing that 'in light of the unequal positions between air
carriers and passengers, an injured party denied recovery under Article 17 should be allowed
recovery under the willful misconduct exception set forth in Article 25.'). Virtually all lower courts
that have addressed this issue have found that Article 25 only comes into play if an Article 17
accident is established. See EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating that Tseng mistakenly asserts that EI AI's conduct is 'willful misconduct' under Article 25
and, therefore, constitutes an 'accident' as defmed under Article 17); Brandt v. American Airlines,
Inc., No. C 98- 2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2000) (holding that Article
25 does not provide an independent cause of action under local law when willful misconduct is
alleged); McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(stating that the Eleventh Circuit previously held that Article 25 does not create a separate cause of
action from Article 17); Carey v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175 (D. Or. 1999)
(concluding that plaintiff must assert a valid Article 17 claim before reaching a claim under Article
25); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that 'Article 25 is
most reasonably interpreted as an exception to the Convention's limitations on the recovery of
compensatory damages, not as authority for a form of damages not permitted elsewhere in the
Convention.'). Further, the concern that, without such a reading of Article 25, carriers cannot be
held accountable for intentional torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment, is simply
ill-founded; accidents cover both negligent and intentional conduct of the carrier. See Laor v. Air
~rance, 31 F. Supp. 2d 247, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that an 'accident' can occur from an
mappropriate or unintended happenstance' during aircraft operation). If the carrier's agent
cOmmits an intentional tort, then the conduct would clearly be an abnormal aircraft operation and
~expected event rendering the carrier liable.
See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 166 n.9. (defining 'accident' under Article 17 as an 'unexpected or
~us~al event or happening that is external to the passenger'). Apparently, Ms. Tseng gave
IllogIcal' responses to routine questions during screening and was classified as a 'high risk'
passenger. See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101. She was thus subjected to a security search pursuant to the
carrier's security procedures, taken to a private room, and searched. See id. at 163, 164. She was
required to remove her jacket and sweater, and lower her blue jeans. See id. A female security
gtlard searched her entire body, including her breasts and her groin area. See id. The search was
f.ur~~ant to standard procedures and, thus, was not an abnormal operation necessary for Article 17
labIlity. See id. Of course, if the claimed 'illogical' answers that formed the basis for the search
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The aftermath of Tseng clearly show the effect, only very a
few cases have interpreted an incident was not an "accident"
after Tseng. Some scholars heavily criticize this broad approach
to interpret Article 17's "accident", say that this approach failed
to include Article 17 within its purview and contrary to the
drafters' intention, which render international air carriers nearly
as virtual insurers to air travel passengers. However, for the
author's view, the Warsaw-Montreal system is intended to
provide uniform rules of international air carriers' liability that
are suitable to modern civil aviation, and the advantages of the
Conventions' exclusivity are commonly understood. Meanwhile,
in the event of an unfortunate occurrence that contributes to the
injury of a passenger, international air carriers are in the best
positions to manage (through insurance) and/or prevent
unfortunate occurrences. Accordingly, in the light of the
Conventions' exclusivity, the author concerns with the courts'
broad interpretation of the meaning of Article 17's "accident",
so long as this interpretation does not render air carriers as real
insurers. Finally, no matter which side you stand for, the strong
suggestion is the readers of this Chapter should pay close
attention to the cases which after the 1999 Tseng case, since
Were false, then an accident would exist, as it would constitute an abnormal operation and
deviation from standard procedures. See id. at 158 (stating that a security search of a passenger
based solely on 'suspicion of circumstances' subjects the carrier to liability under Article 17).
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those

cases

show

the

up-to-date

trend

of worldwide

interpretation of Warsaw-Montreal system's "accident".

2-4. Relation of event to inherent risks of air travel or
aircraft operations

It

IS

comparatively

easy

understanding

and

less

controversial that an event is a Warsaw-Montreal system
"accident" when such an event arising out of risk characteristic
of air

travel

and

aircraft

operations.

However,

more

controversially is that when accident has no relation to risk
characteristic of air travel but connect with aircraft operations.
Furthermore, the most debated ones are the cases which accident
arising out of neither the inherent risks of air travel nor to
aircraft operations, as discussed infra.
Whether a Warsaw Convention Article ITs "accident"
must involve a 'risk inherent or characteristic to air travel'?
While the exact origins of this debate are not particularly clear,
including whether it is meant to be synonymous with aircraft
operation, it is derivative of the drafters' intent to have the
Convention pertain to aviation accidents. Interestingly, the Court
in Saks made no express reference to any risk allocation and, in
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fact, rejected the notion that the Montreal Interim Agreement of
1966 affected Article 17's intention of establishing absolute
liability.187 Moreover, while the Court in Saks did not make
express reference to any notion of risks characteristic to air
travel, it did reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision referencing the
normal depressurization on an aircraft as a 'hazard of air
travel.,188 As a result, one could argue that the Supreme Court
was rejecting 'a risk inherent to air travel' view, especially when
Ms. Saks had expressed such a view in her Supreme Court brief.

I '. ,:~

On the other hand, by holding that injuries resulting from
normal, as opposed to abnormal, aircraft operations are not
recoverable, the Court was equating abnormal operations with
air risks assumed by the carrier. If the injury did not result from
aircraft operations outside the normal and routine, it did not
result from the type of risks for which the carrier should be
liable.
As to whether a Warsaw Convention Article

17 's

"accident" must involve some aircraft operations, a large portion
(but not all) of the decisional law to date has either expressly or
implicitly referenced a causal connection or relationship
between the unusual event and the aircraft's operation or
187
188

See Saks, 470 U.S. at 393.
Id at 395.
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procedures.

189

For instance, where a passenger is injured as a

result of abnormal pressurization changes, a sudden dive,190
unusual

turbulence,

emergencIes,

.
evacuatIon,

191

harsh

·
192 or unusua1
·nOIse,
· 193 the ab normal'Ity 0 f t h e
Iand mgs,
engme
aircraft

operation

element

IS

obviously

present

and

understandable. Nevertheless, this IS not the end of the story,
there are some cases do hold that the Article 17's "accident" is
not limited to events that are related to the operation of an
aircraft (section

2-4-3,

infra).

2-4-1. Event connected to both inherent risks of air travel and
aircraft operations

Maxwell v Aer Lingus Ltd. 194
Remarking that the Warsaw Convention does not impose a
per se rule of liability on an air carrier for every occurrence that
results in an injury to a passenger, the court held that the
189

See Levy v. American Airlines, 1993 WL 205857, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1993), affd, 22 F.3d
1092 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that some relationship between the accident and the operation of the
~~craft is required under Article 17).
See Weintraub v. Capital Int'l Airways, Inc., 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,0858 (N.Y. 1980) (holding
~~t an aircraft's sudden steep dive and swerve to the right constituted an accident).
See Tavarez v. American Airlines, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
1997); Sanna v. Delta Airlines, 132 F.RD. 47, 48-49 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Hinds v. Philippine
~~r1ines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10638, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1979).
See Mathias v. Pan-Am. World Airways, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 447, 448- 49 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Weaver
f§peltaAirlines, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190,1191-92 (D. Mont. 1999).
See Manion v. American Airlines, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1,5 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that whether
~.}!gine noise is unusual for purposes of Article 17 is a question offact).
122 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2000).
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convention reaches only those injurious happenings that result
from risks that are characteristic of air travel in the sense of
having some relationship to the operation of the airplane. 195 The
court explained that at one end of the spectrum are cases in
which liability is always found, where airline personnel have
either facilitated a passenger's tort or have themselves
committed a tort in connection with a flight. At the other end of
the spectrum, the court continued, are cases where the injury is
caused by the passenger's internal reaction to the ordinary
operation of the aircraft in which liability is almost never found
because such accidents involve events or conditions outside the
airline's purview or control. In the middle of the spectrum, the
court added, are hijacking and terrorism cases where liability is
imposed because terroristic acts are held to be a risk
characteristic of modem day air travel which is allocated to the
airline because the airline is in a far superior position than the
passengers are to institute protective safeguards. The unexpected
event, the court concluded, while not fully within the carrier's
control, is not wholly beyond the ability of the carrier to
influence.
195

See id. at 211 (stating that 'while a reasonable passenger would expect some shifting of the
con~ents of an overhead bin, particularly during a turbulent flight, she would not expect, as an
:dm.ary incident of the operation of the aircraft, to be struck on the head by a falling object when
e bm above her seat is opened by a fellow passenger.').
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The court finding the reasoning in cases requiring some
causal relationship between a claimed accident within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and the
operation of an aircraft or an airline or the conduct of a carrier's
employees more persuasive, declared that (1) it is to some
"operation of the aircraft" that a passenger's injury should relate
and it is only the unusual, abnormal, and unexpected operation
of an aircraft that would constitute an Article 17 accident, and (2)
an unusual and unexpected happening arising in the course of air
travel need not rest on any notion of negligence or fault to be
actionable, as long as the element of abnormality relates in some
discernible way to the inappropriate or unintended happening
arising in connection with or during the course of operation of
the aircraft or airline.

2-4-2. Event not connected to inherent risks of air travel but to
aircraft operations

· d v Amerzcan
.
A·zrI·znes, inc.
T
197
Gzrar
196
197

175

F. Supp. 2d 651 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
2003 WL 21989978 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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The court held that it is not necessary that the injury be
related to those risks characteristic of air travel. Whether an
"accident" under Article 17 has occurred depends, the court
thought, on the extent to which the circumstances giving rise to
the claimed accident fall within the causal purview or control of
the carrier. The court said that careful analysis of the post-Saks
cases demonstrated that the causal link necessary for Article 17
liability may be satisfied, the court said, by any act of judgment,
exercise of control or application of carrier operation that,
regardless of fault, implicated the airline in some abnormal,
unusual or unexpected role as a causal agent of the injury.
Alternatively, the court continued, the accident may arise from
any risk reasonably associated with aviation which, if known,
the carrier could reasonably assume and insure against.
Adopting an "inherent risk of air travel" definition would restrict
awards under the Warsaw Convention to only the narrow subset
of accidents that are unusual and unexpected but not so outside
the ordinary that they cannot be deemed risks characteristic of
air travel, the court thought, would be a far-reaching curtailment
of liability that clearly was not the intention of the Warsaw
Convention. Moreover, the court reasoned, to constrain the
definition of "accident" would eviscerate the careful balance
86

achieved by the original Warsaw Convention, especially given
the Supreme Court's recognition that the Warsaw Convention
provides passengers the exclusive means of recovery for injuries
incurred on board an aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking under Tseng. The
court saw no indication that the Warsaw Convention intended to
insulate an airline from all liability stemming from ordinary
negligence or recklessness in the operation of its business.

Barratt v Trinidad & Tobago (BWIA Intern.) Airways Corp.198

Rejecting a passenger's contention that a trip and fall within
an airline terminal can never come within the scope of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention because such an accident is not
caused by a risk inherent in aviation, the court stated that the
definition of "accident" as an injury caused by an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger
under Saks is in no way limited to those injuries resulting from
dangers exclusive to aviation. The court noted that Article 17
specifically limits liability for accidents, not by reference to
risks inherent in aviation, but by whether they occur "on board

198 - - - - - - - -

1990 WL 127590 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking."

2-4-3. Event neither connected to inherent risks of air travel nor
to aircraft operations

Gezzi v British Airways prc 199

In which the court of appeals commented on the defendant
carrier's contention that water on the staircase to its aircraft
could not be an "accident" for purposes of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention because it had no relation to the operation
of the aircraft, stating that it was not clear whether an event's
relationship to the operation of an aircraft is relevant to whether
the event is an accident, since the Supreme Court's definition of
accident in Saks did not indicate that an accident must relate to
the operation of an aircraft.

Morris v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. 200 (UK case)

The English court referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's
definition of "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention in Saks held that there was nothing in Saks that
199-------200

991 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
2001 WL 483072 (CA (Civ Div) 2001).
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justifies the requirement that an "accident" must have some
relationship with the operation of an aircraft or carriage by air.
Nor, the court added, did it consider that a purposive approach
to interpretation requires that gloss on the word. Stating that
liability under Article 17 only arises in relation to an accident
that occurs on board an aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking, the court thought that the accident will occur at a
time when the passenger is in charge of the carrier. In those
circumstances, the court opined, it seemed a logical and
reasonable scheme of liability that, whatever the nature of the
accident, a passenger should be entitled to be compensated for
its consequences.

2-5. Intentional misconduct as "accident"

Can intentional misconduct constitute an "accident" within
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention? The
global cases said yes, according to the inter-relationship of the
Article 17 and Article 25 201 , intentional misconduct will fall in
the scope of Article 17's "accident".
20'--------

" 1 Warsaw ~onvention 1929, Article 25 provides:
( ) The carner shall not be entitle to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which
89

oIympzc. A'zrways v. nUsazn202
U'

The U.S. Supreme Court observing that Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention removes the cap on carrier liability when an
injury is caused by the air carrier's willful misconduct and
stating that because there can be no liability for passenger death
or bodily injury under the Convention in the absence of an
Article 17 "accident," such willful misconduct is best read to be
included in the realm of conduct that may constitute an
"accident" under Article 17. The court referred to its prior
decision in Saks, contemplating that intentional conduct could
fall within the "accident" definition under Article 17 and, as
such, the court stated, Saks correctly characterized the term
"accident" as encompassing more than unintentional conduct.
The term "accident," the court acknowledged, has at least two
plausible yet distinct definitions: (1) accident may refer to an
unintended event or (2) accident may be defined as an event that
IS

unusual or unexpected, whether the result was intentional or

not, adding that Saks discerned the meaning of accident under
excl~de or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default
~n:ls p~ as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered
o e eqUIValent to willful misconduct·

~2) Similarly the carrier shall not be e~tit1ed to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage
IS

caUsed under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his

~loyment."

540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004).
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Article 17 as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that
is external to the passenger.

EI Al Israel Airlines v Tseng

203

With respect to the apparent assertion that a carrier's
conduct was willful misconduct covered by Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention and therefore could not constitute an
accident under Article 17, the US Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court, held that the finding of an accident under Article 17
is a prerequisite to the imposition of any liability for the
personal injuries of a passenger and Article 25 simply describes
a subset of accidents that are more egregious and to which a
greater degree of culpability attaches. The two articles of the
Warsaw Convention are not mutually exclusive, the court
explained; rather, the finding of an accident under Article 17 is a
prerequisite to the imposition of any liability for the personal
injuries of a passenger.

• d A· I·
Carey v uT Tnile
zr znes 204

The Ninth Circuit held that an "accident," as that term is
defined for purposes of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
203

204

525 u.s. 155, 119 s. Ct. 662,142 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1999).
255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
.
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can include intentional misconduct. Noting the Supreme Court's
definition of accident in Saks, as including any unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger, the
court saw nothing in that definition suggesting that an accident
includes only negligent or reckless conduct as opposed to
intentional misconduct. In fact, the court continued, there is no
mention of the carrier's motive or mental state whatsoever and
the Saks court cautioned that its definition should be applied
flexibly. A deeper look into the rationale behind the Supreme
Court's decision in Tseng, supported the conclusion that the
Warsaw Convention applies to claims arising out of intentional
misconduct, the court remarked. If intentional misconduct
claims were outside the Warsaw Convention, the court reasoned,
then international air carriers would face two sources of liability,
the Warsaw Convention and local law, depending on the nature
of their actions, a scenario that the Tseng court rejected. Given
the cardinal purpose of the Warsaw Convention to achieve
uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international
aIr transportation, the Tseng court ruled, it would be hard put to
conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject carriers
to the distinct, nonuniform liability rules of the individual
signatory nations. Moreover, the court found nothing in Article
92

25, eliminating the Convention's limitation on liability for
damage caused by willful misconduct, suggesting that the
Convention does not apply to claims arising out of intentional
misconduct, pointing out that Article 25 does not state that the
entire Warsaw Convention is inapplicable to damage caused by
willful misconduct.

Qantas Ltd. v Pavel0 5 (Australian case)

The Australian Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of
Victoria held that cases show that there may be an accident
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
despite the event consisting of intentional, even criminal,
conduct by one passenger towards another passenger or towards
all passengers. 206 Those cases, Ashley, AJA continued, make
the point that the focus is on whether an event is unexpected or
unusual and not on whether it is, for example, inadvertent,
careless, intentional, or criminal.

205

2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (RCA

~04) and affIrmed on other grounds by, 2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005).

The court cited Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); ~
Y:....Briti.sh Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (abrogated on other
grounds by, Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 113 L. Ed. 2d 569
~91)); Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc., Av. Cas. (CCR) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983); and
~ace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Naval-Torres v Northwest Airlines inc.

207

(Canadian case)

Stating that the word "accident" in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention is a term of art with a meaning particular to
the Warsaw Convention, the Canadian Ontario Court of Justice,
General Division held that, reading the Warsaw Convention as a
whole, it is apparent that "accident" in Article 17 must be
interpreted to embrace intentional acts of wrongdoing. Since
Article 17 is the sole source of liability imposed on a carrier by
the Warsaw Convention for bodily injury to passengers, the
court reasoned, it followed that if "accident" were interpreted to
include only inadvertent or negligent acts by a carrier, it would
lead to the extraordinary result that the Warsaw Convention
provides a remedy for inadvertence or negligence but fails to
provide any remedy for deliberate wrongdoing. In the court's
view, the fact that Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention limits
defenses or limits on liability where a carrier is guilty of willful
misconduct plainly indicated that deliberate wrongdoing is
actionable under the Warsaw Convention.

Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Re.

(UK case)
207
20g

1998 WL 1717959 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1998).
2002 WL 31784484 u.K. QBD 2002).
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208

j'.

The English court held that "accident" under Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention cannot bear its natural meaning as it is
clear that it is intended to cover intentional or reckless acts
committed with intent to cause injury, even though a dictionary
definition could not possibly include such a meaning, finding
support for its statement in Article 25, common sense, and the
decision in Naval-Torres supra.

2-6. Whether "inaction" could be an "accident"

Whether inaction may constitute an "accident" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention? The US
courts said yes, however, the Australian and English courts
denied pure inaction could be an "accident".

. A·zrways v nusazn
l . I . . 209
01ympzc

The US Supreme Court observing its definition of
"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in Saks
as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger and not a passenger's own internal reaction to
the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, held

;;--------

540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221,157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004).
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that the term accident is not limited to affirmative acts. Under
the circumstances of the instant case, the court rejected the
defendant airline's argument that a flight attendant's failure to
act, by refusing to assist a passenger sensitive to second-hand
cigarette smoke in moving farther from the smoking section,
could not constitute an "accident" because it was not an
affirmative act. The court declared that the relevant "accident"
inquiry was whether there was an unexpected or unusual event
or happening and the rejection of an explicit request for
assistance would be an event or happening under the ordinary
and usual meaning of those terms. Moreover, the court thought
that Article 25, providing that Article 22's liability cap does not
apply in the event of willful misconduct or such default
[emphasis added by the court] on the carrier's part that may be
the equivalent of willful misconduct, suggested that an airline's
inaction could be the basis of liability.

Qantas Ltd. v Pave/ fO (Australian case)

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria held
that mere nonaction or any failure to act, however egregious the
negligence involved, should not in itself be characterized as an
210

2 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (HCA
004) and Affrrmed on other grounds by, 2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005).
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"accident" within the meanIng of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. Finding no need to incorporate into the undefined
word "accident" concepts that are alien to the required
precondition of an event or an occurrence of the requisite kind,
the court observed the connotation of accident as "that which
befalls one." One may concede, the court remarked, that usage
in the English language tends to become less precise, dependent
on the whims and usages of the day, but the same could not be
said of the French language where the word "accident" means a
fortuitous and unfortunate event, causing physical injury or
\-/,:

material damage. The court conceded that inaction sometimes

1::1
'11 .. ']1

may lead to an event which may be characterized as an accident,
but that is quite a different thing, the court reasoned, from mere
inaction or any negligent failure to act, however serious.

Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Re. 211

(UK case)
Noting that a critical issue in the instant case was whether a
failure to act or an omission can constitute an accident for
purposes of Article 17, the United Kingdom court held that it
was unable to see how inaction itself can ever properly be
,~-------

.

2003 WL 21353471 (CA (Civ Div) 2003).
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described as an accident. Inaction, the court added, is not an
event, but rather a nonevent and the antithesis of an accident.
The court recognized that often a failure to act results in an
accident or forms part of a series of acts and omission which
together constitute an accident, remarking that in such
circumstances it may not be easy to distinguish between acts and
omissions. Where a passenger's allegations do no more than
state a failure to do something, that cannot be characterized as
an event or happening, whatever the concomitant background of
that failure to warn or advise, the court said. Acknowledging
that a failure to take a specific required step in the course of
flying an aircraft can lead to an event or happening of the
requisite unusual or unexpected kind and, thus, be an accident
for the purpose of Article 17, the court reasoned that a failure by
a pilot to use some device in the expected and correct manner
may lead an accident contemplated by Article 17 but, the court
suggested, it would not be the failure to take the step which is
properly characterized as an accident but rather its immediate
unexpected and dangerous result. It is a slide in reasoning, the
court thought, to say that every failure to do that which a carrier
ought to do necessarily amounts to an accident, although it may
frequently lead to such an event or occurrence of the required
98

kind. The court concluded that the question In each case,
nevertheless, still is whether there has been an accident.

Having discussed the general issues of the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention Article 17's "accident", the following of
this Chapter will concentrate on detailed events which may, by
analyzing the decisions around the world, or may not constitute
a Warsaw Convention's "accident". Those cases fall basically
into three categories: (1) interaction between carrier's personnel
and passengers; (2) events related to passenger's health; (3)
other events.

2-7. Inter-action between carrier's personnel and passengers

2-7-1. Will service offood or beverages be an "accident"
Whether service of food or beverages could be an
"accident"? Normally, courts said yes. However, in one case

212

,

the court held serving food or beverages, under certain
circumstances, insufficient to establish, or support a finding of, a
Warsaw Convention Article 17's "accident".

212

.

PadIlla v Olympic Airways, 765 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), infra.
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A'lrZ'mes, inc.
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Langa dmas
v. Amerzcan

Reversing the district court's order granting a carrier's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs allegation
that a carrier served alcohol to a fellow passenger just prior to
that passenger's assault of the plaintiff, knowing that the
passenger was intoxicated and that his behavior was erratic and
aggressive, sufficiently alleged a violation of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention and that the Supreme Court's definition of
"accident" in Saks was broad enough to permit recovery for torts
committed by fellow passengers. According to the plaintiff, he
was waiting in line to use a lavatory when the fellow passenger
forcefully grabbed the plaintiffs testicles, causing excruciating
pain, and then grabbed the plaintiffs hand and pulled it to the
fellow passenger's own groin. Although the plaintiff reported the
assault to the flight crew, he was unsatisfied with their response.
The court conceded that not every tort committed by a fellow
passenger is a Warsaw Convention accident, noting that where
airline personnel play no causal role, the courts have found no
Warsaw accident/ 14 but where airline personnel play a causal
role in a passenger-on-passenger tort, the courts have found
213

199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
C J?e court cited Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996), and Stone v.
-Jm....tinentalAirlines, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
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Warsaw accidents. 215 In the instant case, the court determined,
the plaintiffs claim survived under those standards. It was
alleged that the fellow passenger appeared intoxicated,
aggressive, and erratic, that the carrier was aware of such
behavior, and that despite its awareness, the carrier continued to
serve him alcohol. Serving alcohol to an intoxicated passenger
may, in some instances, create a foreseeable risk that the
passenger will cause injury to others, the court stated. The court
agreed with the carrier's argument that the complaint could not
survive without a properly pled allegation of over-serving, but
disagreed with the carrier's further argument that the charge of
over-serving was pled defectively in that it relied on conclusory
words and phrases like "erratic," "aggressive," and "diminished
capacity." The carrier, the court declared, demanded more from
the plaintiff than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require,
opining that the plaintiff put the carrier on notice that it was
accused of serving alcohol to an aggressive, erratic, and
incapacitated passenger even though it knew he was intoxicated.
Finally, the court was not persuaded by the carrier's point that
the plaintiff only alleged over-serving of alcohol in his amended
complaint on the basis of information and belief, remarking that
215

The court cited Schneider v. Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd., 686 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988).
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the plaintiffs attorney was entitled to include such information
and believe allegations in the complaint as long as there was a
good faith basis for doing so based on the reasonable inquiry
required under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 11 (b).

'
A'lrZ'mes, .lnc.
T
216
' L
ugo A
v. merzcan
D zaz

Denying a carrier's motion for summary judgment in a suit
by a passenger and her husband for bums she suffered when a
cup of coffee spilled over her while aboard a flight to the

Q!/wlillill

Dominican Republic, the court held that the spill was an unusual

~:lIIm::

\'vl/HUU

or unexpected event external to the passenger and, thus, an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. In response to the passenger's request for a cup of
coffee, a stewardess placed the cup on the passenger's tray. The
coffee spilled on the passenger's lap, causing bums in her pelvic
and gluteal areas. The court explained that, when a passenger
boards a plane, it is not expected that a cup of coffee will spill
Over the passenger's lap, noting that the usual operation of an
airplane does not require that hot coffee be spilled on passengers.
The passenger's injuries did not result from her internal reaction
to normal airplane operations, the court continued; rather, her
216'-~~-----

"

686 F. Supp. 373 (D.P.R. 1988).
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injuries were caused by the unexpected event external to her of
coffee spilling over her body. The carrier urged the court to go
back in the chain of causes resulting in the spill, to find, as a
matter of fact, that the plane's inclination caused the spill, and to
hold that the inclination was not an Article 17 "accident." The
court determined, however, that the inquiry need not go that far
back in the chain, declaring that any injury is the product of a
chain of causes, and that a passenger is only required to prove
that some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event
external to the passenger. The spill, the court concluded, was
such a link.

.
A'zr /.znes 217
Sca /a v. A merzcan

Denying a carrier's motion to dismiss an action under the
Warsaw Convention by a passenger who alleged that he suffered
a physical injury to his heart when he requested cranberry juice
from a flight attendant as part of the carrier's in-flight beverage
service but instead was served and consumed cranberry juice
with alcohol, the court held that the event which happened to the
passenger qualified as an accident within the meaning of Article
17. The mistaken substitution of beverages in the instant case
217--------

249 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Conn. 2003).
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was an unexpected and perhaps unusual event, the court ruled,
because the passenger expected to receive the beverage he
ordered and it was presumably not common for the carrier to
mistakenly provide alcoholic beverages to those who do not
desire them. Moreover, the court found that the substitution of
an alcoholic beverage for the beverage ordered by the passenger
was external to the passenger in the sense that it was a mix-up
presumably done by the flight attendant. Acknowledging that
the passenger's internal reaction to the event was obviously
wholly internal, the court stated that the accident was the drink
substitution, not the passenger's pre-existing heart ailment.
Rejecting the carrier's argument that the event did not qualify as
an "accident" because it did not arise out of a risk that was
peculiar to air travel, the court noted that whether an event's
relationship to the operation of an aircraft is relevant to whether
the event is an "accident" was an open question in the Second
Circuie 18 and declared that even under the restrictive standard
of "characteristic risk of air travel", the drink substitution was a
characteristic risk of air travel in that it increased the passenger's
vulnerability to a mistaken drink substitution. Commenting that
passengers on airplane flights are not free to move about the
218 - - - - - - - -

The court cited Wallace v. Korean Air, 214F:.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
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cabin to prepare their own drinks but must rely on flight
attendants to accurately take their beverage order and prepare
the appropriate drink, the court said that no passenger would
expect to have to supervise preparation of his or her requested
beverage. The court compared the circumstances of the instant
case to those in Wallace,219 where it was found that a sexual
assault was an accident even though, like a drink substitution, it
could have easily occurred in other contexts.

Bousso v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espnan

220

The court held that an injury suffered by a passenger on an
international flight, a cracked tooth that occurred while eating a
meal, was caused by an accident as that term is defined by the
Supreme Court in Saks and the Second Circuit in Fishman by
Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,221 and was therefore covered
by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Since the passenger's
action was commenced more than two years after the flight
landed, the court granted the carrier's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the passenger's claim was time-barred under Article
29(1).

219
220
221

See id.
1998 WL

148422 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).
132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Gonzalez v. TA CA Intern. Airlinei

In a suit by a passenger under the Warsaw Convention for
pain suffered during an angina attack allegedly caused by
actions of a carrier's personnel in spilling a tray of food on him
and serving him a beverage containing a small piece of plastic,
the court found that the incidents in question constituted
accidents under Article 17 since they were unusual and
unexpected events during air travel. Determining that the
passenger suffered an angina attack in flight, causing him
increased anxiety, the court awarded damages to the passenger
in the amount of $5,000.

Price v. KLM-Royal Dutch Airlines

223

Where an international airline passenger asserted a claim
against a carrier under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
based on an injury to her knees which occurred when she was
struck by a food cart, the court referring to the Supreme Court's
definition of "accident" under Article 17 in Saks, held that it was
beyond dispute that being struck by a trolley was an unexpected
event which is external to the passenger and constituted an
accident. The court denied the passenger's motion for summary
222
223

1992 WL 142399 (E.D. La. 1992).
107 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
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judgment, however, since she still had to prove that an accident
caused her injury.

Padilla v Olympic Airways224
Concluding that a passenger failed to sustain his burden of
proving that he was injured as the result of an "accident" within
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the court
entered judgment in favor of the carrier as to the passenger's
claim that his injury from a fall in a lavatory during a flight from
Athens, Greece to New York City, was caused by a violation of
the carrier's rules by employees who served him between seven
and nine beers. The court explained that in order to succeed on
his theory, the passenger was required to prove that the
continued service of alcohol to him during the flight was an
"unusual

or unexpected

event"
,

noting

Second

Circuit

authority225 for the proposition that the consumption of alcohol
during travel, in and of itself, is not an unusual occurrence.
Although the passenger argued that his injuries did not occur
during the course of a routine or normal flight because
permitting or causing him to become intoxicated was an obvious
deviation from the norm, the court found no evidence that the
224
225

See Supra note 212.
The court cited German-Bey v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 703 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1983).
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carrier was aware of the passenger's alleged intoxication. The
passenger did not establish that he requested the seven to nine
beers from one flight attendant or that when he spoke to any of
the flight attendants serving his section, if he spoke to them at
all, he appeared so intoxicated that he should have been refused
further alcohol. Moreover, the court pointed out, the flight
attendant in charge of the passenger's section testified that he
observed nothing abnormal in the passenger's gait or carriage.
Given these circumstances, the court ruled, the passenger did
I.••.

not establish that the carrier's employees knew or should have
known that to continue to serve the passenger alcoholic
beverages was to expose him to danger or that the carrier's
service of alcohol to him was anything but normal and routine;
no unusual or unexpected event occurred before the passenger
collapsed in the lavatory, and the evidence suggested that the
injury sustained by the passenger was caused by his own
internal reaction to his voluntary intoxication.

2-7-2. Will detention or search a/passenger be an "accident"

Can detention or search of a passenger be an "accident"?
Probably yes. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision of Tseng,226
226

525 U.S. 155 (1999).
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courts are divided for the outcomes, however, after Tseng,
notice that there has no case particularly concerned this issue,
the reasonable expect is that courts will interpret detention or
search of passenger as a Warsaw Convention Article 17' s
"accident" as long as the detention or search is unexpected or
unusual.

El Al Israel Airlines v Tseng

227

The Supreme Court stated, in dicta, that it disagreed with
the lower court's conclusion, which was not before the Supreme
Court, by concluding the routine security search to which Ms.
Tseng was subjected was likely an 'accident.' Apparently, Ms.
Tseng gave 'illogical' responses to routine questions during
screening and was classified as a 'high risk' passenger.

228

She

was thus subjected to a security search pursuant to the carrier's
security procedures, taken to a private room, and searched.

229

She was required to remove her jacket and sweater, and lower
her blue jeans. 230 A female security guard searched her entire
body, including her breasts and her groin area.

231

Of course, if

the claimed 'illogical' answers that formed the basis for the
227
228
229
230
231

S

ee id.
See Tseng, 122 F.3d at 10 l.
See id. at 163, 164.
See id.
Id.
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search were false, then an accident would exist, as it would
constitute an abnormal operation and deviation from standard
procedures. Stating that a security search of a passenger based
solely on 'suspicion of circumstances' subjects the carrier to
liability under Article 17.

Shen v. Japan Airlinei

232

33

Noting the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning
of "accident" in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as a
passenger's injury caused by an unexpected or unusual event or
happening that is external to the passenger in Saks, a definition
which the Supreme Court said should be flexibly applied after
assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's
injuries, the court found that the passengers' injuries, as
described in their complaint, appeared to have been caused by
unusual events, prolonged detention without food as well as
search and seizure. Specifically, the complaint stated that the
carrier, a Japanese airline, and another defendant falsely arrested
and maliciously prosecuted the passengers by keeping them in a
jail in Tokyo for over 15 hours without any food, illegally
searched them and seized their passports and luggage, and then
232
233

See id, at 158.
918 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. N.Y. 1994), aff'd without opinion, 43 F.3d 1459 (2d Cir. 1994).
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forced them back to Shanghai, China. The passengers claimed
that they were delayed in returning to the United States, suffered
great pain of body and mind, and incurred expenses for traveling
and medical attention as well as loss of time from work as a
result of the defendants' actions. The court thus determined that
all of the passengers' claims were governed by the Warsaw
Convention.

Thach v. China Airlines, Ltd. 234

An action was brought against a carrIer for injuries
allegedly suffered when a passenger was not allowed to board

: ;\!
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the carrier's flight from Taiwan to New York due to the mistaken
belief of an employee of the carrier that the passenger held a
fraudulent passport, which resulted in the passenger's detention
by Taiwanese police, and the court stated that the weight of
authority in the Southern District of New York was contrary to
the passenger's argument that the incident giving rise to the
action did not constitute an "accident" under the terms of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. The court concluded, however,
that since the plaintiffs did not suffer any physical injury, no
recovery was available under Article 17 for any of their claims.
234

1997 WL 282254 (S.D. N.Y. 1997).
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Curley v. American Airlines Inc.

235

This case is a good example of different decisions, most
likely, would be held if the case happened after Tseng. It was a
diversity action against a carrier alleging negligence and false
imprisonment brought by a passenger who claimed that he
suffered psychological injury when Mexican customs authorities
detained and searched him after an aircraft captain falsely
1,-

:',

I

.i:

identified him as having smoked marijuana in the aircraft
lavatory, the court denied the carrier's motion for summary
judgment in which the carrier contended that the passenger's
causes of action for negligence and false imprisonment were
preempted by the Warsaw Convention. In the instant case, the
passenger alleged that the captain had been informed by the
flight attendants of the passenger's suspected activity during
descent and, on landing, advised the carrier's ground crew,
which in tum informed Mexican customs authorities who
detained and searched the passenger. Observing that the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention to the passenger's
claims turned on whether his injuries were caused by an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the court
235 - - - - - - - -

846 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).
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determined that the captain's unfounded SUSpICIOn that the
passenger had been smoking marijuana in the aircraft and the
relaying after the landing of this suspicion to the carrier's ground
crew did not constitute an accident within the contemplation of
the signers of the Warsaw Convention.

2-7-3. Will removal ofpassenger from aircraft be an "accident"
Can removal of passenger from aircraft be an accident
under Warsaw Convention Article l7? Some courts said yes,
while others said no, depending on the particular circumstances
: :,1·
i

of each case.

.
P'LC.236
· . v. B'
SInca
ntIs. h A Irways
With respect to an airline passenger's claim under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention for the injuries she allegedly
sustained when she was removed from the carrier's airplane by
London, England Metropolitan Police, the court denied the
carrier's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was a
triable issue as to whether an accident within the meaning of
Article 17 occurred. Agreeing that if the passenger refused an
order to leave the aircraft, then that refusal and not the actions of
236

2002 WL 113877 (E.D. N.Y. 2002).
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the carrier would be the proximate cause of her injury, the court
found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
passenger, she did not refuse to voluntarily disembark the
aircraft. As to the carrier's contention that it should not be held
liable for the actions of the police, the court also found a triable
issue of fact. If the passenger's version of the incident was found
accurate by a jury and the carrier's employees gave police false
information that led to the plaintiffs violent arrest, the court was

~a,'",
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of the opinion that the carrier could be liable for InjUrieS
~Ifll"t,:,

sustained by the passenger at the hands of the police.
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Cush v. B WI Intern. Airways, Ltd. 237

Where a passenger brought an action under Article 17 of
the Warsaw convention based on injuries allegedly sustained
when Guyana immigration officials forcibly removed him from
an international flight after he had boarded the aircraft and
refused to deplane, the court granted the carrier's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the passenger's injuries were
not the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17.
It was alleged that the passenger was surrounded by five or six

Immigration officials after he had taken a seat on the aircraft,
237

175 F. Supp. 2d483 (E.D. N.Y. 2001).
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that the officials did not wear uniforms or badges and did not
identify themselves, and that after he refused to leave
voluntarily the immigration officials punched him, placed him in
a choke hold, handcuffed him, and pushed him down the stairs
to the tarmac.
Noting that under Saks, a passenger need only prove that
some link in the chain of causes of an injury was an unusual or
unexpected event external to the passenger as long as that link is
attributable to the cause of the incident and not merely to the
occurrence itself, the court determined that it was not the
unusual circumstances of the passenger's boarding that caused
the altercation but rather the passenger's refusal to leave the
plane after he was informed that he was not permitted to travel.
Accepting that the passenger was not made aware that the
individuals who sought to remove him were immigration
officials, the court nevertheless found that the passenger should
have been aware that the carrier had approved his removal since
the carrier's representatives onboard did not intervene, thereby
indicating their approval. The court opined that once the
passenger was aware that his removal was officially sanctioned,
he was obligated to depart the aircraft, adding that if the
passenger had complied with that obligation he would not have
115
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been forcibly removed. In other words, the court said, when a
passenger is forcibly removed after refusing to disembark at the
request of airline officials or at the request of those authorized
and accompanied by airline officials, the passenger's refusal to
disembark, not the decision to remove the passenger, is the
proximate cause of the passenger's injury. Furthermore, the court
pointed out that the instant case involved a passenger who
caused a disturbance because he refused to disembark at the
request of immigration officials seeking relief based on the
premise that the altercation that he himself instigated was an
"unusual" occurrence. Were relief available to a disruptive
passenger based on the proposition that the forcible removal was
"unusual" or "unexpected," the court reasoned, disruptive
passengers would be rewarded for their disruptions.

Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 238

The court held that the removal of an international airline
passenger from an aircraft by airport police after the passenger
refused to comply with a request of the carrier's employee to
move from his seat in an exit row because another passenger
had been assigned the same seat, an event in which the
~-------------1999 WL 562244 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aft'd without opinion, 216 F.3d 1076 (3d Cir. 2000).
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passenger allegedly was injured, was not an "accident" under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Noting the Supreme
Court's definition of that term as an unexpected or unusual event
that is external to the passenger in Saks, the court found that
whatever injuries the passenger suffered occurred because he
was arrested, and he was arrested only because he refused to
leave the aircraft voluntarily.
Reasoning that the passenger would not have been
handcuffed and taken off the aircraft had he left the aircraft
when ordered to do so by the captain, the court stated that it did

; -:,1

not matter if it was the captain's decision that initiated the chain
of events leading to the passenger's arrest because the fact
remained that it was entirely within the passenger's control
whether he was arrested. The passenger's decision interrupted
the captain's causal connection to the alleged injuries, the court
remarked. Under Saks, the court said, it was necessary to look at
the circumstances surrounding the incident and the passenger's
behavior and decisions plainly were among the factors to be
considered. Having precipitated the result, neither the Warsaw
Convention nor equity permitted the passenger to recover from
the carrier, the court concluded.

117
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2-8. Events related to passenger's health

2-8-1. Will passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an
"accident"

Can a passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an
accident under Warsaw Convention Article 17? Usually the
cases about this issue concerned passengers' heart attack, and

r'
~

l'

the courts said "no", it is not a Warsaw Convention "accident".

Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd. 239

In an action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
the court held that the death of a passenger, who suffered a heart
attack during layover in an airport transit lounge utilized by
several carriers and restricted to passengers who cleared
customs and security checks, was not the result of an "accident"
under Article 17 because a heart attack, under the definition of
that term by the Supreme Court in Saks, was not an event
external to the passenger.

Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 240

239
240

89 F• Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. NY 2000).
122 Misc. 2d 445,471 NYS.2d 478 (Sup 1983).
118

..

..
i'

The court held that an airline passenger's fainting
approximately 10 feet from the door of the aircraft on the jet
way connecting the terminal and the plane did not constitute an
"accident" under the Warsaw Convention, and declared that an
event or occurrence is not an accident if it results solely from the
stated health of a passenger and is unconnected with the carrier's
flight. The passenger was on a flight from Rome to New York
with a scheduled one-hour stopover in Ireland. The first leg of
the flight was delayed by eight hours, during which time the
passenger became ill, allegedly due to the crowded and
unsanitary conditions in the terminal waiting room. She tried
unsuccessfully to obtain medical treatment during the stopover.
After approximately a three-hour delay in Ireland, the
passengers were informed that their plane was disabled and that
they would not continue their flight to New York until the
following day; the passengers were told to retrieve their
personal belongings from the plane, after which they would be
taken into a hotel for the night. The passenger sustained injuries
when she fainted while walking to the plane to retrieve her
possessions. The court quoted with approval the definition of the
district court in Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,241 that
241

442 F. SUpp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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an occurrence must be an unusual or unexpected happening to
constitute an accident, and in the present case, it is not.

2-8-2. Will carrier's personnel response to passenger's medical
emergency be an "accident"

Can a carrier's personnel response to passenger's medical
emergency be an accident under Warsaw Convention Article l7?
The courts are divided for the outcomes. The following cases
are held to be "accident".

. A'zrways v H
' 242
usazn
01 ympzc

Holding that the requirement of an "accident" under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention was a condition precedent to an
airline's liability for personal injury of a passenger is satisfied
when the airline's unusual and unexpected refusal to assist a
passenger is a link in a chain of causation resulting in
aggravation of the passenger's pre-existing medical condition by
exposure to a normal condition in the aircraft cabin, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed an award of damages for the death of
an asthmatic passenger after a flight attendant refused on three
occasions the passenger's request to move to a seat further from
242

540 u.s. 644 (2004).
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the smoking section. Under the facts of the case, the decedent,
who was sensitive to second-hand smoke, and his spouse
requested and obtained seats away from the smoking section on
the airline's international flight. After boarding the flight, the
decedent's spouse discovered that their seats were only three
rows in front of the smoking section and asked a flight attendant
to move the decedent, but was told to "have a seat." Prior to
takeoff, after all passengers had boarded, the decedent's spouse
again asked the flight attendant to move the decedent and
explained that the decedent was allergic to smoke, but the flight
attendant refused because the plane was totally full and that she
was too busy to help. After takeoff, the decedent was
surrounded by ambient cigarette smoke, and the flight attendant
refused to move the decedent, stating erroneously that the plane
was full, that the decedent could exchange seats with another
passenger, but that the decedent's spouse would have to ask
other passengers without assistance from the crew. The decedent
died about two hours into the flight after moving toward the
front of the plane to get some fresher air. Affirming the Ninth
Circuit's ruling243 that the flight attendant's refusal to reseat the
decedent was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17
243

Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 538 U.S. 1056, 123 S.
Ct. 2215,155 L. Ed. 2d 1105 (2003) and affd, 540 U.S. 644,124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,
4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004).
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because the flight attendant's refusal to reseat the decedent was
clearly external to the decedent and was an unexpected and
unusual in light of industry standards, the court noted that the
airline did not challenge the district court's ruling244 that the
flight attendant's conduct was unusual or unexpected in light of
the relevant industry standard or the airline's own company
policy. The court rejected the airline's contention that the flight
"q',

attendant's conduct was irrelevant for purposes of the "accident"
inquiry and that the only relevant event was the presence of
ambient cigarette smoke in the aircraft's cabin. Acknowledging
that the presence of ambient cigarette smoke during an
international flight might have been "normal" at the time of the
flight in question, the court said that the airline's argument that
the "injury producing event" inquiry, which looks to the precise
factual event that caused the injury, neglected the reality that
there are often multiple interrelated factual events that combine
to cause any injury. The court stated that anyone factual event
may thus be a link in the chain of causes and, so long as it is
unusual or unexpected, may constitute an "accident" under
Article 17.

244

Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2000), supplemented, 2000 WL
1780264 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
.
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Fishman by Fishman v Delta Airlines, Inc. 245

The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling that
both the scalding of a child by a stewardess attempting to
alleviate the passenger's earache and the emotional injuries
alleged by the child's mother were caused by an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. On
the defendant carrier's international flight from Tel Aviv, Israel

I.

I

.,'1',

to New York City, the child, who had a cold, suffered from the
change of air pressure. The stewardess suggested that a cup
containing a warm cloth be placed over the ear and, when the

,,.1'-,
~

poultice was applied to the child's ear, scalding water in the cup
dripped on the child's neck and shoulder, causing bums.
In an effort to take their claim outside the Warsaw
Convention and avoid the result of the district court's ruling,
dismissal of the claims because the two-year limitations period
for bringing suit under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention
had expired, the plaintiffs attempted to cast their claims chiefly
in terms of the tortious refusal of medical care that happened
afterward and argued that the claims did not arise out of the
normal operation of aircraft, and in any event were not
accidental in nature. The appellate court approved the district
245-------

132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
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court's reasoning that the underpinning of both claims was the
scalding of the child by the flight attendant, an unexpected event
that was external to both plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs
contended that the child suffered serial colds and ear infections
and had narrow eustachian tubes, all of which predisposed her to
earaches caused by a change of pressure on the aircraft, the
appellate court agreed with the district court's reasoning that the
injury in the instant case was not the child's earache, but rather
the application of scalding water to treat it. The appellate court
thus found that, although the earache was caused by a change in
air pressure, which was part of the normal operation of the
aircraft and not an accident, all the harm alleged by the plaintiffs
flowed from the scalding, which was easily seen as accidental.

Turturro v Continental Airlinei

46

The court held that an airline passenger's allegations that
the carrier falsely imprisoned her, defamed her, and caused her
to suffer emotional distress in connection with her request to
deplane prior to departure because of anxiety she experienced
on realizing that her anti-anxiety medication had been stolen at
the airport were within broad definition of "accident" under
246

128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D. NY 2001).
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Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Specifically, the court
found, the accident included the carrier's act of delaying the
return to the gate and its employees' comments directed to the
passenger and her fellow passengers.

McCaskey v Continental Airlines. Inc. 247

An action brought against a carrier under the Warsaw
Convention on behalf of a passenger who allegedly suffered a
stroke onboard an aircraft during a domestic leg of an
international flight and subsequently died, the court denied the
carrier's motion for summary judgment, holding that a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that an "accident" within
the meaning of Article 17 occurred based any or all of three
types of events alleged by the plaintiff: (1) rude treatment of the
plaintiff and the passenger by the carrier's gate attendant prior to
boarding, (2) a malfunction of the aircraft which caused the
cabin temperature to rise uncomfortably and delayed the flight's
departure, and (3) the flight crew's inappropriate response to the
passenger's stroke. The plaintiff alleged that after the passenger's
stroke symptoms appeared, a fellow passenger who was a
registered nurse took control of the situation and the carrier's
247

159 F. Supp. 2d 562 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
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personnel contacted a contractor which provided medical advice
during in-flight medical emergencies. Oxygen was administered
to the passenger, but because of concerns about supply, the flow
was reduced below 100%. A physician employed by the
contractor expressed the opinion, based on an inaccurate belief
that the aircraft was closer to its destination than it was, that the
flight need not be diverted. Stating that it was inclined to agree
that a failure to divert is not ipso facto an accident under Article
17, the court nevertheless said it was unwilling to hold that a
failure to divert can never present a jury question, particularly in
view of the Supreme Court's mandate in Saks, that courts
flexibly apply the definition of an accident after an assessment
of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's injury.

. A'lr z·mes248
Gupta v A ustrzan

The court denied the defendant carrier's motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim under the Warsaw
Convention for the death of their decedent who suffered a heart
attack on a the carrier's international flight, holding that it could
not be said, as a matter of law, that in the context of all the
CIrcumstances surrounding the decedent's death, the carrier's
248

211 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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allegedly inadequate procedures in rendering medical assistance
did not constitute an "accident" under Article 17.

Kemelman v Delta Air Lines, Inc.

249

Reversing the trial court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant carrier on the plaintiffs
claim under the Warsaw Convention for the death of an airline
passenger who suffered a heart attack on an international flight,
the court held that, contrary to the carrier's contention, the
plaintiffs response to the carrier's summary judgment motion

.li111

raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the passenger's demise

, lin:

was caused by an accident under Article 17. Based on
deposition testimony and affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in
opposition to the carrier's motion, the court found that it could
not be said, as a matter of law, that the routine procedures which
the carrier's employees followed in response to the passenger's
medical situation were carried out in a reasonable manner. The
court pointed out that an injury resulting from routine
procedures in the operation of an aircraft can be an accident if
the procedures or operations are carried out in an unreasonable
manner. 250
249
250

293 A.D. 2d 576, 740 N.Y.S.2d 434 (2d Dep't 2002).
The court cited Fishman case, supra note 245, in support of its statement.
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The courts held, under the circumstances of the following
cases, that the alleged failure of a carrier's personnel to properly
respond to the medical emergency of a passenger on an
international flight was insufficient to show or support an
allegation as to the occurrence of an accident as that term is used
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.

251

Horvath v. Deutsche Lufthansa, Ag

The court held that an airline passenger did not suffer an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw

:lil11:
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Convention when, after ingesting salmon served by the
defendant carrier and experiencing an allergic reaction, a fellow
passenger-physician administered the drug "Tiaphlin" which
caused the passenger further difficulty. In view of the
passenger's concessions that the carrier acted properly in
eliciting the assistance of the physician-passenger and the
physician's response was entirely within the best tradition of the
profession, the court ruled that the administration of Tiaphlin or
any other drug to a passenger who was experiencing an allergic
reaction was not an "accident" separate and independent from
251

2004 WL 486976 (S.D. NY 2004).
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ingestion of the salmon under the definition of that term by the
Supreme Court in Saks, as an unusual or unexpected event
external to the passenger. The court recognized that under
certain circumstances, a carrier's response to and treatment or
lack thereof of a passenger's in-flight medical emergency may
constitute an accident, but explained that without a claim that
the carrier departed from ordinary procedures with respect to the
passenger's treatment and in light of the passenger's admissions
to the contrary, no reasonable jury could conclude that the
administration of a drug by a physician-passenger constituted an
accident under the Warsaw Convention.

Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlinei

52

The behavior of a carrier's personnel m response to a
passenger's in-flight chest pain, specifically, the failure to divert
the flight in order to provide the passenger medical care did not
qualify as an "accident" as defined under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, the court held. The passenger contended
that the carrier's failure to act caused permanent damage to his
heart that would not have occurred if the carrier had diverted the
flight so that proper medical treatment could have been obtained
252--------

244 F. Supp. 2d 217 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
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sooner. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
passenger experienced chest pains shortly after the flight
departed Budapest, Hungary for New York, and requested
assistance from the carrier's crew. The crew located a
passenger-physician who injected a painkiller and checked the
passenger's vital signs on several occasions, observing no
change. After administering the injection, the physician
informed the pilot that although the passenger appeared to be
feeling better, he could not predict how the passenger would feel
during the remainder of the flight. The pilot decided not to
divert the flight to England so that the passenger could receive
medical

treatment

based

on

consultation

with

the

physician-passenger. The passenger claimed at trial that he
asked a crew member to divert the flight to England, but in
contrast the carrier claimed that both the passenger and the
physician-passenger felt diversion was unnecessary. The court
found, on the basis of the trial testimony and the corresponding
record that the passenger did not meet the burden of proving a
violation of operational standards by the carrier's personnel.
According to the carrier's procedures for tending to sick
passengers, the absolute decision-making authority to divert the
plane was left to the captain, who was required to endeavor to
130

obtain a medical opinion from a passenger, determine whether
the sick passenger required urgent medical assistance, and if so,
contact the nearest suitable airport and make preparations for an
emergency landing. The court regarded the carrier's procedures
substantially similar to industry standards. According to the
court, the pilot's decision to continue with the flight was a
decision made after taking into account, in addition to all other
considerations of safety and convenience of other persons on
board, the overall thrust of the physician's advice that the
passenger appeared stable and that his condition did not warrant
';·1,'

diversion of the flight. The court was unpersuaded that the
passenger proved that the pilot gathered insufficient information
to make his decision Regardless of whether the physician
conveyed the passenger's medical history to the pilot, the court
pointed out, there was no evidence that the pilot's decision
would have been any different, especially since the physician
was not a cardiac specialist and may not have known the
necessary implications of the passenger's prior medical history.
The court was also unpersuaded that even if the passenger
actually made a request to divert the flight, the request was
demonstrative enough to indicate that his medical condition was
so severe as to warrant an emergency diversion. The passenger's
131

single request to one crew member, not specifically adopted or
endorsed by the physician who assessed his medical condition,
was not sufficient to establish an urgent matter, the court
reasoned, and his failure to repeat himself could have been
reasonably interpreted by others on board either as a change of
mind or as a signal that his condition had improved or was not
sufficiently severe in the first place. Consequently, the court was
unable to conclude that the carrier ignored the passenger's
requests for a diversion in a manner that violated its own
policies or procedures or any relevant industry standard.

Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co.! Ltd.

253

The Third Circuit court held that the alleged acts and
omissions of an airline and its employees in responding to a
passenger's attack from a preexisting hiatal hernia during a
routine flight did not constitute an "accident" for which the
Warsaw Convention imposed liability on the carrier. The
passenger and his wife testified that the passenger could
alleviate an attack by a "self-help" remedy and by lying down,
and that the wife asked a flight attendant for a place where he
could lie down and employ his remedy, but he was advised that
253-------

739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984).
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there were no empty seats. Discovery revealed, however, that
there were nine empty seats in the first-class section. The
passenger alleged that without the opportunity to employ
self-help his condition worsened, and he was hospitalized on
arriving at his destination. The court of appeals reiterated the
definition of "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 set
forth in DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,254 as an
,,:1

1

event, a physical circumstance, which unexpectedly takes place
not according to the usual course of things; if the event on board
an airplane is an ordinary, expected, and usual occurrence, then
it cannot be termed an accident; to constitute an accident, the
occurrence on board the aircraft must be unusual, or unexpected,
an unusual or unexpected happening.
The appellate court rejected the passenger's argument that,
although the airline did not cause his hiatal hernia injury, the
alleged aggravation of the injury by the airline employees' acts
and omissions constituted an unusual or unexpected happening
within the definition. Emphasizing that the injury was suffered
during the course of a routine and normal flight, the appellate
court stated that, in the absence of proof of abnormal external
factors, aggravation of a preexisting injury during the course of
~---------------

580 F.2d 1193,3 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 575,26 Fed. R. Servo 2d 226 (3d Cir. 1978).
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a routine and normal flight should not be considered an accident
within the meaning of Article 17. The appellate court stated
further that the injury the passenger suffered was not a risk
either associated with or inherent in aircraft operation. Although
affirming the entry of summary judgment for the airline on the
Warsaw Convention claim, the court of appeals vacated the
entry of summary judgment for the airline on the passenger's

I"j,

state law claims and remanded the action.

i'I:,

..
bit!

Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlinei

55

Rejecting a carrier's claim that a passenger's state law claim
of negligence, based on the failure of the crew of an aircraft on
an international flight to make an unscheduled landing to treat
the passenger's heart attack, was preempted by the Warsaw
Convention because the incident was an "accident" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that if, in the instant case, the aggravating event
was the continuation of the flight from its scheduled point of
departure to its scheduled point of arrival, then it seemed clear
that the aggravation injury arose not from an unexpected or
unusual happening, but rather from the passenger's own internal
~--------------

119 F.3d 1515 (11 th Cir. 1997).
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reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the
aircraft.
The appellate court identified the relevant event by asking
what precise event or events allegedly caused the damage
sustained by the passenger and found it clear that, if the
passenger in the instant case suffered damage as a result of any
external event, that event was the continuation of the flight and
~I I

the resultant delay in hospitalization. Acknowledging that the

!, ..

question was close, the appellate court was convinced that the

lin:
I !~r,

proper approach was indeed to look at a purely factual

11f!!
:1'11'

IIll!

description of the events that allegedly caused the aggravation

IIII1

injury suffered by the passenger. The appellate court stated that
such an approach was in accord with the plain meaning of the
phrase "event or happening" as used in the definition of
"accident" in Saks. In addition, the appellate court thought that
looking at the factual events, as opposed to an assertion of "crew
negligence," was in accord with the design of the Warsaw
Convention, which provides carriers a "due care" defense.

256

Having provided for a defense turning on the absence of
256

Under Article 20( 1) of the Warsaw Convention, carriers may defend claims on the grounds that
they took all necessary measures to avoid a passenger's injury or that it was impossible to take
su~h measures. The appellate court noted that the Montreal Agreement requires carriers to waive
~s "d~e care" defense for international flights that originate, terminate, or have stopping points in
fe Umted States, but found that waiver immaterial to its rationale with respect to the occurrence
o an accident.
.
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negligence, the appellate court thought it unlikely that the
drafters of the Warsaw Convention intended that the initial
"accident" inquiry be resolved by reference to negligence, both
because the word "accident" is located in a separate article and
because determining the occurrence of an accident involves an
inquiry into the nature of the event that caused the injury rather
than the care taken by the airline to avert the injury. The court of
(II

appeals thus concluded that looking solely to a factual
description of the aggravating event in the instant case, the

lit!

continuation of the flight to its scheduled point of arrival,
Illk

compelled a conclusion that the aggravation injury was not
caused by an unusual or unexpected event or happening that was
external to the passenger.

2-8-3. Will health risks of international flights be an "accident"

Approximately

30,000 people

a

year

succumb

to

pulmonary emboli triggered by blood clots, and 100/0 of victims
are alleged to have developed Deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
following a long haul flight. DVT is an abnormal formation of
blood clots that may travel through the blood stream to the heart
or lungs and cause serious injury. Medical evidence is currently
Inconclusive that air travel increases the risk of DVT and some
136

studies suggest that there is no connection at all, nevertheless,
whatever it is, DVT already be the subject of lawsuits
worldwide and fast becoming a major issue in aviation litigation.
Courts have suddenly had to classify this ailment under existing
rules, the main issue is whether DVT is an "accident" per
Warsaw-Montreal System. The cases below led to widespread
press coverage of "economy class syndrome", which is
something of a misnomer as the condition has also occurred
amongst first-class travelers.

Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd.

257

The court held that an airline passenger's development of
deep vein thrombosis (DVT) during an international flight
resulted from the passenger's own internal reaction to the
aircraft's usual, normal, and expected operation, rather than from
an unexpected or unusual event, and thus was not caused by an
"accident" within the meaning of the provision of the Warsaw
Convention addressing air carrier liability for harm to
passengers,

notwithstanding

the

passenger's

lack

of a

pre-existing condition when she boarded the airplane.

257

383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1665 (U.S. 2005), affmning Rodriguez v.
ADsett Australia Ltd., 2002 WL 32153953 (C.D: Cal. 2002).
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In an action under the Warsaw Convention by an airline
passenger who suffered a stroke after taking an international
flight that he alleged was caused by a deep vein thrombosis that
was the result of an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17,
specifically, that the design of the seat's leg rest restricted blood
flow to his legs and that his business class seat was so
comfortable that he did not want to get up, the court granted the
carriers' motion for summary judgment, holding that a
comfortable seat with a leg rest was not an unexpected or
unusual event in business class and thus could not qualify as an
accident.

Miller v. Continental Airlinei

59

Where international airline passengers asserted, in their
actions against carriers under the Warsaw Convention, that as a
result of the carriers' seating configurations, the passengers
developed Deep Vein Thrombosis either during or after the
flight, the court granted the carriers' motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, holding that the allegations that the
258
259

2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003).
260 F. Supp. 2d 931, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 16709 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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111

passengers' injuries resulted from an "accident" under Article 17
were unacceptably vague and conclusory. At most, the court
observed, the passengers made only passing and conclusory
reference to the carriers' negligent design, construction, and
transportation. Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss the
passengers' claims under the Warsaw Convention with prejudice
because it was unable to conclude that the passengers would be

Ii:.

unable to amend their complaints with additional and consistent

I,."

facts to supply a ground for relief. The passengers were

IW

1[,

accordingly granted leave to amend their complaints, and the
court advised that they would be required to present a factual
basis for any allegation that the accident was unusual or
unexpected.

260

Pavey v. Qantas Airways Ltd

(Australian Case)

The High Court of Australia in a joint judgment affirming
QANTAS Ltd v. Povey,261 in which the appellant alleged that,
"during the course of or following the flights" from Sydney to
London and return, he suffered from deep venous thrombosis
(DVT) , "caused by the conditions of and procedures relating to
passenger travel upon the flights," including cramped seating
260
261

2005 WL 1460709 (RCA 2005).
2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (RCA
2004).
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from which it was not easy to move, the discouraging of
movement about the cabin, and the offering of alcohol, tea, and
coffee during the flights, held that the allegations which the
appellant makes, if proved, would not establish a cause of action
against the carriers.
The court noted that that conclusion is consistent with the
decisions reached in intermediate courts of appeal in the United
States and in England about the application of the Warsaw
Convention and subsequent treaties to cases of DVT. The court
noted that in the Deep Vein Thrombosis case infra, the Court of
Appeal of England and Wales held that the word "accident" in
the Warsaw Convention as modified by the Hague Protocol was
to be given a natural and sensible, but also flexible and
purposive, meaning in its context and that for there to be an
accident within the meaning of the relevant article, there had to
be an event external to the passenger which impacted on the
body in a manner which caused death or bodily injury and the
event had to be unusual, unexpected, or untoward. The
conditions

In

which passengers travelled on flights (with

cramped seating and the like) were not capable of amounting to
an event that satisfied the first limb of the definition of an

140

accident which "took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."
The High Court of Australia further noted that in the United
States, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Blansett v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.,262 and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd.,263 have
also held that development of DVT was not, in the
circumstances alleged in those cases, an accident within the
meaning of the Warsaw Convention. Although the appellant
sought to gain some comfort from a statement made in the
opinion in Rodriguez to the effect that the court did not need to
decide whether an airline's failure to warn ofDVT can constitute
an accident, that aspect of the court's opinion was no more than
a reflection of the narrowness of the issue tendered for its
decision, and it is not, as the appellant's argument tended to
suggest, to be translated into any positive proposition of law. For
these reasons, it was held that appeal to the High Court should
be dismissed with costs.

262
263

379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 672, 160 L. Ed. 2d 498 (U.S. 2004).
See supra note 257.
'
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Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation,

Ri64

(UK Case)
Where a group of international airline passengers alleging
that a group of carriers was liable to them under the Warsaw
Convention for the occurrence of deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
resulting from traveling in the carrier's aircraft, the United
Kingdom court held that the alleged provision of cramped
seating, inadequate air pressure, and uncomfortable atmosphere
and temperature in the cabin, integral features of carriage
pertaining throughout the flight, were not capable of amounting
to an accident for purposes of Article 17. The existence of those
permanent features of the aircraft or the subjecting of the
passengers to carriage in an aircraft with those features was not
capable of amounting an event that satisfied the first limb of the
definition of an accident taking place on board an aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking, the court stated. For that reason alone, the court
concluded, the flight itself, even assuming that it caused the
DVT, was not capable of amounting to an accident under Article
17.

264--------

2003 WL 21353471 (CA (Civ Div) 2003).,
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2-8-4.

Will failure

to warn

the risks associated with

international flight be an "accident"

Whether failure to warn the risks associated with
international flight could be a Warsaw Convention Article 17' s
"accident", the global courts said "no", except one US case,
Miller (infra), the court held differently. These cases are mainly
concerned about DVT as well, except one case, re UAL Corp
(infra), concerned the issue of exposure to pesticides.

Miller v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 265

Allegations of international airline passengers

In

their

amended complaints that the failure of the defendant carriers
failed to warn them of risk of deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
despite the customary procedure and policy of the carriers to
warn passengers of the risks of contracting DVT during lengthy
flights and to warn or advise of the simple steps that passengers
could take to minimize the risks of DVT constituted an
"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention were
sufficient, the court held, to withstand the carriers' motion to
dismiss the passengers' Warsaw Convention claims under Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief
265

2003 WL 21557678 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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can be granted. The court rejected as immaterial the carrier's
argument that the passengers' allegations had no factual basis
since, under Saks, the occurrence of an accident

IS

a

fact-intensive inquiry that should be flexibly applied after
assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger's
injuries, an evaluation not appropriate on a motion to dismiss.

Rodriguez v. Ansett Australia Ltd. 266

The court held that the air carrier's alleged failure to warn
the passenger about the risks of developing deep vein
thrombosis CDVT) during long flights was not an "accident"
I"H.

1),,1'1,

within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, given the
absence of evidence of either an industry standard or airline
policy requiring the air carrier to issue such warnings, and of a
showing that the air carrier's conduct rose to the level of an
unexpected or unusual event or happening external to the
passenger, who developed DVT during the international flight.

.
L t.
d 267
. v. B··
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Holding that a carrier's alleged failure to warn an
international airline passenger of the risk of deep vein
266
267

383 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1665 (U.S. 2005).
.
2003 WL 22769110 (D. Alaska 2003).
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thrombosis (DVT) associated with long periods of sitting was
not an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention, the court granted the carriers' motion for
summary judgment in an action under the Warsaw Convention
alleging that the passenger suffered a stroke after his flight
caused by a blood clot which had traveled to his brain. A failure
to warn, the court ruled, cannot constitute an unexpected or
unusual event in the absence, as in the instant case, of an
established industry standard to do so. The passenger presented
['I f.1 : f- ~; ..

the affidavit of an expert to show the existence of an industry
standard to warn but, the court emphasized, noticeably absent in
that affidavit was any reference to an industry standard in place
in 2000 when the flight in question was taken by the passenger.

Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 268

The plaintiff, who traveled from Houston, Texas, to
London, England on a flight operated by the defendant, during
the flight, suffered an episode of deep vein thrombosis ("DVT"),
resulting in a cerebral stroke that left him permanently
debilitated, sued the defendant, alleging that it was liable for his
injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, to which the
26&

379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 672, 160 L. Ed. 2d 498 (U.S. 2004),
reversing Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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United States is a signatory, held that the defendant's failure to
provide DVT warnings and instructions could not have
constituted an "accident" under Article 17. The pertinent
question was whether the defendant's failure to provide
warnmgs

and

instructions

concernmg DVT could have

constituted a covered "accident" under Article 17. The court
noted that because the Convention was written in French and
against the background of French law, the Supreme Court has
looked to French law to interpret the meaning of "accident" in
Article 17 (citing Saks). In French law, "accident" is usually
given to mean a "fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended
event." The Supreme Court noted, accordingly, that an accident
under Article 17 is an "unexpected or unusual event.. .. " The
Supreme Court also noted that the Convention speaks of an
"accident which caused" an injury rather than an accident that is
an injury, and accordingly, a qualifying "unusual or unexpected
event" must be distinct from "the passenger's own internal
reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the
aircraft." The court noted that in Olympic Airways v. Husain,269
the Supreme Court concluded that, under some circumstances,
an "accident" may constitute an omission or refusal to act. The

269

540 u.s. 644,124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004).
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court noted that the situation in the instant case differs markedly
from that in Husain. Here, no request was made of the airline;
the flight staff was entirely passive. The Supreme Court noted
that facts similar to those here are at least distinguishable from
those in Husain. Justice Scalia's dissent pointed to decisions in
several foreign jurisdictions concluding that a failure to warn
and instruct ofDVT risks is not an "event" under Article 17. The
Supreme Court stated that the failure to give warning in the
foreign

Warsaw

Convention

cases

involving

DVT,

as

distinguished from a specific refusal to lend requested aid in
Husain, was enough to prevent conflict between them. The court
held that the defendant's failure to warn of DVT was not an
"unusual or unexpected event" and not a qualifying "accident."
The court noted that though many international carriers in 2001
included DVT warnings, it was undisputed that many did not,
and, moreover, the defendant's battery of warnings was in
accord with the policies of the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA"), which prescribes what warnings airlines should issue
to passengers. The court thus held that no jury may be permitted
to find that the defendant's failure to warn of DVT constituted
an "accident" under Article 17, as the defendant's policy was far
from unique in 2001 and was fully in accord with the
147

expectations of the FAA, and its procedures were neither
unexpected nor unusual.

Re UAL Corp. 270

The court held that personal injuries that the airline
passenger allegedly sustained due to her exposure to pesticides
applied in furtherance of the airline's legal obligation to
exterminate insects that might be present on planes flying to
Australia

and

New Zealand did not result

from

any

"unexpected" or "unusual" event, as required for injuries to arise
;::,

from an "accident" and to be compensable under the Warsaw
Convention, though the passenger may not have been aware that
the airline routinely applied such pesticides in planes flying to
Australia and New Zealand as a result of the airline's failure to
inform her of this fact; accordingly, the personal injury claim
filed in the debtor-airline's Chapter 11 case for such injuries had
to be disallowed, as invalid under governing law.

Pavey v Qantas Airways, Ltd.

271

(Australian Case)

A joint judgment of the High Court of Australia held that
the alleged failure of the carrier to provide the passenger with
270
271

31 0 B.R. 373,43 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
.
2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005).
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information or any warnmg about the risks of DVT did not
constitute an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17. The
joint judgment noted that references to "failure" to warn in this
context were irrelevant and unhelpful. They were irrelevant
because they had to proceed from unstated premises about the
content or origin of some duty to warn. The joint judgment
noted that there was no basis for introducing, for example,
concepts of the common law of negligence to the construction or
application of an international treaty like Montreal No.4. The
joint judgment noted that unless there is resort to some standard
of legal behavior to determine whether what happened was a
"failure," the description of what happened as a failure is, in
truth, no more than an assertion that there was no warning. The
joint judgment further noted that the references to failure were
unhelpful because they suggested that the only point at which
some relevant warning could or should have been given was on
board the aircraft. But if some warning was necessary or
appropriate, it is not apparent why it should not have been given
at a much earlier point of making arrangements to travel by air,
rather than on board the aircraft. Further, the joint judgment
noted, reference to failure was unhelpful because it diverts
attention from what it is that happened on board to what might
149

have, could have, or perhaps should have happened there and
why that should be so; if it is appropriate to ask "what happened
on board?" the answer in this case is that the appellant alleged
that nothing unexpected or unusual happened there.
The lower court in Qantas Ltd. v Povey,272 noted that
following the definition of the word "accident" by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Saks, the word accident requires proof of a
specific incident or occurrence that can be characterized as
fortuitous. Noting that the passenger's allegations started out in
relatively simple terms largely derived from a description of the
flight conditions particularized in five different but cumulative
ways and a bald allegation that there was "an accident which
took place on board the aircraft," the lower court said an
allegation that the passenger had not been provided with any
information or warning about the risk ofDVT or about measures
to reduce that risk, on its own, certainly could not amount to an
accident. The reason, the lower court declared, was not only that
it referred to a nonevent and mere inaction, but also that it
described a state of affairs which did not change from the start
to the end of each flight. On their own or in combination, the
flight conditions alleged by the passenger seemed far removed
272

2003 WL 23000692 (VCA 2003), affmned by 2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005).
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from the description of an accident given in Saks because they
were merely the broad description of circumstances attending
the flights. At the end of the day, the lower court commented,
one was left with a description of the conditions and
circumstances of the flight rather than anything that could in
ordinary language be described as an event, occurrence, and
more particularly, an accident. Moreover, the lower court stated,
the concentr~tion on the carrier's behavior and whether it was
either expected or unexpected, or usual or unusual, missed the
point because Article 17 is directed toward the occurrence of an
accident which must take place on board the aircraft. It was thus
irrelevant, the lower court continued, who caused the accident.
The strict or presumptive liability of Article 17 does not seek an
answer to that question as long as the accident occurs in one of
the designated places, which is why acts of hijackers satisfy
Article 17 although there may be no responsibility in common
law on the part of the carrier. If the allegations in the instant
case go at all beyond nonaction, the lower court concluded, they
must consist in the describing of the alleged circumstances in
colored terms such that the alleged behavior becomes unusual or
unexpected but the complaint did not tum the allegations into an
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accident, i.e., a fact, event, happening, or incident of a fortuitous
kind for which Article 17 otherwise provides compensation.

273

McDonald v. Korean Air

(Canadian Case)

An action under the Warsaw Convention by an airline
passenger against a carrier for injury caused by deep vein
thrombosis (DVT) during an international flight, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice held that the failure of the carrier to
warn and educate passengers on lengthy flights that they may be
exposed to DVT did not constitute an unusual and unexpected
operation of the aircraft, that the failure did not mark a breach of
:'.::,1

duty of care of carriers to their passengers, and that the breach
of such duty was not an accident within the meaning of Article
17. While noting that a carrier may be negligent in not advising
passengers of the risk they assume, the court said that such
negligence is not in itself an accident within the meaning of
Article 17 in the sense that the DVT sustained by the passenger
was not linked to an unusual or unexpected event external to the
passenger.
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2002 WL 1861837 (Ont. S.C.J. 2002), surmnarily affirmed by, 2003 WL 8203 (Ont.
2003), leave to appeal refused by, 2003 WL 22006338 (Can. 2003).
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!2eep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation, Ri74
(UK Case)
The United Kingdom held in an action by a group of
international airline passengers alleging that a group of carriers
was liable to them for the occurrence of deep vein thrombosis
(DVT) resulting from traveling in the carrier's aircraft, that the
failure to warn of the risk of DVT or to advise on precautions
which would avoid or minimize that risk could not be
categorized as an accident under Article 17. Rather, the court
explained, it was simply something that did not happen, a
nonevent.

2-9. Other events

2-9-1. Can the conduct of another passenger be an "accident"
Can the conduct of another passenger be an accident under
Warsaw

Convention

Warsaw-Montreal

Art.

System's

177

Under

power

the

pressure

of exclusivity,

of

smce

recovery for personal injury if not allowed under Warsaw
Convention, is not available at all,275 courts usually interpret the
meaning of "accident" in a broad fashion after the US Supreme
274
275

2003 WL 21353471 (CA (Civ Div) 2003).
See Tseng, 525 u.s. at 161, (1999).
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Court's decision of Tseng. From 1999 to present date, only one
case held the conduct of other passenger was not an Article 17's
"accident", 0' Grady infra.

Schneider v Swiss Air Transport Co. Ltd. 276
The court stated that the full reclining of two seats in front
of the plaintiff, coupled with the refusal of the occupants of the
seats to raise their seats when requested to do so, and the refusal
of the flight attendant to intervene when requested to do so,
could be considered by the fact-finders to have been external to
the plaintiff and beyond the usual, normal, and expected
operation of an aircraft and, finding that genuine issues of
material fact remained as to whether the carrier's personnel
refused to intervene, denied the carrier's motion for summary
judgment, in which the carrier claimed that the plaintiffs injury
was not caused by an "accident" within the meaning of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention.

Wallace v Korean Air277
Holding that sexual molestation by a fellow passenger
constituted an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the
276
277

686 F. Supp. 15 (D. Me. 1988).
214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Warsaw Convention, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the carrier
in the plaintiffs action under the Warsaw Convention based on
an incident in which the person sitting next to her unzipped and
unbuttoned her shorts and placed his hand in her underpants
while she slept. The court remarked that the struggle with the
Supreme Court's definition of "accident" in Saks, as an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger is particularly difficult where putative injuries are
caused by torts committed by fellow passengers. Without taking
a position on the propriety of the standard applied by the district
court, that an accident under Article 17 must arise from risks
that are characteristic of air travel, the court found that even
under that narrow approach, an accident occurred in the instant
case. It was plain, the court thought, that the characteristics of
air travel increased the plaintiffs vulnerability to the fellow
passenger's assault: when she took her seat, she was cramped
into a confined space beside two men she did not know, one of
whom turned out to be a sexual predator, the lights were turned
down, and the sexual predator was left unsupervised in the dark.
Equally important, in the court's view, was the manner in which
the fellow passenger was able to carry out his assault. The court
155
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pointed out that his actions could not have been brief even for
the nimblest of fingers, and they could not have been entirely
inconspicuous yet for the entire duration of the attack not a
single flight attendant noticed a problem. Finally, the court said
it was not insignificant that when the plaintiff awoke, she could
not get away immediately and had to endure another attack
before clambering out into the aisle.
~ '.: "

Lahey v Singapore Airlines, Ltd.

27s

,1;f'::,':

Where the plaintiff, a passenger on an international flight,
sought damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention for
injuries sustained in an alleged assault by a fellow passenger,
the court held that the assault in the instant case was an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17. The fellow
passenger, who was seated behind the plaintiff, pushed and
kicked the back of the plaintiffs seat on several occasions.
Refusing to switch seats, the fellow passenger subsequently
punched the plaintiff through a gap in her row of seats, threw a
food tray at her, and struck her head with a plastic entree dish
causing a laceration of the plaintiffs scalp. The plaintiff pressed
charges against the fellow passenger and he was arrested when
;=-8- - - - - - 115 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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the aircraft landed. Contrary to the position the carrier advanced
at trial, the court said the actions of the crew were not relevant
to a determination of whether the assault was an "accident"
because it was clear that nothing in the term "accident" suggests
a requirement of culpable conduct on the part of the airline crew.
Noting the plaintiffs testimony that she was "shocked and
surprised" when she was struck on the temple from between the
seats and that no member of the crew expected that the fellow
passenger would throw his tray at the plaintiff, the court
declared that the incident was certainly "unexpected and
unusual" and "external" to the plaintiff and, as such was an
~ i ,I

accident under Article 17.

Oliver v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc.

279

The court held that an accident within the meanmg of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention occurred when a fellow
passenger fell unexpectedly on the plaintiff-passenger, and thus
the Warsaw Convention applied in the action of the injured
passenger against the airline. The court stated that, although the
alleged cause of the accident, the continued availability of
alcohol on the plane, may not have been accidental, the proper
279

Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,283 (D. Md. 1983).
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focus was on what happened to the injured passenger. The court
stated that, while the Warsaw Convention does not itself define
the term "accident," the facts in the instant case met the
definition found in Demarines v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,28o
that an accident is "an unexpected and sudden event that takes
place without foresight." The court concluded, however, that the
filing of that claim more than two years after the alleged
accident was time barred, because the passenger's claim was
governed by the terms of the Warsaw Convention, and
accordingly granted the airline's motion to dismiss.

Tsevas v Delta Air Lines. Inc. 281

Where a passenger sought to recover damages under the
Warsaw Convention for injuries suffered in a sexual assault by
another passenger, contending that the carrier's flight attendants
continued to serve the assailant alcoholic beverages despite
being notified of the assailant's behavior, and that the flight
attendants refused to move her to another seat until after the
assault, the court recognizing the Supreme Court's definition of

280 433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Although the Third Circuit reversed the district court in
DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 575,26 Fed. R.
Servo 2d 226 (3d Cir. 1978), the court of appeals stated that the trial court's definition of "accident"
properly presented the jury with the correct legal standard for determining the occurrence of an
accident.
281 1997 WL 767278 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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"accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention in Saks,
as an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external
to the passenger, held that the unwanted advance of another
passenger, coupled with the refusal of the carrier's flight
attendants to intervene when requested to do so, constituted an
unexpected event external to the passenger that was beyond the
usual and normal operation of the aircraft. In the instant case,
the court observed, the passenger's injuries clearly did not result
from her internal reaction to normal airplane operations, but
rather from a combination of unexpected and unusual events
external to her. According to the complaint, the carrier's
employees served alcohol to the assailant to the point where he
became intoxicated or otherwise uninhibited. When the
passenger informed the flight crew that the assailant was
intoxicated, they took no action and continued to serve him
drinks. Thereafter, when the assailant began to make unwanted
and unsolicited advances toward her, the passenger advised the
flight crew of the situation and asked to be moved. Again, the
carrier's employees failed to act by either subduing the assailant
or moving the passenger to a different seat on the plane. The
court rejected the carrier's argument that an assault by a fellow
passenger cannot be an accident, an argument based on Stone v
159

Continental Airlines, Inc.,282 the court distinguished Stone from
the instant case, pointing out that there was no indication in
Stone that the carrier's flight attendants failed to provide any
service to the plaintiff that would have defused the situation or
that the situation allowed the carrier's employees an opportunity
to prevent the assault. Finding that the passenger's alleged
injuries, if established, could be the result of an accident within
the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the court
"

denied the carrier's motion to dismiss her claims under the

j',,\

.• ,.',
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of

Warsaw Convention.

Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlinei83 (UK Case)
An action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention by a
15-year old female international airline passenger who allegedly
was touched in an inappropriate manner by a fellow male
passenger seated next to her, that the incident which befell the
passenger was an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17.
Specifically, it was agreed that the passenger was seated next to
two men who were speaking French to each other. After a meal,
she fell asleep and woke to discover the hand of the man next to
her was caressing her between her hip and knee and his fingers
"Li
"

282
283
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905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
2001 WL 483072 (CA (Civ Div) 2001).
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dug into her thigh. She got up, walked away, and told an air
hostess what had occurred. The court took judicial notice of the
fact that those who travel economy have to accept relatively
cramped conditions which bring them into close proximity with
their neighbors and the circumstances are rare that result in a 15
year-old girl settling down to sleep in close proximity to an
unknown man. The court did not doubt that incident exemplified
a special risk inherent in air travel and that, whatever the precise
test may be, it constituted an accident.

,;.

· · h A zrways
.
284
O 'Grad
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v ntzs
The court denied the motion for a new trial of an
international airline passenger following an adverse jury verdict
on her action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention based
on an alleged assault by a fellow passenger, ruling that although
the courts in Wallace v Korean Air285 and Lahey v Singapore
Airlines, Ltd.

286

found that the passenger on passenger violence

in those cases constituted an accident under the Warsaw
Convention, those cases do not lend support to the proposition
that this Court was required to instruct the jury that an accident
under the Warsaw Convention includes, as a matter of law, an
284
285
286

134 F. Supp. 2d 407 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
See supra note 277.
See supra note 278.
161

assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a fellow airline
passenger. In fact, in Wallace, the Second Circuit explicitly
stated that "we have no occasion to decide whether all
co-passenger torts are necessarily accidents for the purposes of
the Convention." The fact that neither court made the bold
assertion that an assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a
fellow airline passenger was ipso facto an accident under the
Warsaw Convention belies Ms. O'Grady's argument. In addition,
the fact that the decisions of neither court are directly binding
upon this Court further negates Ms. O'Grady's argument. As
such, Ms. O'Grady's argument that the Court erred by not
instructing the jury that the definition of accident includes, as a
matter of law, an assault committed upon a seated plaintiff by a
fellow passenger during an international flight is without merit.
These cases serve as fair warning to air carriers that their
immunity from liability of passenger actions continues to be
severely limited to circumstances that do not lend themselves in
any way to being labeled as an unusual or unexpected event.
The rulings above demonstrate that courts have rejected the
airlines' argument that the Warsaw Convention was not
intended to impose absolute liability on air carriers for the
unforeseeable acts of passengers. Under the Saks definition of
162

"accident", an injury passenger need only prove that some link
in the chain of causation was an unusual or unexpected event
external to the passenger. Courts will impose liability on air
carriers where a link in the chain of causation was some act or
omission on the part of the airline or its employees. The recent
trend in the law indicates that air carriers may avoid liability
only when courts adopt the "inherent in air travel requirement"
and then find that passenger torts are either not "characteristic
risk of air travel" or have no relationship with the "operation of
the aircraft".

I,c,,!

As in the 1970's and 1980's, the courts responded to
hijackings,

I':"

:"",1,'

terrorist

attacks,

and

bombings

on

board

international aircrafts by imposing liability for passenger
injuries caused by these "accident". At the tum of twenty-first
century, the courts are again responding to the rise in violent
incidents aboard aircrafts by extending liability for "accident"
caused by the violent intentional acts of passengers. Commercial
air carriers are in the best position to enact and implement safety
and security measures that would deter dangerous passenger
behavior. To avoid liability for violent passenger behavior, air
carriers must be proactive rather than reactive. Airlines must
adopt a "zero tolerance" policy or assaults.
163

2-9-2. Will turbulence be an "accident"

Can turbulence be an accident under Warsaw Convention
Art. 17? The US courts more likely to answer it as "yes",
however, outside of the US, such as Canada, courts are more
likely to answer it as "no".

87

Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlinei

Reversing the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of a carrier in an action by a passenger under
the Warsaw Convention for an injury received during a flight
,II'

when he bumped his head on the cabin ceiling while the aircraft
encountered turbulence, the court held that the plaintiff
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to the degree of
turbulence experience by the aircraft and whether his injury was
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. In the instant case, the district court decided that, as
a matter of law, injuries sustained in the course of "light" or
"moderate" turbulence as described by the turbulence reporting
criteria of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) can never
qualify as resulting from an "accident" under the Warsaw
287

339 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Convention for purposes of imposing liability on a carrier and
determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the degree of turbulence experienced by the flight on
which the plaintiff was injured. Noting the Supreme Court's
exhortation in Saks, to apply its definition of accident as an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the
passenger flexibly, the court rejected the carrier's view, adopted
by the district court, that turbulence will not constitute an
accident under Article 17 unless it is established that the
turbulence was "severe" or "extreme" as defined by the FAA as
well as the plaintiffs view that the degree of turbulence is
,Ii'

irrelevant to the accident inquiry as long as it results in an
impact, an event external to the passenger. Observing nothing in
the Supreme Court's various formulations of an accident
suggesting that a bright-line rule of liability should be or
necessarily can be, established for particular weather events and
all their attendant consequences, the court said that the district
court's attempt to graft weather-reporting criteria for pilots,
which the court characterized as not regulatory and established
for purposes wholly independent of the Warsaw Convention,
namely to facilitate pilot reporting to a national weather
database, was misplaced. Contrary to the district court's
165

conclusion, based on FAA information on several web sites, that
light and moderate turbulence are a normal part of any routine
flight while severe and extreme turbulence are not, the court
thought that such a determination was a factual matter more
appropriately addressed at trial.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the record in the instant
case was far from settled regarding the amount of turbulence
actually experienced by the flight. While the pilot described the
turbulence as both light and medium in the log, the plaintiff
indicated that he found walking almost impossible, a hallmark
of severe turbulence, a fellow passenger described the
turbulence as significant, and the plaintiff presented expert
testimony suggesting that the aircraft may have encountered
momentarily severe turbulence. By concluding that the flight
experienced only light or moderate turbulence, the court
reasoned, the district court essentially credited the pilot's
characterization over the plaintiffs contrary evidence, an
approach that was not appropriate at the summary judgment
stage when the record was to be construed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.
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Brunk v. British Airways PLC. 288

Rejecting the defendant carrier's contention that it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff
international airline passenger's claim under the Warsaw
Convention that the turbulence which the plaintiff claimed
caused her knee injury was not sufficiently severe to constitute
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the court held
that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
. plaintiff, showed that a reasonable juror could find that the
plaintiffs injury was caused by an unusual or unexpected event,
a precipitous drop of the aircraft during moderate to severe
I!

turbulence, and not be her own internal reaction to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft. In particular, the
court noted, there was evidence that the plaintiff sustained an
injury caused by a jolt of turbulence substantial enough to cause
her to leave her feet and fall to the floor of the aircraft with such
an impact that the ligaments of her knee were tom. Moreover,
the court observed, it was claimed that the turbulence caused a
sensation likened to that resulting from the dip of a roller coaster
which, in addition to causing the plaintiff to fall, dislodged
several of the passengers' food trays. Applying the definition of
288

195 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2002).
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accident under Saks, and elementary summary judgment
principles, the court denied the carrier's motion for summary
judgment.

Koor v. Air Canada

289

(Canadian Case)

An action by a passenger on an international flight under
the Warsaw Convention for injury suffered when the aircraft
encountered turbulence while she was attempting use a lavatory,
causing her to fall and fracture her ankle, the court held that the
turbulence in the instant case did not constitute an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17. The court noted a "Turbulence
Reporting Criteria Table" produced by Transport Canada with
the purpose of providing guidelines for reporting cases of
various levels of turbulence which described four different
degrees of turbulence: light, moderate, severe, and extreme, as
well as a flight report filed by the crew indicating moderate
turbulence for six or seven seconds. Observing that the
witnesses were not unanimous in their description of weather
conditions, the court found it more probable that there was only
light turbulence at the very most during the 10 to 15 minutes
that the seatbelt lights had been on prior to the passenger's fall

289

2001 WL 452006 (Ont. S.C.J. 2001) ..
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and that what caused her fall was a violent, sudden, and
extremely brief increase in the intensity to the point where the
turbulence for six or seven seconds was of the high moderate
classification bordering on the severe. Accordingly, the court
ruled, since the turbulence was short of severe, the passenger's
injury was not caused or contributed to by any accident within
the meaning of Article 17.

Quinn v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd. 290 (Canadian
Case)
Where a 72-year-old international airline passenger,
'I'"

suffering from severe chronic osteoporosis, brought an action
against a carrier both in contract and tort after she sustained
compression fractures of three vertebrae in her back allegedly
caused by a pocket of turbulence encountered by the aircraft, the
Ontario Court of Justice ruling that to succeed, the passenger
was required to establish that her injuries were suffered during
the flight and that her injuries were the result of an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
held that the degree of turbulence encountered on the flight in

290 1994 WL 1694773 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1994), Affirmed without opinion by, 1997 WL 1917376
(Ont. CA. 1997), leave to appeal refused by, 1997 WL 1932474 (Can. 1997).
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the instant case could not be said to have been unusual or
expected and did not constitute an accident under Article 17.
The court referred to the testimony of the plaintiff and two
other passengers that, in addition to the turbulence of the sort
that they had often previously experienced and that they
regarded as normal and expected, there was on the flight in
question an incident of turbulence that was notably more severe,
involving a sudden loss of altitude and a loud bump which made
two of them think that the aircraft may have hit the ground.
Remarking that air turbulence is neither unexpected nor unusual
and that up to some level of severity it is a commonplace of air
i"'1

travel, the court found as a fact that the turbulence encountered
on the flight in question, while greater than that previously
experienced by three passenger-witnesses, including the plaintiff,
did not amount to an accident, defined in Saks, as an unexpected
or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.
The court, relying on a "Turbulence Reporting Criteria Table"
published by Transport Canada which classified turbulence
intensity in four categories: light, moderate, severe, and extreme,
the court opined that the degree of turbulence encountered on
the flight in the instant case did not amount to severe turbulence.
The court observed that the passenger herself did not report any
170

strain on her seatbelt, that the evidence did not show that objects
were tossed about, and that the captain did not file any report of
severe or extreme turbulence, a report that would have been
required if such turbulence had been encountered.

2-9-3. Will acts of terrorism be an "accident"

Can acts of terrorism be accidents under Warsaw
Convention Art. 17? The courts unanimously said "yes",
terrorism acts are within the scope of the Warsaw Convention's
"accident" .

'!I'!

Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd.

291

In an action by a passenger against an airline for bodily
injury and mental anguish allegedly suffered by the passenger as
a result of an aircraft hijacking, the court held that a hijacking
was within the ambit of the term "accident" and sufficient to
raise the presumption of liability under the Warsaw Convention
as modified. The flight from Zurich to New York was hijacked
to Amman, Jordan, where the passengers were forced to remain
for approximately six days. The court declared that to invoke the
Convention
291

there

must

be

485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
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an

"accident"

within

the

contemplation of Article 17, and the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that such an accident occurred. The airline
argued strenuously that, if the cause of the damage is intentional,
it is not an "accident." Rejecting this contention, the court based
its construction of the word "accident" on the United States State
Department press releases and orders of the United States Civil
Aeronautics Board subsequent to the Montreal Agreement,
which amends the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized
the wording of the State Department that "those guilty of
sabotage and persons claiming on their behalf will not be
entitled to recover any damages," explaining that one is led to
infer that the innocent victims of willful acts by others were to
be able to recover from the carrier, even in respect to acts of
sabotage to the aircraft. The court reasoned that the analogy
between hijacking and sabotage is clear and that the airline had
failed to indicate any logical basis for distinguishing the two.
The court explained further that the policy underpinnings of the
Warsaw Convention also led to its conclusion that the hijacking
was an accident since the Convention as modified functions to
redistribute the costs involved in air transportation: the carrier is
best qualified initially to develop defensive mechanisms to
avoid such incidents since the carrier physically controls the
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aircraft and access to it; the carrier is likewise the party most
capable of assessing and ensuring against the risks associated
with air transportation; and, finally, the carrier is the party most
able to distribute the costs of the first two steps effectively. The
court accordingly denied the airline's motion for dismissal of the
complaint and for summary judgment.

Re Tel Aviv292

The court held that passengers who were injured in a
terrorist attack in the baggage area of an airport terminal
building were no longer in the course of disembarking, stated
that the defendant airline conceded that the terrorist attack was
an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention.

Day v TWA

293

Holding that the fact that a terrorist attack occurred inside a
terminal building did not preclude coverage under the Warsaw
Convention, the appellate court stated that it was undisputed that
a terrorist attack is considered an "accident" within the purview

292
2

93

405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975).
528F.2d31 (2dCir.1975).
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of Article 17.294 The appellate court affirmed a judgment

III

favor of passengers who had been injured in the attack.

Evangelinos v TWA

295

The court of appeals discussing whether a terrorist attack
on airline passengers in an airport took place in the course of
any of the operations of embarking, stated that the airline did not
dispute the district court's conclusion that a terrorist attack on an
airline's passengers is an "accident" within the meaning of
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.

296
I",

La Compagnie Nationale Air France, SA v Haddad

297

(French

Case)
The French court determined that the term "accident" could
not be restricted to technical or mechanical accidents affecting
the aircraft. The court ruled that physical injuries resulting from
hijackers aboard an international flight from Tel Aviv, Israel to
Paris, France, was within the category of Article

17

compensable acts. The court found that the term applies to
The court cited without elaboration Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Company, Ltd., supra note
as authority.
291,
295
29 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977) .
. 6 The trial court in Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
Judgment rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977), had stated that there was no attempt
by the Montreal Agreement to limit the application of" an accident" as defined in Article 17 of the
~arsaw Convention to exclude the criminal act of a third party.
CAParis, June 19, 1979, E.C.C. 1981,207 . .
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troubles during a normal flight that result from "unforeseen
intervention by malevolent third parties," such in the
circumstances of a hijacking.
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CHAPTER THREE

What Constitutes "From EMBARKING To
DISEMBARKING" Under the Warsaw Montreal System

176

3-1. Introduction

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 provides:
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." (The Montreal
Convention 1999 Art. 17 is substantially the same).

While the word "accident" describes the type of incident
covered by the provisions of the Conventions, the terms
"embarking" and "disembarking" delineate the points in time at
which liability of the carrier begins and ends.
It makes no difference that the negligence occurred or that

the contract was formed prior to embarkation, for Article 17
refers to the place in which the accident causing injury must
take place in order for that article to cover the case and establish
the presumption of liability for the injury. The actual, ultimate
cause of the accident is irrelevant for purposes of Article 17 ...
As long as, and only if, the accident which caused the injury
'took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking,' the action is covered

by Article 17. 298
At the 1929 Warsaw Conference, the delegates were faced

See Husser! v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 13 CCH Avi 17603 (S.D. NY
1975).
.
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with two general proposals concernmg the extent of carrier
liability. One point of view was that liability attached from the
moment the passenger entered the air terminal and extended
until the passenger left the terminal at his destination. A more
restrictive view was advanced which would have extended
liability from the time the passenger boarded the aircraft until
the time of deplaning. The broader plan of liability was rejected
in favor of the language presently contained in Article 17.
Perhaps the restrictive one too.

300

299

Since the Guatemala

Conference, in 1971, the use of the words "embarking" and
"disembarking" were re-examined in the light of the absolute
I"

liability regime which had been established by the Montreal
Interim Agreement, but it was apparently the consensus of
opinion of the delegates that the wording needed no change.

301

Even in the new Montreal Convention 1999, the words are still
the same.
Little difficulty has been encountered in the cases dealing
with the phrase, "on board the aircraft," physical presence while
299 For useful background discussion of the views expressed at the 1929 Conference, see Martinez
Hernandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800,
97 S Ct 1592. Infra.
See also Note: Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within
~orerrninal. 45 Fordham L Rev 369.
See Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den
~o~9 US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US 1124,51 LEd 574,97 S Ct 1162. Infra.
As to discussion of "embarking" and "disembarking" by the delegates of the Guatemala
Conference, see Minutes of the International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City (1971),
ICAO Document 9040--LC/167-1, pp 31 et seq. .
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reboarding is sufficient to allow the carner to avail of the
Convention even though the claimed injury was assertedly
caused by negligent activity of another airplane of defendant
carrier--other than the one being reboarded in international
transportation?02 A somewhat more complicated problem as to
construction of "on board the aircraft" occurs where a passenger
claims damages for injuries also suffered while she was being
confined in a hotel by hijackers after having been removed from
the aircraft being hijacked. The Husserl opinion, in construing
"on board the aircraft" to include the time spent in the city in
question in the hotel, reasoned as follows:
The drafters of the Convention undoubtedly assumed that
the time 'on board the aircraft' included all of the time between
embarkation at the origin of a flight and disembarkation at a
scheduled destination of a flight. Furthermore, the purpose of
the Convention to limit liability is best served by such a
construction. Presumably, if a third party caused the plaintiff
injury while she was detained off the aircraft, the airline would

302

Scarf v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 4 CCH Avi 17795 (1955, SD NY), app dismd, 4 CCH Avi

18076 (CA2 NY) 233 F2d 176.
See also Chutter v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611,4 CCH Avi 17733 (S.D.
N.Y. 1955), where the court held that the case fell within the Convention because the accident
causing the damage had occurred on board the aircraft, etc., where the passenger had stepped out
onto a ramp or loading stairs to wave goodbye to her daughter just as the ramp was being pulled
away, and had fallen. Infra.
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be subrogated to her claim against that party; but it would bear
primary liability. In any case and particularly in this case, it
would be extremely difficult to determine what part of plaintiffs
alleged injuries was caused directly by the accident on the
aircraft, what part was caused by events themselves proximately
caused by the accident, and what part was caused by events not
proximately caused by the accident, by the negligence of the
carrier, or by a breach of contract. Therefore, all events which
caused the plaintiff's alleged injuries and which occurred during
the time between leaving Zurich (point of departure) and
returning to Zurich shall be considered to have occurred 'on
board the aircraft. ,303
Until the present day, a huge number of cases have been
strenuously contested as to the meaning of the terms
"embarking" and "disembarking". Those cases have arisen in the
United States and around the world. While some courts appear
to have given more weight to the location factor, other courts
will take into account the totality of circumstances at the time of
the passenger injury, including such factors as the location of the
passenger, the specific activities being performed by the
303 See HusserI v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., supra note 298. See also, Simons, a review of
issues concerned with aerial hijacking and terrorism 63 JALC 731 (1998); Duncan, battling aerial
terrorism and compensating victims 39 NAVLR 241 (1990); Gross, limitation of liability of air
carrier for personal injury or death, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 547.
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passenger, and the degree of control being exercised over the
. 304 Hence, th e courts h ave not been
passenger by th e carner.
uniform in construing "in the course of ... embarking or
disembarking" as used in Article 17, due perhaps to the
ambiguous history of the Convention and the changes in air
transportation technology since the original drafting. The
advantages of international uniformity in the interpretation and
application of the Warsaw Convention are well known,305 but
this is difficult to achieve in the face of conflicting decisions of
national courts, even within one Contracting State, as with the
United States.
Generally, however, "Embarking and disembarking," for
the purposes of the Warsaw Convention, does not include within
its scope all injuries a passenger sustains from the time he or she
first enters the airport of departure until he or she leaves the
airport of arrival. 306 The phrase "embarking and disembarking"
connotes a close temporal and spatial relationship with the flight
itself. 307
Most of the cases wherein it was alleged that the passenger
was killed or injured while embarking held that the injuries did
304
305

:06
07

Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. See supra note 299.
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines (1980) 2All E.R. 696 (H.L.). JBL 1993, Jul,
Beaudet v British Airways, PLC, 853 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
McCarthy v Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F: 3d 313 (1 51 Cir. 1995).
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in fact occur during the course of "embarking," as that word is
used in Article 17. Except those people injured in the common
areas of airports are found not to be embarking,308 and if an
accident occurs more than an hour before the scheduled
departure, it is generally not considered to have occurred in the
course of embarking. 309 However, in those cases wherein it was
alleged that the passenger injuries occurred during the operation
of disembarking, most of them were held that the allegation was
not sustained under the particular circumstances involved.
Article 17 holds the carrier liable for accidents occurring
during the course of "any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking." A broad interpretation of that language might
permit the conclusion that such peripheral activities as checking
baggage, or waiting to pick it up, are indeed operations
31o
connected with embarking or disembarking from an aircraft.
McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 FJd 313 (1st Cir. 1995) (passenger injured on
escalator in common area); Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990)
(passenger killed by terrorist in public area of airport after checking baggage); Abu Hamdeh v.
American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (passenger injured on escalator in
common area of airport); Knoll v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 844 (D. Colo. 1985)
(slip and fall near immigration area at least 300 yards from gate); Kantonides v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, 802 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1992) (passenger injured on moving sidewalk in
common area of airport); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(passenger injured on moving sidewalk in public are of airport); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (passengers in line to check baggage and receive boarding
Ptasses when terrorists attacked).
09 Abu Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (1 Yz hours before
flight); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (more than 1Yz
hours before flight); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (more
than 1\12 hours before flight); Stovall v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 595 N.E.2d
330 (1992) (more than one hour after landing and 2Y2 hours before next flight).
310 Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. See supra note 299. Discussed infra. The court observed that
the French word "operation," as contained in the official version of the Warsaw Convention,

308
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Arguably, the point could be made that the movements of a
disembarking passenger are still under the control of the carrier's
agents until the passenger picks up his baggage, for the
passenger would certainly be loath to leave the terminal without
his baggage. In fact, in many larger terminals, the passenger is
not permitted to leave the baggage area with luggage until an
agent of the airline has examined the baggage check stubs to
ascertain whether they coincide with the claim checks attached
to the luggage items.

311

In those cases that present a close factual question as to
whether the client was "embarking" or "disembarking," when
the injury occurred, the attorney might consider the possibility
of proceeding against either the carrier or the airport authorities,
or both, on a premises liability theory. While such a proceeding
would not have the advantage of absolute liability under the
Warsaw System, neither would it be subject to the limitation on
liability or the two years time bar provided for in the
Convention. 312

connotes a process composed of many acts, and that it has been defined in English as meaning "a
~roup of procedures combined to achieve a result."
11 See, however, MacDonald v Air Canada (1971, CAl Mass) 439 F2d 1402; and also Martinez
&mandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800,
97 S Ct 1592, both discussed infra, in which the court held that under the circumstances involved
in each case passengers killed or injured in the baggage claim area of an air terminal would not
fave the benefit of absolute liability under Article 17.
12 See Adatia v Air Canada (1992) 2 S&B AY. REP. Discussed infra.
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3-2. View that total circumstances in each individual case are
determinative in the US

Taking the position that the physical location of a passenger
was not a sufficient sole criterion on which to determine
whether a passenger was in the course of "embarking" or
"disembarking" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention, the courts in the cases below will look at the
following factor:
(1) The activity of the passenger at the time of the accident

or injury; whether the activity is related to boarding or leaving
the plane;
(2) The passenger's whereabouts at the time of the injury;
the physical proximity of the passenger to the gate and whether
the passenger was in an area controlled by the carrier;
(3) The extent to which the carrier was exercising control
over the passenger at the moment of injury; whether the
passenger was acting at the direction of the carrier or was
restricted by the carrier;
(4) The Immmence of actual boarding or leaving the
plane. 313
McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1995); Buonocore v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441
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3-2-1. Day v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 314 (The leading US
case)
Injured passengers and the executrix of a passenger who
died in a terrorist attack, filed an action against airline company
in which they claimed that the TWA was liable for the injuries
and the death under the Warsaw Convention. The TWA
contended that the application of Article 17 should be
determined by reference only to the area where the accident
occurred. Liability under the Convention should not attach while
the passenger is inside the terminal building. The very earliest
time at which liability can commence is when the passenger
steps through the terminal gate. Judge Brieant, the trail judge,
however, believed that 'the issue ... is not where (the plaintiffs)
feet were planted when the killing began, but, rather, in what
activity was he engaged.' Applying a tripartite test based on
activity (what the plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose
direction) and location, the district judge determined that Article
17 covered the attack at the departure gate. And the appeal
judges agreed.
Irving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge in the appeal, held that the
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Abu Hamdeh v. American Airlines, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mo. 1994);
Stovall v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 595 N.E.2d 330 (1992).
314
See supra note 299.
,
185

..

:

,',

words 'in the course of any of the operations of embarking' do
not exclude events transpiring within a terminal building. Nor,
do these words set forth any strictures on location. Rather, the
drafters of the Convention looked to whether the passenger's
actions

were

embarkation.

a

part

of the

operation

or

process

of

315

Article 17 does not define the period of time before
passengers enter the interior of the airplane when the 'operations
of embarking' commence. It is, nevertheless, appropriate to
consider the activities of the plaintiffs in this case as falling
within the purview of this somewhat cryptic phrase. The facts
disclose that at the time of the terrorist attack, the plaintiffs had
already surrendered their tickets, passed through passport
control, and entered the area reserved exclusively for those
about to depart on international flights. They were assembled at
the departure gate, ready to proceed to the aircraft. The
passengers were not free agents roaming at will through the
terminal. They were required to stand in line at the direction of
TWA's agents for the purpose of undergoing a weapons search
which was a prerequisite to boarding. Whether one looks to the
The French word 'operation' contained in the official version of the Warsaw Convention
connotes a process composed of many acts. It is defmed in the Nouveau Petit Larousse (1950) as
'Ensemble de moyens que l'on combine pour en obtenir un resultat,' or 'a group of procedures
combined to achieve a result.'

315
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passengers' activity (which was a condition to embarkation), to
the restriction of their movements, to the imminence of boarding,
or even to their position adjacent to the terminal gate, the court
driven to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were 'in the course of
embarking. '
Comparing this case with Macdonald v Air Canada 316 ,
discussed infra, the court held:
"We find Macdonald v Air Canada clearly distinguishable. In MacDonald, the court
declined to construe Article 17 as covering an elderly passenger who fell after
disembarking. Mrs. MacDonald was, at the time of her accident, standing near the
baggage 'pickup' area, waiting for her daughter to recover her luggage. Mrs.
MacDonald was, therefore, not acting, as were the passengers in the case at bar, at the
direction of the airlines, but was free to move about the terminal. Furthermore, she
was not, as were the plaintiffs here, performing an act required for embarkation or
disembarkation. We do not, of course, indicate any views on the correctness of the
MacDonald decision."

Moreover, a relatively broad construction of Article 17,
affording protection to the plaintiffs under the Warsaw liability
umbrella, is in harmony with modem theories of accident cost
allocation. The airlines are in a position to distribute among all
passengers what would otherwise be a crushing burden upon
those few unfortunate enough to become 'accident' victims. 317
Equally important, this interpretation fosters the goal of accident
prevention. 318 The airlines, in marked contrast to individual
passengers, are in a better posture to persuade, pressure or, if
316

3\7
318

MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents at 39--45 (1970).
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558,569--70 (9th Cir. 1974).
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need be, compensate airport managers to adopt more stringent
. measures agaInst
.terronst
. attack s. 319
secunty

Finally, the administrative costs of the absolute liability
system embodied in the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the
Montreal Agreement, are dramatically lower than available
alternatives. If Article 17 were not applicable, the passengers
could recover--if at all--only by maintaining a costly suit in a
foreign land against the operator of the airport. The expense and
inconvenience of such litigation would be compounded by the
need to prove fault and the requirements of extensive pretrial
investigation, travel, and other factors too difficult to anticipate.
Such litigation, moreover, would often unduly postpone
payments urgently needed by the seriously injured victim or his
surviving dependents. 320
The court stated that, in interpreting a treaty, one should
look to its legislative history. The Warsaw Convention was the
product of two international conferences, one held in Paris in
1925, and another in Warsaw in 1929. 321 The Paris conference
appointed

a

small

committee

319
320

of experts,

the

Comite

Calabresi at 150--152. Supra note 308.
See Rosenberg and Sovem, Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59
~?lumL.Rev. 1115 (1959).
The history of the Warsaw Convention is discussed in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967); and in Ide, The History and
Accomplishments of the CITEJA, 3 J.Air.L. 27 (1932).
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Intemationale Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA),
to prepare a draft convention for consideration by the delegates
at Warsaw. The version proposed by CITEJA would have
extended accident coverage to passengers from the time when
they enter the airport of departure until the time when they exit
from the airport of arrival. 322 At the Warsaw conference, several
of the delegates criticized this draft. Alcibiades Pecanha, the
Brazilian delegates, proposed that Convention liability not
attach until the passengers were actually inside the aircraft. 323
Prof. Georges Ripert, the French delegate, however, forcefully
argued against both the CITEJA and the Brazilian proposals. It
was, he observed, virtually impossible to draft a precise formula
that would satisfactorily cover the myriad of cases that could
arise. Prof. Ripert proposed that the article be recast in terms
broad enough to allow the courts to take into account the facts of
each case. 324 The delegates voted to reject the CITEJA draft and
to accept the French suggestion?25 The drafting committee then
rewrote the CITEJA proposal in the form now set forth in
Article 17.

322
323
324
325

See Warsaw Minutes at 171.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49--50,
53--54
.
Id. at 57.
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TWA argues that the rejection of the CITEJA draft
manifested an intent to exclude from Warsaw coverage of all
accidents occurring within a terminal building. The court did not
agree. The court asserted that the delegates' action constituted a
rejection of a rigid location-based test in favor of the more
flexible approach espoused by Prof. Ripert. Even if one
disregards this legislative history, the most the court could infer
from the rejection of the CITEJA formula would be a reluctance
to cover all accidents occurring inside a terminal, not a
determination that no such accidents should be covered.
The minutes of the Warsaw proceedings thus undermine
TWA's contention that the delegates wished to implement a rigid
rule based solely on location of the accident. Rather, the court
believes they preferred to provide latitude for the courts to
consider the factual setting of each case by considering the
elements which have been referred to above.
In interpreting a treaty, the court continues: Those called
upon to construe a treaty should, in the words of Judge Clark,
strive to 'give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent
with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting
parties. ,326 These expectations can, of course, change over time.
See Maximov v United States, 299 F. 2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1962), affd 373 U.S. 49, 83 S.Ct.
1054, 10 L.Ed. 2d 184 (1963).

326
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Conditions and new methods may arise not present at the precise
moment of drafting. For a court to view a treaty as frozen in the
year of its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the
Constitutional clock as forever stopped in 1787. Justice
Holmes's counsel concerning Constitutional construction, set
forth in his opinion in Missouri v Holland, applies with equal
force to the task of treaty interpretation:
"(W)hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act ... we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."m

The conduct of the parties subsequent to ratification of a
treaty may, thus, be relevant in ascertaining the proper
construction to accord the treaty's various provisions. A court
might

even

feel

obliged to

sustain

(the parties'

later)

construction of a treaty differing widely from that which it was
in fact possible to prove to have been the design of the parties at
the time when the agreement was concluded. In so acting, the
court does not, of course, impose its own values upon the parties.
Rather, the court does no more than respect and implement the
goals and intentions of the parties.

327
328
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See Missouri v Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433,40 S.Ct. 382, 383, 64 L.Ed. 641 (1920).
See Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co. v Cox, 291 U.S. 138, 158-63, 54 S.Ct.

361, 78 L.Ed. 695 (1934); Harvard Research, Article 19; M. McDougal, H. Lasswell and 1. Miller,
The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order 56, 58 (1967); II. C. Hyde,
International Law 72 (1922); Vienna Convention Art. 31(3).
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In divining the purposes of the Warsaw treaty, the court
found the adoption in 1966 of the Montreal Agreement
particularly instructive. This Agreement did not alter the
language of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. But it
provides decisive evidence of the goals and expectations
currently shared by the parties to the Warsaw Convention.
Although it was the foreign airlines, and not their
respective

governments,

who

signed

the

agreement

implementing these modifications (raise the Warsaw liability
limit to $75,000; and impose absolute liability), the governments
whose carriers were to participate in the plan formally assured
the United States, at the request of the State Department, that
they would permit the new plan to go into effect.

329

And as a conclusion, the court stated: "even if we restricted
our interpretation to the intent and purposes of the Warsaw
treaty as of 1929, we would reach the same result."
Since 1929, the risks of aviation have changed dramatically
In

ways unforeseeable by the Warsaw framers.

Some

commentators have suggested that when confronted with such
genuine gaps in the parties' expectations, the interpreter should
consider accepted policy goals, such as accident prevention, in
329

Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn at 594, 595. See supra note 312.
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filling them. It is relevant in this connection that the technology
of embarkation has also changed in ways unforeseeable to the
Warsaw delegates. Moreover, airports are today far larger and
boarding procedures substantially more complex than they were
in 1929. And, many of the operations of embarking have been
moved inside the terminal building. Indeed, even the boarding
ladder, now being increasingly replaced by the jetway, may
soon become an anachronism.
The court believes that the Warsaw drafters wished to
create a system of liability rules that would cover all the hazards
of air travel. 330 The rigid location-based rule suggested by TWA
would ill serve that goal. Under TWA's test, many claims
relating to liability for the hazards of flying would be excluded
from the Warsaw system and would be governed by local law.
Rather than serving the drafters' intent of creating an inclusive
system, TWA's proposal would frustrate it.
Moreover, the court also believes that the result it has
reached furthers the intent of the Warsaw drafters in a broader
sense. The Warsaw delegates knew that, in the years to come,
civil aviation would change in ways that they could not foresee.

See Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 1. Air. L.
1,20 (1936); Calkins, The Cause of Action under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.Air.L. 217 (1959).

330

193

'"

.

They wished to design a system of air law that would be both
durable and flexible enough to keep pace with these changes.

3-2-2. Evangelinos v Trans World Airlines, Inc

33

].

Issues arising out of the same facts as Day case, supra, the
court also rejected location of the passengers as the only test as
to whether they were embarking or disembarking within the
meaning of Article 17, and held that the passengers were in the
course of embarking at the time the terrorist attack occurred.
The court noted that the undisputed facts revealed that at
the time of the attack the passengers had completed virtually all
the activities required as prerequisites to boarding, and were
standing in line at the departure gate ready to proceed to the
aircraft, and that the injuries were sustained while the
passengers were acting at the explicit direction of airline
employees and while they were performing the final act required
as a prerequisite to taking boarding buses to the aircraft itself.
The court also noted that at the time the boarding operations had
commenced, the flight had already been called for final boarding,
and that as a result, the passengers were no longer mingling over
a broad area with passengers of other airlines, but were

331

(1977, CA3 Pa) 550 F2d 152.
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congregated in a specific geographical area designated by airline
employees and were thus identifiable as a group associated with
a particular flight. The court concluded that by announcing the
flight, forming the group, and directing the passengers as a
group to stand near the departure gate, the airline had assumed
control over the group and caused them to congregate in the area
where the attack occurred.
The court observed that adoption of a strict location test
could lead to differing results based solely on the fortuity of
where passengers are placed at the time of injury. The court
stated that in its own view, three factors are primarily relevant to
a determination of the question of liability under Article 17: (I)
location of the accident; (2) the activity in which the injured
person was engaged; and (3) the control by the defendant of
such injured person at the location and during the activity taking
place at the time of the accident. Although in so recognizing, the
court stated that it would place less emphasis upon carrier
control over passengers than did the Day Court, reasoning that
while control remains at least equally as important as location
and activity, it is an integral factor in evaluating both location
and activity.

195

A dissenting opinion pointed out that a terrorist attack in an
airport is no more likely to occur than the bombing of a
restaurant, bank, or other place of public congregation, and that
the conclusion of the majority that the passengers were injured
as a result of a risk inherent in air travel was therefore
unwarranted.

The dissenting opinion further

stated that

operations of embarking could only include the actual boarding
of the aircraft or, at most, movement across the traffic apron
from the terminal building to the plane itself.

3-2-3. Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France

332
I, ,

In 1971 Maugnie exited from the Air France plane and
entered the Orly Airport terminal to make her Swiss Air
connection. She proceeded down the only passenger corridor
leading from the Air France gate to the main terminal area. In a
hallway between the airline gate and the center of the terminal,
appellant slipped and fell, incurring the injuries which gave rise
to the complaint. The sole dispute of this case is whether
Maugnie's injury come within the scope of disembarkation of
the Warsaw Convention Article 17, the court said no.

332

(1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256,39 ALR Fed 440, cert den 431 US 974, 53 LEd 2d 1072,97 S Ct 2939.
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To arrive at a workable definition of the term "in the course
of . . . disembarking" as used in Article 17, the court may
properly look to the history and purpose of the Convention and
subsequent interpretations thereof. The scope of the Warsaw
Convention is a matter of federal law and federal treaty
interpretation, and must be determined from an examination of
the "four corners of the treaty." 333 Moreover, it is well
established that treaty interpretation involves a consideration of
legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.

334

Maugnie argues that since jurisdiction in this action

IS

based on diversity of citizenship, the court should have
consulted conflicts rules in interpreting the scope of Article 17.

It is true that the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of
action, but merely creates a presumption of liability if the
otherwise applicable substantive law provides a claim for relief
based on the injury alleged.

335

Thus, conflicts rules are

applicable in determining whether a cause of action exists.
However, the determination of the scope of the Warsaw
Convention is a matter of federal law and federal treaty
333 See American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957); Husser! v. Swiss Air
Transport Co., Ltd., 388 FSupp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
334 See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-432, 63 S.Ct. 672, 87 L.Ed. 877
(1943); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385,392,358 N.Y.S.2d 97,314 N.E.2d
848,854 (1974).
335 See Noel v. Linea Aeroposta1 Venezolana, 247 F2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 907,
78 S.Ct. 334,2 L.Ed.2d 262 (1957); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 FSupp. 393
(S.D.N.Y.1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953).
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interpretation. Conflicts principles are not applicable in
interpreting the words of the Convention; rather, the meaning of
Article 17 should be ascertained from the intention of the
drafters and the goals of the Convention.

336

The Warsaw Convention, together with its modifications,
function to protect passengers from the hazards of air travel and
also spreads the accident cost of air transportation among all
passengers. Taking a broad view of the term "accident," courts
generally have extended air carrier liability to include injuries

:i
'I':"

:

resulting from such modem air hazards as hijacking and terrorist
attacks. However, the courts have not been uniform in
construing "in the course of ... embarking or disembarking" as
used in Article 17.
In

construing

"disembarking,"

several

courts

have

interpreted Article 17 as defining Warsaw coverage primarily by
.
1ocatlOn

0f

IM
. . .
th
e passenger.
n
acDonald 337 case, InJunes

sustained by a passenger while awaiting her suitcase in
defendant airline's baggage area were held to be outside the
scope of the Convention. The First Circuit reaffirmed the
MacDonald decision in Hernandez v. Air France338 , and at the
same time indicated its willingness to consider factors other than
336
337
338

See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336-338 (5th Cir. 1967).
MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (Ist Cir. 1970), infra.
(1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den.430 US 950,51 LEd 2d 800, 97 S Ct 1592.
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location of passenger in interpreting Article 17. Also in re Tel

Aviv 339 , involved a terrorist attack on passengers who had
deplaned and were waiting in the baggage area of the terminal
building. Endorsing a test based primarily on physical location
of passengers, the district court held that the Warsaw
Convention did not apply. On the other hand, the Second and
Third Circuits have refused to give a strictly geographical
interpretation to the language of Article 17 with respect to
"operations of embarking. ,,340
Embarkation and disembarkation might be distinguished
for purposes of Article 17, since the embarking passenger must
perform certain required acts within the terminal as a condition
of completing his Journey. In contrast, the disembarking
passenger normally "has few activities, if any, which the air
carrier requires him to perform" once the passenger has entered
the terminal building. 341 Similarly, other courts have denied
Warsaw coverage to in-terminal accidents in the context of
disembarkation.

342

339
340

405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975).
See Day v TWA, and Evangelinos v TWA, supra notes 314 and 34.
341
342 See Day v TWA, supra note 314.
See Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Avi.Cas.17,145 (SD.N.Y.1974) (injury on
escalator leading to lower level of terminal); Klein v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 A.D.2d 679,
360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2d Dept. 1974) (injury on baggage conveyor belt inside tenninal); cf. Mache v.
Air France, Rev. Fr. Droit Aerien 343 (Court d'Appel de Rouen 1967), affd Rev. Fr. Droit Aerien
311 (COlif de Cassation 1970) (injury in customs area off the traffic apron).
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The court in present case held that a rule based solely on
location of passengers is not in keeping with modem air
transportation technology and ignores the advent of the mobile
boarding corridors utilized by many modem air terminals. In
construing the scope of the Convention, the court may properly
consider changes in circumstances subsequent to the drafting of
the treaty.343 Today the expandable boarding units have
eliminated to a great extent the need for embarkation and
disembarkation outside the terminal building. Thus, determining
whether passengers were inside or outside the airport terminal at
,;,,',.'1

the time of injury should not end the analysis. Since the
Convention drafters did not draw a clear line, the Court is also
reluctant to formulate an inflexible rule. Rather, prefer an
approach

which

requires

an

assessment

of the

total

circumstances surrounding a passenger's injuries, viewed against
the background of the intended meaning of Article 17. Location
of the passenger is but one of several factors to be considered.
However, even under the more flexible interpretation of the
language of Article 17, Maugnie's claim does not come within
the scope of the Warsaw Convention. Maugnie's situation
contrasts sharply with the status of the passengers in Day and
343 See Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53,255 N.Y.S.2d 249,203 N.E.2d 640 (1964);
ALI Restatement Second of Foreign Relations Law ss 147, 153.
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Evangelinos. There the passengers had obtained their boarding
passes and were standing in line at the departure gate, waiting to
be searched immediately before boarding. On those facts, it was
reasonable for the courts to conclude that the travelers were
involved in embarkation operations. Maugnie, on the other hand,
had deplaned and was heading to the Swiss Air gate to make her
connecting flight to Geneva at the time of injury. She had
proceeded through a boarding lounge and into a common
passenger corridor of Orly Airport which was neither owned nor
leased by Air France. Furthermore, she was acting at her own
direction and was no longer under the "control" of Air France.
,!

Under these circumstances, the court finds that appellant had
completed disembarkation operations within the meaning of
Article 17.
One important thing from present case should be bear in
mind is Judge Wallace (who argues that Day test is seriously
wrong) concurring that the majority recognizes that application
of either the location-of-the-passenger MacDonald test, or the
tripartite Day test results in the same disposition. It is therefore
plainly unnecessary in this case to resolve an important question
concerning an international treaty. The court ought not to be
reaching out to do so. However, if choose he must, he would
201
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choose the MacDonald test because he believes that test is more
in keeping with both a fair reading of the language of Article 17
and the Article's historical derivation.
Courts defining "disembarking" have consistently refused
to extend the coverage of the Warsaw Convention to encompass
injuries occurring within the terminal. The principle announced
in MacDonald and followed by the courts in Felismina v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.,344 and in re Tel Aviv 345 , created a standard
which emphasized the passenger's location, thereby ending
liability when the passenger has reached a "safe" point within
the terminal.
i'

The Day test, on the other hand, suffers from several
serious flaws. First, the conclusions reached by Day rest upon a
somewhat selective reading of the Warsaw minutes.

346

In other

words, the substantial portions of the legislative history, which
favor the location test,347 were disregarded. Second, the Day
test is bottomed on a social theory of compensation designed to
spread the burden of damages from travel to all travelers. By
relying on this theory of social engineering, "the Day court
clearly injected policy arguments alien to the spirit of the
344
345
346
347

13 Av.Cas. P 17,145 (S.D.N.Y.1974).
405 F.Supp. 154 (D.P.R.l975).
See 45 Fordham L.Rev. at 380.
See Id at 380-381.
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Warsaw convention when drafted in 1929.,,348 Moreover, it is
not possible to implement such a theory under the current terms
of the Warsaw Convention without such a torturing of language
as to constitute a redrafting. The court in Day, unfortunately,

..
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~.,

engaged in such contortions. If the signatories of the Convention

'
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wish to redraft it, they may do so, but the courts should not.
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Finally, it seems clear that the Day test was designed to extend a
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right of recovery to persons for whom sympathy inspires a
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method of compensation. The Day test was meant to be
plaintiffs' law. Yet in many cases it may operate to thwart
plaintiffs' attempts to recover the full value of their claims. The
Warsaw Convention is a two-edged sword: the basis of liability
is strict but at the same time the amount recoverable is limited.

3-3. Particular circumstances considered: "embarking"

3-3-1. The course of "embarking" established

Under the circumstances presented in each of the following
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each
case were in the course of "embarking," as that word is used in
348

Id at 385.
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Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions of
the Convention were therefore applicable to death or personal
injury actions arising out of the particular incident.

Chutter v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

349

wherein a passenger who, after boarding an airplane and
being escorted to her seat, and while the "fasten seat belt" sign
was lighted, got up from her seat and proceeded to the rear
toward the open door of the aircraft in order to wave a farewell
to relatives, was "on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking,"

as that

phraseology is used in Article 17. At the very moment that the
passenger appeared at the doorway to wave the farewell, the
ramp or loading stairs were being pulled away from the plane by
employees, and the passenger fell from the plane as she went to
step on the ramp which was no longer there. Without going into
a detailed analysis of the law, the court merely stated that to hold
otherwise in the instant case would be an unwarranted dissection
of minute and almost undefinable areas from the coverage of the
Convention.

349

(1955, DC NY) 132 F Supp 611.
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A·zrI·znes 350
s..hen v Japan

Airline passengers were "embarking" within meaning of
Article 17 when they were wrongfully detained and tortured by
airline for 15 hours at hotel near airport and then wrongfully
deported by airline.

Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd.

351

Passenger was in process of embarking on airplane, for
·,i

purposes of applying the Warsaw Convention, where he was
proceeding to departure gate when he suffered heart attack, he
had completed virtually all steps required to board, and he was
in part of airport accessible only to passengers on international
flights.

Leppo v Trans World Airlines, Inc.

352

Also arising out of the same incident as the Day and
Evangelinos Cases, the court affirmed the granting of a
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs to the extent of
finding the airline absolutely liable under Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. Noting that the precise issue before it was

350
351
352

(1994, SD NY) 918 F Supp 686.
89 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
(1977) 56 App Div 2d 813, 392 NYS2d 660.
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whether the terrorist attack took place in the course of
"operations of embarking or disembarking," the court cited the
opinions in the Day and Evangelinos cases, both supra, and
expressed the view that while tenable arguments could be made
for the point of view opposite that reached by those courts, it
would be inadvisable for a state court to reach a different
decision from that which the two United States Courts of
Appeals rendered with respect to the identical incident,
particularly where, as in the instant case, the question presented
was one of federal treaty law.

3-3-2. The course of "embarking" not established

Under the circumstances presented in each of the following
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each
case were not in the course of "embarking," as that word is used
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions
of the Convention were therefore inapplicable to death or
personal injury actions arising out of the particular incident.

Marotte v. Am. Airlines. Inc. 353

353

296 F.3d 1255.
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The husband and the wife, along with their son and his
girlfriend, attempted to board their scheduled flight from Miami
to New York, which was the final leg of their round-trip travel
from New York to the Bahamas. The wife was unable to find
their tickets and the husband asked the attendant on duty if they
could board because the tickets had been paid for and the seats
were already assigned. The attendant called over the supervisor,
who refused to allow them to board the plane. The wife
eventually found the tickets and when the party attempted to
board the plane, the supervisor assaulted the husband. The
husband was taken by ambulance to the hospital where he
remained for a number of days. Four years after this event took
place the husband and the wife brought the instant action. The
court of appeals held that based on the total circumstances
surrounding the incident in question, with particular emphasis
placed on location, activity, control, and the imminence of the
intended flight, the injury that the husband suffered due to the
attack by the supervisor occurred in the process of embarking,
as contemplated by the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, the
husband and the wife's claims were barred by the Warsaw
Convention's two-year limitations period.
The

court noted

that the
207

terms

"embarking"

and

"disembarking" are not specifically defined in the Convention.
Despite the Marottes's contention to the contrary, however, the
court held that the definition of the term "embarking" within the
Warsaw Convention is a question of law to be decided by the
court, not one of fact to be decided by the jury.354 That is, its
interpretation is left up to the courts and is dependant upon the
facts of each case. 355
Generally, when determining whether an airline is liable
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, courts employ a
totality of the circumstances approach. 356 In making this
determination, three factors are particularly relevant: (1) the
passenger's activity at the time of the accident; (2) the
passenger's whereabouts at the time of the accident; and (3) the
amount of control exercised by the carrier at the moment of the
injury.357 Additionally, courts also consider the imminence of
the passenger's actual boarding of the flight in question. 358
Under this analysis, no single factor is dispositive, and the three
factors form a "single, unitary [analytical]

base.,,359

However,

because the term "embarking" evokes a "close temporal and
354 See Blake v Am. Airlines, Inc., 245 F. 3d 1213, 1215 (11 th Cir. 2001). (" Construction of the
{Varsaw Convention is a question of law. ").
th
55 See Schmidkunz v Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 628 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9 Cir. 1980).
3 56
See Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France, (1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256, 39 ALR Fed
:40, cert den 431 US 974, 53 LEd 2d 1072, 97 S Ct 2939.
57 S
Id
358
ee .
359 See Buonocore v Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1990).
.
See McCarthy, 56 F. 3d at 317.
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spatial relationship with the flight itself," a close connection
between the accident and the physical act of boarding the
360
aircraft is required.
Seemingly ignoring these cases mentioned above, the
Marottes asks the court "to adopt the view that a passenger is
only 'embarking' after the ticket has been collected and honored
for travel and the passenger is passed through [the] gate check
where the boarding stub is given the passenger to be examined
by the attendant on the plane." In other words, the Marottes ask
the court to draw a bright-line at, what appears to be, the actual
doorway to the jetway leading to the aircraft. Such a position
based on arbitrary line-drawing "is both too arbitrary and too
specific to have broad application,,361 Because treaties should
generally be read to have broad applicability, the court rejected
the Marottes's position and adopted the broader position of at
least five other circuits.
Viewing the total circumstances surrounding the incident in
question, with particular emphasis placed on location, activity,
control, and the imminency of the intended flight, leads the
court to the firm conclusion that any injury that Mr. Marotte
suffered due to the attack by Barrett occurred in the process of
360

See Id at 316.
See Evangelinos, 550 F.2d at 155. (drafters of the Warsaw Convention "intended a flexible
approach which would adapt to the changing conditions of international air travel over the years").

361
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embarking, as contemplated by the Warsaw Convention. First,
the party had their boarding passes in hand and were attempting
to board the plane when the attack took place. This is significant
because it shows that the Marottes had already passed through
security and were in a section of the airport that is not open to
the general public, but rather only to ticketed passengers.

362

Further, it evinces that the Marottes had satisfied almost all of
the conditions precedent to boarding.

363

Second, the door into

which Mr. Marotte was pushed was the door leading to the
actual aircraft he had hoped to board, evincing an extremely
close spatial relationship between the attack and the aircraft.
"

Third, as the facts clearly show, American Airlines exerted much
control over the Marottes. By taking their boarding passes and
tickets and forbidding them access to the jetway that led to the
airplane they wished to board, American Airlines, through its
employee Barrett, exerted control over the entire Marotte party.
Furthermore, by jumping on top of Mr. Marotte, Barrett
physically prevented him from boarding his intended flight. It is
difficult to imagine a situation that more clearly establishes
control then the act of physical restraint. Finally, it is apparent
from the facts before the court that the flight in which the
362
363

See McCarthy, supra note 343, at 318.
See Id at317.
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Marottes were attempting to board was imminent. All the
Marottes had to do was pass through the glass door, which
Barrett ordered closed, walk down the jetway, and take their
seats. The fact that they were prevented from doing so, without
more, does not take this case out of the purview of the Warsaw
Convention. Viewing the surrounding facts in totality, the court
concluded that the Warsaw Convention applies to the Marottes's
claims,

and therefore those claims

are barred by the

Convention's two-year limitations period.

Upton v Iran Nat. Airlines Corp. 364

Taking into account steps required by airline to complete
embarkation, test for liability is based upon three elements,
activity (what passengers were doing), control (at whose
direction), and location; passengers had not entered into control
of carrier where they were in public waiting area, not in
restricted area reserved for departing passengers, and were free
to proceed to restaurant, visit with nonpassengers, or exit
building at time when roof of airport terminal collapsed causing
death and injury to passengers.

364

(SD NY) 450 F Supp 176.
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Kflntonides v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

365

In action against international air carrier in which airline
passenger alleged that she had been injured as result of fall
within airport terminal building, court granted carrier's motion
for summary judgment where fall occurred on moving walkway
within common area of airport terminal building, so accident did
not occur during "course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking" from plane, and action thus was not covered
by

Warsaw

Convention;

passenger's

Injury

occurred

approximately one-half hour before her flight had been
scheduled to depart, she had been injured about 200 to 500 feet
from her departure gate, passengers for plaintiffs flight had not
yet been congregated into specific geographical area, and there
was no suggestion that carrier's personnel had been near moving
walkway, monitoring it, or instructing passengers to use it.

Schmidkunz v Scandinavian Airlines System 366

Passenger was not embarking as defined by Article 17 of
Warsaw Convention, where she left airplane on which she had
arrived, walked not closer than approximately 500 yards from
boarding gate to airliner that she was to take, was still within
365
366

(1992, DC NJ) 802 F Supp 1203.
(1980, CA9 Cal) 628 F2d 1205.
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common passenger area of terminal, did not receive boarding
pass, was not imminently preparing to board plane, and was not
at that time under direction of airline personnel.

Stovall v Northwest Airlines. Inc. 367

Plaintiff daughter brought an action against defendant
international air carrier after she was injured and her mother was
killed when they fell off a bus in route to the domestic air
terminal where they were to board a connecting flight. The sole
issue is whether Stovall and Shaleen were injured "in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Neither
the text of the convention, nor its history, clearly defines the
scope of liability for accidents in and around an airport terminal.
Some courts, looking only to the passenger's location at the
time of the accident, have defined the scope of liability narrowly.
Thus, a passenger who fell in the baggage area of an airport was
deemed to have disembarked from "the time he had descended
from the plane by the use of whatever mechanical means had
been supplied and had reached a safe point inside of the terminal,
even though he may have remained in the status of a passenger
of the carrier while inside the building. ,,368 However, with the
367
368

(1992) 33 Mass App 1,595 NE2d 330.

See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402,.1405 (1st Cir.1971).
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growing risk of airport terrorism, courts have been called upon
to extend the protection of the treaty to passengers within airport
terminals. 369 In Day case, and numerous other cases following it,
courts have held that coverage would depend upon the particular
facts analyzed on the basis of a number of factors: (1) the
activity in which the passenger was engaged at the time of the
accident; (2) the degree of control the airline had over the
passenger at the time; (3) the physical proximity of the
passenger to the aircraft; and (4) the closeness of the time of the
accident to the passenger's entering or leaving the airplane?70
Even under the more expansive Day test, which is now
routinely applied whether the issue raised relates to embarkation
or debarkation, the plaintiff in this case may not prevail. The
accident occurred while the two women were engaged in the
activity of travelling on a public bus from one terminal to
another. True, they were required to travel between terminals to
continue their flight, but the activity in which they were engaged
presented none of the dangers generally associated with air
travel with which the Warsaw Convention was concerned.
Airline personnel exerted some restrictions and control over
Stovall and Shaleen's activities by providing them with vouchers
See e.g., Shinn v. El Al Israel Airlines. 21 Av.Cas. (CCH) 18,331 (D.Co1.1989); Sweis v. Trans
Inc .. 681 F.Supp. 501 (N.D.Il1.1988).
oSee Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. ,550 F.2d 152, 155 (3d Cir.l977).

369

~or1dAirlines,
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and escorting them to the Massachusetts Port Authority bus. The
airline did not tell them they were required to take that particular
bus, however, and they were free to proceed by any means of

.
. termlna
. 1.371 If any agency was
transportatIOn
to th e domestlc
directly in control of the two women at the time of the accident,
it was the Massachusetts Port Authority, operating the bus,
rather than Northwest, the airline. With regard to the relative
proximity of the accident scene to the aircraft, the accident
occurred a considerable distance from the airplane, the tarmac,
or even the type of secure passenger waiting area on occasion
found to be covered.

372

Finally, with regard to the time factor,

more than an hour had elapsed since the flight from London had
landed, and the Minneapolis flight was not scheduled to depart
for yet another two and a one-halfhours.

373

The plaintiff emphasizes the facts, different in some
respects from those in the numerous cases cited by Northwest in
which no liability was found, that at the time of the accident
371 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France. 545 F.2d 279,284 (1st Cir.l976); Knoll v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc .. 610 F.Supp. 844, 846-847 (D.Colo.l985); Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741
ESupp. 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y.l990); Curran v. Aer Lingus. 17 Av.Cas. (CCH) 17,560, 17,562
(S.D.N.Y.1982).
372 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d at 282; Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France. 549 F.2d at 1262; Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. 900 E2d 8, 9 (2d Cir.1990).
Contrast Ricotta v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, 482 F.Supp. 497, 499-500 (E.D.N.Y.l979)
("accident occurred immediately after plaintiff had descended the steps of the aircraft" and "prior
~~3 time that she entered any common passenger area").
Compare Schmidkunz v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys .. 628 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir.l980);
Jiuonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc .. 900 F.2d at 10; Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741
ESupp. at 446.
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stovall and Shaleen remained passengers on the Northwest
flight from London to Minneapolis, they were in possession of
their boarding cards, their baggage was in custody of the airline,
and Northwest had made arrangements for their transportation
between terminals. The plaintiff contends, therefore, that the
women were on one continuous journey to their final destination.
However, the court held:
"The entire duration of a stop-over in the course of such a journey, however, is not
necessarily included within 'the operations of embarking or disembarking' as that
phrase is used in the Warsaw Convention. 374 Where an accident occurs, as this one
did, outside any airport terminal building while the passengers are on a public bus,
substantially removed both in time and space from their flight, the court thinks the
uniform result in courts throughout this country would be that the accident is not
covered by the Warsaw Convention. The risk that materialized was not a risk of
aviation. "

Beaudet v British Airways, PLC375

Beaudet (the passenger) slipped and fell in a lounge owned
by the airline, while awaiting an international flight that was
scheduled to depart almost 2 hours later. The Defendant
contends that this case falls within the scope of the Convention;
Plaintiff contends that it does not. This type of dispute is a
matter of federal law and federal treaty interpretation. 376 In

374
375
376

See Rabinowitz v. Scandinavian Airlines. 741 FSupp. at 447.
(1994, ND Ill) 853 F Supp 1062.

See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines. 875 F2d 613, 617 (7th Cir.l989) (quoting
Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France. 549 F2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977)).
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interpreting a treaty, the Court must begin "with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used. ,,377
The Article at question here is the Warsaw Convention
1929 Article 17. The court held, at minimum, Article 17's

..

~I ~j

"embarkment" language does not extend to "all injuries a
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passenger sustained from the time he first entered the airport of
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departure until the moment he left the airport of arrival. ,,378
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Such a proposal was expressly rejected by the delegates of the
Convention. 379 Beyond this, the federal courts have adopted
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multifactor tests to determine whether a plaintiff may be said to
have been injured during "any of the operations of embarking."
In the Seventh Circuit, the proper test for determining the
scope of" any of the operations of embarking" requires the Court
to look at the total circumstances surrounding the Plaintiffs
accident, "with particular emphasis on location, activity, and
control.,,380 And the court concluded that under the Seventh
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,396-97, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1340-41,84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985).
See id.
379 See Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279,283 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
950,97 S.Ct. 1592,51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977), and Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35
(2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976).
380 This approach represents a combination of the multi-factor test applied by the Second Circuit
in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97
S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976) (using a "triparte test" considering activity, control, and
location), and employed by both the First and Third Circuits and district courts in this district, see
Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279,282 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950,
97 S.Ct. 1592,51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 152,
155 (3d Cir.1977); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 501 (N.D.Il1.1988), with a
"total circumstances" test employed by the Ninth Circuit in Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 549 F.2d at 1262 (indicating that the proper inquiry under Article 17 was not limited to the
Day analysis).

377

378
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Circuit approach, or either of the other Circuits, the Plaintiff in
this case was not performing "any of the operations of
embarking. "
Looking first to the three factors emphasized in Day, the
Court finds that these factors favor a finding that the plaintiff
was not in the course of embarking. First, location. This factor
originated with a now rejected rule that required solely an
inquiry into the passenger's location. Once the passenger had
reached a "safe" point within the terminal, the Convention no
longer applied. 381 While the location of a passenger at the time
of injury is but one factor to be considered, generally, the closer
a passenger is to the gateway, or jetway or "jetty", the more
likely the passenger is performing "any of the operations of
embarking. ,,382 Also, location may include a reference to an
area owned or leased by the defendant. 383 Here, the Plaintiff
was nowhere near the gateway. In fact, she was on a different
level of the airport, potentially hundreds of yards away from any
gate from which she might board her plane. Plaintiff argues that
she was "elevator rides, passageways, and potentially in excess
See MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir.1971).
See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2053 (N.D.!Il. March 13, 1987) (fmding that the plaintiff was in the course of
embarking when she was injured twelve feet from the gate room of her departing flight).
383 See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d at 618 (indicating that one reason
Article 17 did not govern the plaintiffs case was because her injury occurred outside neither
owned nor leased by the airline defendant).
381

382
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of ten football fields from the departure gate." The Defendant
virtually ignores this point, but does point out that Plaintiff was
injured in an area controlled by the Defendant. This fact

IS

counterbalanced, however, by the other two factors.
Second, control. The more a passenger is acting at the
direction of an airline in boarding an airplane, the more the
passenger may be said to be in the course of embarking. 384 Here,
the Plaintiff was acting entirely at her own direction. She was
free to leave and re-enter the Lounge at any time and there was
nothing in the Lounge that the airline considered a prerequisite
to boarding. While the Defendant controlled whether or not a
given passenger could enter the Lounge, that fact has no bearing
on the Plaintiffs boarding her flight. Had she so desired, the
Plaintiff need never have entered the Lounge. Even if the
Defendant had directed her to stay in the Lounge, it is unlikely
that Plaintiff could be said to be in the Defendant's control, since
she had not been segregated from other passengers on other
flights or airlines. 385

384 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168 at *4, 1987
D.S. Dist. LEXIS 2053 at *11 (finding that the plaintiff was in the course of embarking when she
Was "in the process of completing acts required of her by the defendant."); see also Sweis v. Trans
:World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. 501, 505 (N.D.Il1.1988) (stating that the passengers' standing in
line at the direction of the Defendant's employee was not necessarily within the Defendant's
Control).
385
See Sweis. 681 F.Supp. at 505.
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Third, activity. The more a passenger's actions relate to the
purpose of boarding, the more likely the passenger may be said
to be in the course of embarking.

386

Plaintiff was relaxing when

she was injured. Her purpose was to get some reading material,
not board any plane. While Defendant correctly points out that
another of her purposes was that of waiting for her flight, it is
the opinion of the Court that this notion of "activity" is too
broad to assist in the current inquiry. Otherwise, any passenger
waiting for a plane might be said to be in the course of
embarking. As any air traveler is well aware, waiting for a plane
and starting to get on it are two different things.
Extending this inquiry to other factors does not assist the
Defendant. In Sweis,387 Judge Shadur read Day to include an
"imminence" factor, that is, any inquiry into how soon the plane
was to be boarded. Here, boarding was not imminent when the
Plaintiff was injured. At best, Plaintiff was injured one and a
half hours before her flight was to leave, and a half of an hour
before the flight even was to be called for boarding. At worst,
the flight was a full two hours from departure and a full hour

See, e.g., Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168 at *4, 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2053 at *11. (finding that the plaintiff was in the course of embarking when her
actions "were solely related to the purpose of boarding.")
387
See supra note 378.
.

386
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from

boarding.

Under

either VIew,

boarding

was

not

"imminent".388
Plaintiff was injured in a Lounge maintained and operated
by the Defendant, but used for passengers on multiple of the
Defendants' flights and by passengers on other airlines. She was
injured not less than one and one half hour before her flight was
to leave and a half hour before it was to board. She was not
doing anything at the Defendant's direction or for the purpose of
boarding. And, she was on a level of the airport that differed
from the gate level at the time she was injured. In these
circumstances, the Court must conclude that she was not
engaged in "any of the operations of embarking."
In an analogous case, Buonocore,389 the Second Circuit
held that Article 17 did not govern an injury to a passenger who
had only checked in at a ticket counter and was injured in a
public area. There, as here, the plaintiff was unrestricted in his
movement. The fact that Plaintiff here was injured in a location
maintained by the Defendant is not dispositive. In Sweis,390 the
plaintiffs were under more control of the airline than was
Compare Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 F.Supp. at 505 (stating that boarding was not
"imminent" when departure was scheduled for two hours after the plaintiffs injury) with Day, 528
F.2d at 32-34 (indicating that when passengers were injured while in line at the gate of departure,
boarding was imminent).
389 Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8(2d Cir.1990).
390
See supra note 378.
388
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Plaintiff here, yet the Court held that the Convention did not
apply. Other authorities also support this conclusion. 391
The two cases most favoring Defendants, Day 392 and
Jefferies,393 are distinguishable. In both cases, the Court found

that Article 17 applied to a passenger's claim for damages. In

Day, passengers were killed and injured when terrorists attacked
them while they stood in line at a departure gate, waiting to be
searched before entering their airplane. At the time of the attack,
the passengers had surrendered their tickets, passed through
passport control, and entered the areas reserved for departures
on international flights, just like Plaintiff here. In addition,
however, they were assembled at the departure gate "virtually
ready to proceed to the aircraft" and they were required to stand
in line at the airline's directions, and boarding was imminent.
Plaintiff here was subject to none of these last conditions.

391 See Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir.l977) (holding that
Article 17 did not govern passenger injured in public area not under the "control" of the air line,
despite fact that passenger was on way to connecting flight), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct.
2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977); Kantonides v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 802 F.Supp. 1203
(D.NJ.1992) (holding that passengers were not "in the course of the operations of embarking"
when they were injured on a moving walkway when en route to connecting flight; passengers had
not yet been segregated); Rolnick v. EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 551 F.Supp. 261 (E.D.N.Y.l982)
(holding that Article 17 did not govern passenger injured on elevator in public area while
proceeding to his gate); Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, Corp., 450 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.1978)
(holding that Article 17 did not govern passenger injured under the collapse of a roof after being
directed to wait in a public area by the defendant's personnel because the passengers were free to
~~ve about the airport), affd, Upton v. Iran Nat'lAirlines Corp., 603 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.l979).
Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890,97
~3Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976).
Jefferies v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 85-C-9899, 1987 WL 8168, 1987 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
2053 (N.D.Ill. March 13, 1987).
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Similarly, in Jefferies, the plaintiff was injured while completing
acts required by the airline, was twelve feet from her departure
gate room, and her actions were "solely related to the purpose of
boarding." None of these conditions are similar to those of the
plaintiff here.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds, as a matter of
law, that Plaintiff was not "in the course of any of the operations
of embarking" when she was injured.

Buonocore v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 394

Appellant parents filed an action against appellee airline,
arguing that appellee was liable for the death of their son due to
a terrorist attack at a Rome airport, pursuant to Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention. The language of Article 17, however, is not
so clear. Reasonable people may differ as to whether the focus
should be on "embarkation", so that only the physical act of
enplaning is covered. Alternatively, a focus on "any operations"
can be broad enough to cover almost any transaction between a
passenger and an airline relating to the passenger's eventual
walk onto the airplane. Reference to the treaty's history therefore
.
IS

394

D5

.

appropnate.

395

900 F.2d 8 (1990, CA2 NY).
. '
See Choctaw NatIOn
v. Umted States, 318 U.S.423, 431, 63 S.Ct. 672, 677, 87 L.Ed. 877
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The court held that consistent with a flexible approach,
such as Day case, several factors should be assessed to
determine whether a passenger was "in the course of any of the
operations of embarking". The factors to be considered are: (1)
the activity of the passengers at the time of the accident; (2) the
restrictions, if any, on their movement; (3) the imminence of
actual boarding; and (4) the physical proximity of the
passengers to the gate.
The Day test has come under some criticism over the years
,1,,1"

on the ground that it construed Article 17 too broadly in favor of
liability.396 Aside from the rule that one panel of the Court is
not free to overrule the holding of a previous one,397 the court
hold that the Day analysis is still the correct one. A side-by-side
comparison of the facts in Day with the facts in the instant case
leads the court to believe that a different outcome is warranted.
The first factor enunciated in Day is the activity of the
passengers at the time of the accident. The Day passengers were
actively engaged in preparations to board the plane. By contrast,
Buonocore here had only checked in at the ticket counter and
(1943).
396 Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F2d 1256, 1262 (9 Cir.) (Wallace, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 97497 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d IOn (1977); Martinez
Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 283-84 (1 Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 95097 S.Ct.
1592, 51 L.Ed.2d 800 (1977); Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 FSupp. 501, 504
(N.D.Ill.1988).
397 See e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 623 F2d 786, 788 (2 Cir.1980.), affd, 456 U.S.
461,102 S.Ct. 1883, n L.Ed.2d 262 (1982).
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was in the public area near a snack counter. The second factor is
the restrictions on the passengers' movement. The Day
passengers had been herded in line and risked missing the flight
if they strayed. Buonocore had ample time to roam freely about
the terminal before his flight was called. The third factor is the
imminence of actual boarding. The Day passengers were within
minutes of boarding. Buonocore's flight was to depart almost
two hours later. The fourth factor is the proximity of passengers
to the gate. The Day passengers were at the gate. Buonocore was
nowhere near the gate.
Appellants here place great emphasis on the fact that the
Day passengers, like Buonocore, had not yet gone through

security inspection, although they acknowledge that, unlike
Buonocore, the Day passengers had gone through passport and
immigration control. The disparity in physical layout between
the Rome and Athens airports explains why this similarity is
relatively unimportant. At the time of the Day terrorist attack,
passengers in Athens could not avail themselves of security
inspection until immediately before they boarded the plane.
They had no choice but to remain exposed to the risks
associated with an area open to the public. By contrast, the
Rome airport has the configuration more familiar to the
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contemporary traveler. That is, passengers may use the services
(restaurants, newsstands, and the like) in the airport's public
areas, and wait until the last minute to go through the security
checkpoint (i.e., when the passengers walk through the metal
detector and submit their carry-on bags for x-ray screening).
Alternatively, if they choose to undergo security inspection
earlier, they can find the same services in the "secured" or
"sterile" area. Since passengers are free to exercise that option, it
would not be consistent with Article 17 to hold airlines liable to
those passengers who elect to remain in the area open to the
general public. If the court was to adopt appellants' claim, for
practical purposes the court would be imposing Article 17
liability on airlines for all accidents that occur in airport
terminals. The drafters of Article 17 specifically rejected such
liability.
Appellants and TWA do not agree whether TWA instructed
Buonocore to arrive at least two hours prior to departure. On
appeal from summary judgment in favor of TWA, the court
assumes all inferences favorable to appellants, including the
assumption that the airline did so instruct Buonocore.
Nevertheless, the analysis of Day above leads the court to hold
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that this one factor in favor of Article 17 liability is insufficient
by itself to tip the balance in favor of appellants.
"This court has applied the Day test once before. 398 In Upton, the passengers had
checked in and were waiting for their delayed flight in the airport's public area when
the roof collapsed, killing several. The case was similar to the instant one in all
material respects other than the cause of the injuries. The district court, applying Day,
ruled for the airline, due primarily to the fact that the passengers were in the airport's
public area and not under any immediate supervision by the airline. 399 We affirmed
without opinion.
Appellants contend that the distinction between a terrorist attack and a roof collapse is
significant for Article 17 liability. They fail to point to any basis for such distinction in
the treaty's text or history. Instead they merely assert that terrorism is a more serious
danger in modem air travel. While they may be correct, that strikes the court as
having no apparent relevance to the issue of the construction of a treaty.
The court aware, as was the district court, of the well-reasoned opinion in Sweis400 ,
infra, which involved an action for damages arising from the same terrorist attack as
in the instant case. Sweis criticized the Day test, but applied it anyway. It held in favor
of TWA on a motion for summary judgment. We find the analysis in Sweis, while not
binding, to be persuasive."

Appellants attempt to distinguish Sweis on the ground that
Buonocore had received his boarding pass and baggage claim
check, while the Sweis passengers were in line waiting for theirs.
To the extent that this distinction is relevant, it cuts both ways.
The Sweis passengers were at an earlier stage of the check-in
process than was Buonocore, but they were under greater
restriction of movement by TWA than was Buonocore.
For the reasons above, the court held that Buonocore has
not in "any operation of embarking".

398

See Upton v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 450 FSupp. 176 (S.D.N.Y.1978), affd mem., 603 F2d
215
(2 Cir
1979) •
399
.'
400 See Id at 178.
Sweis v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 681 FSupp. 501 (N.D.I1l.1988).
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S.weis v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 401
Terrorists attacked the airline's terminal at an Italian airport
at around 9:10 a.m. The travelers were injured in that attack, and
filed suit against the airline. The only issue in this case is: Did
the accident that caused the injuries take place "in the course of
any of the operations of embarking"?
Sweises (the passengers) say because they were checking
their baggage and obtaining boarding passes at the time of the
attack, they were engaged in one of the operations of embarking.
That does not overly strain the word "embark" taken alone--two
of its accepted meanings are "to make a start" and "to engage,
enlist or invest in an enterprise ,,402. But that certainly cannot be
the meaning of the word in the context of a treaty fixing air
carriers' liability to their passengers. After all, Sweises
"embarked" in that same sense when they started for the airport.
Certainly the Convention did not contemplate carrier liability
that far afield. Moreover, the term "embark" is paired with
"disembark," a word of narrow meaning: It is defined only as "to
go ashore out of a ship" and "to get out of any vehicle" .403
Normal reading would treat the terms as a matching pair, so that

401
402
403

See id.
See Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 739 (1976).
S .
ee Id at 648.
.
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the correspondingly limited meaning of "embark" would also
apply.
By examined the famous Day case, which emphasizes four
factors: activity, control, imminence, and location. TWA says

Day was wrongly decided and mounts a frontal attack on its
doctrine.

TWA

reads

the

legislative

history

and

contemporaneous understanding of Article 17 as applying strict
liability only when passengers are actually boarding or
"deplaning" the aircraft (and perhaps when they are crossing
from aircraft to terminal). TWA's argument has plausibility and,
while no United States court has held Article 17 is that limited,
several judges and commentators have

criticized Day's

interpretation of the legislative history. However, the court held
that to decide this case it is unnecessary to choose between the

Day approach and TWA's position. Neither alternative imposes
liability on TWA under the Convention.
As for the first factor--the activity in which the passenger is
engaged--in Day the passengers were standing in line to be
searched before boarding, which the court characterized as a
"condition of embarkation". 404 Sweises were checking their
baggage and obtaining boarding passes, also conditions of

404

528 F.2d at 33.
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embarkation. But compared to the Day plaintiffs, Sweises'
activities were several steps further removed from actual
boarding. They still had to go through passport control and a
security check, make their way to the boarding gate and wait for
their flight to be called. No case applying Day has found Article
17 to apply at a stage of the departure process so remote from
physical embarkation.
As for the second factor--carrier restriction of the
passengers' movements-- the Day plaintiffs were told by airline
personnel to stand in line at the boarding gate. They had to obey
if they wanted to go on their flight. Sweises stress that factor,
noting that TWA required them to obtain boarding passes and
chose the location of the ticket counter outside a sterile area. But
Sweises were not in TWA's control in the same sense as the
plaintiffs in Day. TWA employees had not told them to go
someplace at a specific time as in Day. Rather, TWA required
them to get a boarding pass at its counter at some time. It is also
unclear that each of the Sweises had to go to the counter to get a
pass. Sayel (one of the passengers) had gone elsewhere. Finally,
unlike the situation in Day, TWA had not segregated its
passengers from those on other flights (or even other airlines):
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Michael (one of the passengers) was with the rest of the family
and he was not a TWA passenger.
As

for

the

third

factor--the

ImmInence

of actual

boarding--in Day the plaintiffs were a few moments from
getting on the aircraft. Here departure was not scheduled until
two hours after the attack. Boarding can hardly be said to have
been imminent.
As for the final factor--physical proximity to the plane or
the boarding gate--in Day the plaintiffs were a few feet from the
boarding gate and 250 meters from the plane. Here Sweises
were about 620 feet (by the most direct route) from the boarding
gate, and their plane had not yet even landed in Rome.
Thus, on all four factors identified in Day this case presents
no really persuasive reason to apply Article 17 --each factor has a
far more attenuated nexus than in Day to the primary
"embarkation" concept of physical boarding of the aircraft. And
there is another practical reason supporting the conclusion that
Article 17 should not apply. When the Convention governs, its
provisions supplant local law. There may be substantial variance
between the agreed international rule and the local rule. It makes
sense that there ought to be a point at which the Convention's
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provisions attach at the beginning of the trip, and another where
they end once the trip is over.
Yet to accept Sweises' position would have passengers
"wandering" in and out of the Convention's coverage.
Passengers might be seen as under a carrier's control or in
sufficient proximity to the gate at any number of points after
arriving at the airport, but not at others.

405

For example, had

Sweises left the check-in counter to go to a lunchroom
elsewhere in the airport once they had obtained boarding passes,
the analysis they urge would treat them as no longer being in an
operation of boarding. Then when going through security they
might again be boarding (depending on how the Day factors are
assessed). Then when left to their own devices in the Transit
Hall, they would again not be boarding and would be subject to
local law. Obviously the variations could be multiplied.
It is always necessary to draw lines in shaping legal rules,
even if it is not possible to say precisely where the lines should
be drawn before a specific case presents itself. Yet it is generally
preferable to draw fewer lines rather than more--if only for the
sake of simplicity and certainty. The court stated that:

See, e.g., Rolnick v. EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 551 F.Supp. 261, 263-64 (ED.N.Y.1982),
where passengers were injured while walking to passport control, after having obtained boarding
passes and checked their bags. Applying Day, the Court found Article 17 nonapplicable.

405
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"We need not resolve whether the one line needed to give Article 17 meaning should
be drawn at the terminal wall, as TWA suggests. Rather it is enough to say that the
Convention has clearly drawn the line at some point much closer to actual boarding
than where Sweises were."

3-4. Particular circumstances considered: "disembarking"

3-4-1. The course of "disembarking" not established
Under the circumstances presented in each of the following
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each
case were not in the course of "disembarking," as that word is
used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the
provisions of the Convention were therefore inapplicable to
death or personal injury actions arising out of the various
incidents.

In the following cases from the First Circuit, the courts
appeared to place more emphasis on the location factor, but did
not foreclose the consideration of other criteria in determining
the applicability of the terms "embarking" and "disembarking"
to particular circumstances.

MacDonald v Air Canada 406

406

(1971, CAl Mass) 439 F2d 1402.
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This is the most often cited case by other courts as
advocating a strict location test. The passenger, a 74-year-old
woman in apparent good health and who was accompanied, fell
in the baggage area while awaiting her suitcase. The airline had
leased rights to the baggage delivery and customs clearance area
along with other carriers who used it simultaneously. The
passenger had made no request for any assistance and gave no
appearance of needing any. On appeal, the court held that there
was no negligence on the part of the airline because the airline
should not have known that the passenger needed volunteer
attention. The court held further that the airline was not liable
under the Warsaw Convention, holding that there was no basis
for finding an accident, which was the first requirement under
the Convention.
In addition, even if there was evidence of an accident, the
Convention required that the accident occur in the course of
disembarking operations. The court held that if these words
were given their ordinary meaning, it would seem that the
operation of disembarking had terminated by the time the
passenger has descended from the plane by the use of whatever
mechanical means have been supplied and has reached a safe
point inside of the terminal, even though he may remain in the
234

status of a passenger of the carrier while inside the building.
Examination of the Convention's original purposes reinforces
this view. The most important purpose of the Warsaw
Conference was the protection of air carriers from the crushing
consequences of a catastrophic accident, a protection thought
necessary for the economic health of the then emerging industry.
Partially in return for the imposition of recovery limits, and
partially out of recognition of the difficulty of establishing the
cause of an air transportation accident, the Conference also
,',

placed the burden on the carrier of disproving negligence when

I,
!.;::

1

an accident occurred.

407

Neither the economic rationale for

liability limits, nor the rationale for the shift in the burden of
proof, applies to accidents which are far removed from the
operation of aircraft. Without determining where the exact line
occurs, it had been crossed in the case at bar.

Martinez Hernandez v Air France408

It was held that passengers killed or injured by a terrorist
attack in the baggage claim area of an airport in Tel Aviv, Israel,
were not in the course of disembarking insofar as that word is
407 II Conference International De Droit Prive Aerien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, at 135-36 (1930);
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
408

(1976, CA 1 Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 L Ed 2d 800, 97 S Ct 1592.
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used in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The facts
indicated that on arrival at the airport, the plane came to a halt
about 113 to 112 mile from the terminal building, the passengers
then descending movable stairs to the ground from where they
walked or rode a bus to the terminal. Once at the terminal, they
presented their passports for inspection by Israeli immigration
officials and then passed into the main baggage area of the
terminal. It was while the passengers were awaiting the arrival
of the baggage that three terrorists removed their luggage from
the conveyor belt, produced submachine guns and hand
grenades, and opened fire upon persons in the baggage area.
In rejecting the passengers' claim that the case cited by the
District

Court

re-examined

III

as

controlling

precedent 409

should

be

light of recent decisions involving the

applicability of Article 17 to injuries sustained in a terrorist
attack on departing passengers,410 the court stated that it did not
view its holding in the precedential decision as necessarily
foreclosing the adoption of the tripartite test used to determine
the applicability of Article 17 in the other terrorist attack cases,
and further expressed the view that the nature of a plaintiffs
The case cited was MacDonald v Air Canada, supra.
The decisions specifically referred to were Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY)
528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den 429 US 890, 50 L Ed 172,97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US
1124,51 LEd 574, 97 S Ct 1162; and Evangelinos v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1977, CA3 Pa)
550 F2d 152, both discussed supra.

409

410
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activity when injured, its location, and the extent to which the
airline was exercising control over the plaintiff at the time of the
injury are certainly relevant considerations in determining the
applicability of the Article.
Applying the tripartite test to the facts of the instant case,
the court noted that at the time of the attack all that remained to
\,

be done before the passengers left the airport was to pick up
their baggage, and that passengers who either carry no luggage
or carry their luggage on the plane, would have no occasion to
retrieve their baggage, it seeming therefore, that such activity
could not constitute a necessary step in becoming separated
from a plane. The court felt that the passengers' location also
militated against Article 17 coverage since the attack occurred
inside the terminal building located approximately 1/3 to 112
mile from the point where the aircraft was parked. The control
factor also weighed against holding the carrier liable, stated the
court, since in sharp contrast to the factual situations in the other
terrorist attack cases cited by the passengers, they were not here
segregated into a group at the direction of airline employees,
there being no indication that airline personnel were dictating to
the passengers how they were to go about retrieving their
baggage or leaving the terminal, and that, rather, the passengers
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appeared to have been "free agents roaming at will through the
terminal. "
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that the
operation of disembarking continues until the passengers
retrieve their baggage, such suggestion being based on Article
18, in which a carrier's liability for damage to baggage extends
until the baggage is retrieved, the court noting that the history of
the Warsaw Convention indicates that the questions of baggage
liability and personal injury liability were intended to be
absolutely distinct. Referring to the intentions of the framers of
the Convention, the court concluded that while the drafting
history did not determine the precise meaning of Article 17, it
was quite clear that the delegates understood embarkation and
disembarkation as essentially the physical activity of entering or
exiting from an aircraft, rather than as a broader notion of
initiating or ending a trip.
The court added that a fundamental premIse of the
argument for expanding carrier liability in this case is that the
risk of death or injury in a terrorist attack is appropriately
regarded as a characteristic risk of air travel, but the court felt
that this could not be said of the sort of senseless act of violence
involved in this case, since the risk of violence at the hand of
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zealots could occur in any public place, whether it be a bank,
courthouse, university campus, Olympic village, or airport.
Unlike the risk of hijacking, stated the court, where the aircraft
and the fact of air travel are prerequisites to the crime, the risk
of a random attack such as that which gave rise to this litigation
is not a risk characteristic of travel by aircraft, but rather a risk
of living in today's world. Finally, the court observed that to
expand carrier liability under Article 17 to include all terrorist
attacks at airports would produce anomalous results, since,
under Article 17, only passengers could have a right to recover,
and that any nonpassengers injured in the same attack would not
have the benefit of the absolute liability provisions of the
Convention. 411

·
IA·I·
Tlurturro v. Contznenta
zr meso 412

Airline passenger who requested to deplane pre-departure
due to anxiety had fully disembarked within meaning of Warsaw

AffIrmed by the Martinez Hernandez Case was Re Tel Aviv (1975, DC Puerto Rico) 405 F
Supp 154, in which the court expressed the view that whatever uncertainties there may be as to the
precise line drawn by Article 17, the legislative history of the Convention indicated that Article 17
was not intended to be applicable to accidents occurring after the passenger "has reached a safe
point inside of the terminal," and "which are far removed from the operation of the aircraft."
The court in Maugnie v Compagnie Nationale Air France (1977, CA9 Cal) 549 F2d 1256, 39 ALR
Fed 440, cert den 431 US 974, 53 L Ed 1072, 97 S Ct 2939, supra, disapproved of the position
taken by the court in Re Tel Aviv, as expressing a point of view too closely related to a strict
location test, the Maugnie Court preferring the tripartite test initially set out in the Day and
Evangelinos Cases, both supra.
411

412

128F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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Convention at time that airline employees allegedly caused, via
conversations with police, passenger's false imprisonment in
mental hospital; conversations occurred in terminal after
passenger was out of airline's control, and thus airline could not
be liable under Convention's accident provisions for employees'
statements.

Knoll v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 413

Passenger

who,

after

leaving

airplane,

walked

approximated 100 yards to first moving sidewalk and then
traveled on two more moving sidewalks approximately 100
yards each and who, as she approached immigration area,
slipped and fell on some liquid sustaining injuries including
fractured elbow, did not fall while disembarking airplane for
purposes of Article 17 of Warsaw Convention. Airline did not
have exclusive use of area where accident occurred as plaintiff
was in concourse of airport which was not near enough to airline
gate from which she had walked to warrant finding of liability
and she was not under control of airline agents at that point but
involved in activity of looking for immigration; plaintiffs
actions in going through immigration and customs were not
413

(1985, DC Colo) 610 F Supp 844.
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conditions imposed by airline for her disembarking but by host
country in which plaintiff and her husband were traveling.

414

Klein v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

An action arising out of an infant's injuries caused by a
conveyor belt in an airport, the court held in a memorandum
opinion that the plaintiffs, having gotten off the aircraft and
having arrived safely within the terminal, had disembarked
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.

3-4-2. The course of "disembarking" established

Under the circumstances presented in each of the following
cases, it was held that at the time of the incident that caused
their death or personal injuries, the passengers involved in each
case were in the course of "disembarking," as that word is used
in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and that the provisions
of the Convention were therefore applicable to death or personal
injury actions arising out of the various incidents.

Ricotta v Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana 415

Ricotta (the passenger) had flown on a flight operated by
414
415

(1974) 46 App Div 2d 679, 360 NYS2d 60.
(1979, ED Ny) 482 F Supp 497.
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the airline, when the flight arrived, the passenger boarded a bus
that was to drive the passenger, and the others from the flight, to
the airport terminal, the passenger fell when the bus moved, and
the passenger sustained personal injuries. The passenger filed an
action against the airline, but the complaint was filed more than
two years after the accident. The only issue here is whether the
accident occurred while plaintiff was "disembarking" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. If plaintiff was injured

,

"\

;":.'

~"" ;

during the course of operations of disembarking, then the rights
of the parties are governed by the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention. The two year period of limitations contained in
Article 27 of the Convention would therefore be applicable to
the damage action and the failure to commence suit within the
two year period perforce would extinguish plaintiff's remedy.
It is well established that on a motion for summary

judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 416 Yet an action to determine the
precise meaning of the terms of the Warsaw Convention is to be
treated by the court as a question of law and not as a triable

416 United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Friedman v.
Meyers, 482 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1973).
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issue of fact.

417

The scope of the Convention

federal law and federal treaty interpretation.

IS

a matter of

418

Here, plaintiff had descended from the plane, but she had
neither reached a safe point inside the terminal nor left the
control of Iberia personnel. The area where the incident
occurred was not a public portion of the airport and only aircraft
passengers, airline staff and airport ground personnel were
permitted in the area. Further, the accident occurred immediately
after plaintiff had descended the steps of the aircraft and prior to
the time that she entered any common passenger area. Plaintiff
had not proceeded through Spanish immigration or customs and
had not located her baggage. She was not roaming at will but
was within the control of Iberia personnel who were directing
passengers to board airport buses owned and operated by Iberia.
The buses were located near the plane and the terminal was
some distance from the aircraft. Significantly, on the date of the
accident, the Iberia bus driver completed an Iberia accident
report in accordance with Iberia company policy. Under such
factual circumstances, the court finds that plaintiff was in the
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 392 U.S.
905, 88 S.Ct. 2053, 20 L.Ed.2d 1363 (1968); Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396
F.Supp. 95 (W.D.Pa.1975), Rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally
Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556, 563, 207 Ct.Cl. 254 (1975); Citizen Band of Potawatomi
Indians v. United States, 391 F.2d 614,618, 179 Ct.Cl. 473 (1967), Cert. denied 389 U.S. 1046,88
S.Ct. 771, 19 L.Ed.2d 839 (1968).
418 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.1975).
417
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course of disembarking as envisioned by Article

17.

The court's determination is further supported both by the
French text and the purpose of the Convention. The binding
meaning of the terms of the Convention is the French legal
meaning. 419 The French word "operation" contained in the
official version of the Convention connotes "a process of many
acts" combined to achieve a result. 420 Finally, the minutes of the
Convention proceedings undermine any contention that the
delegates wished to implement a narrow construction or a rigid
rule in determining accident coverage pursuant to Article

17.421

Accordingly, the Warsaw Convention is applicable to the
accident in question. The claim is therefore barred by the two
year time period of Article 29(1) and summary judgment is
granted on behalf of the defendant.

People ex rei. Compagnie Nationale Air France v Giliberto.

422

Removal of passengers from airplane by hijackers at point
which

was

neither

intended

destination

nor

intended

intermediate stop cannot realistically be looked upon as
419 See Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 392
U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 2053, 20 L.Ed.2d 1363 (1968).
420 See Nouveau Petit Larousse (1950).
421 See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
Harv.L.Rev. 497 (1967).
422 74 Ill2d 90,23111 Dec 106,383 NE2d 977, cert den 441 US 932, 60 LEd 2d 660, 99 S Ct
2052.

244

"disembarkation" which would terminate airline's liability under
article 17 of Warsaw Convention.

.
Ilrans A·lr, 1nco 423
Lyons v A merzcan
When Lyons fell, she had just deplaned and was walking
down a corridor under the control and supervision of ATA and
Sceptre agents or employees. Lyons was not free to move about
the terminal, nor was she in a common public area. Rather, she
was being escorted by airline personnel to customs, a necessary
step in the disembarking process. It is therefore clear that, since
the injury occurred "in the course of. .. the

operations

of... disembarking" from an international flight, the Warsaw
Convention governs the claims.

3-5. Location is the crucial factor, if not the only factor, in
English approach

Probably due to the different attitude to process a lawsuit in
court, English courts have seldom occasions to consider the
meaning of "embarking" or "disembarking" in the Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention. Until the present day, there is no

423

231 A.D. 2d 689, 647 N.Y. S.2d 845 (2d Dep't 1996).
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authority on "embarking", nevertheless, there is a landmark
case424 on the issue of "disembarking", from which, the English
Court of Appeal express the opinion that location is the crucial
factor, if not the only factor to determine the extent of from
embarking to disembarking.

Adatia v Air Canada 425 . (The leading English case)

III,,,

The plaintiff arrived at Heathrow Airport from Toronto and
suffered injury on the moving walkway while proceeding from
,",1""[

the aircraft to the immigration and customs hall. More than two
years after the accident, she issued a writ against Air Canada
alleging negligence, which raised fairly and squarely the
question whether, at the time of the accident, she had been "in
the course of disembarkation," in which case the Warsaw
Convention applied and with it the two-year time-bar of Article
29. The English Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the
County Court that the plaintiff had not suffered the injury in the
course of disembarkation and that the Warsaw Convention, with
two-year time-bar, did not apply.
The Warsaw Convention is given the force of law in the
UK by section 1 of the Carriage by Air Act 1961, as there is no
424
425

Adatia v Air Canada, May 21, 1992. Lloyds Aviation Law, vol. 11, No. 13, July 1, 1992.
See Id.
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dispute in this case that the defendants are vicariously liable for
such negligent acts, the only question is whether the two year
period provided for by the Convention applied, so as to render
the plaintiffs claim out of time. This depended on whether the
claim fell within Article 17.
As the judge said, the point to be resolved was whether her
injuries, which sustained on the travelator, were caused "in the
course of any of the operations of ... disembarking". There is
no English authority which specifically deals with the meaning
,II>,""''')

~~., '

of those words. In the absence of such authority, the judge

!.i.:I.

concluded: "One has to construe them in their ordinary English

I; :~:t

!~; Ci:
1.1

meaning and disembarking, either from a ship or aircraft, in my
judgment means leaving the ship or aircraft and actually
stepping on to dry land or that part of the non-movable part of
the airfield or aerodrome or terminal." The judge derived
support for this conclusion from an American authority,
MacDonald v Air Canada.

426
427

The equivalent phrase of Article 17 in the French text

reads: "Au cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de
debarquement". It is thus plain that the draftsman contemplated
that the process of disembarking, as well as that of embarking,
426
427

MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
Which must prevail ifthere is any inconsistency with the English text -- see section 1(2) of the

Carriage by Air Act 1961.
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may In some circumstances be capable of including at least
some activities beyond the mere actual assent or descent of the
steps of an aircraft or use of an equivalent device. Problems,
however, may arise in determining what other location should be
treated as the point where the process of embarkation begins or
the process of disembarking ends.
While there appears to be no relevant English authority, the
problem has given rise to extensive case law in other
jurisdictions. The object of the Convention as thereby described
is "the unification of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air". So far as possible, therefore, uniformity of
interpretation must be desirable and it is common ground that
the courts of the UK, in interpreting and applying Article 17,
should have due regard to the case law in other jurisdictions.

428

Then the court examined a list of US cases and one
decision of the Brussels Court of Appeal relating to the
construction and application of Article 17. The English Court of
Appeal agreed with MacDonald Test, i.e. the location factor is
decisive. In MacDonald v Air Canada429, the US court held that
if the words in Article 17 were given their ordinary meaning, it
would seen that the operation of disembarking had terminated
428 This case law is helpfully analysed in paragraphs 155, 155.1 and 1552. of Shaw cross &
Beaumont on Air Law (4th Edition).
429 MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
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by the time the passenger reached a safe point inside of the

terminal. A similar test was applied by the United States Court
of Appeals in Klein v KLM Royal Dutch Airline430, in holding
that the phrase "operations of disembarking" did not cover
injuries sustained where a passenger was hurt by a conveyor belt

I'I.

I:.:,:'!

in a baggage pickup area. In the present case, the judge

r"

il:!!1
1\11
li'\

concluded that the position was the same at English law. He said:

1!'If.'
I~', ~,

" ... you have disembarked when you have left the aircraft and

il;:!!,

you are in and within the terminal."

(,il:1

d!,~

:;)m

)!'~j .

A number of subsequent United States' authorities suggest
that the mere fact that a passenger is at a particular time within
the limits of the air terminal does not necessarily preclude him
from being in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking within the meaning of Article 17.

431

However,

Sir Christopher Slade held that assuming for the moment that
the judge should have applied a test based on activity, location
and control, he first consider location. As he said: "We have a
plan which shows this long corridor with two passenger
conveyors or travelators. Regrettably nobody thought to give us
a scale, but I am satisfied that that was quite long and it was at
the end of this travelator quite a fair distance from where the
430
431

360 NYS 2d 60, 1973.
See secilon
. 3-2. supra.
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aeroplane had docked that the accident occurred." This fair
distance was plainly one not of a mere few yards, but of a
substantial number of yards.
As to the contention that the plaintiff at the time of her
accident was under the control of Air Canada's employee, after
compared with two US cases,432 the judge made a finding of
fact as follows:
"Whatever that means I am not exactly clear but I am satisfied that after she left the
plane she was a free agent and not under the control of anyone at all. The passengers
just follow each other like sheep and no doubt the stewardess had the de facto control
of the plaintiffs mother because she was wheeling her but that lady had no control
whatsoever either factually or legally or in any other circumstance of the plaintiff."

If in any given case an activity is a condition imposed by
an airline itself (rather than by the country of departure or host
country) for permitting embarkation or disembarkation, such
activity might well be regarded as part of the process of
embarkation or disembarkation as the case may be. 433 This is
432 In Curran v Air Lingus (17 Avi Cas 17560), the United States' District Court (New York) found
that merely assisting passengers off the plane and towards Customs, Air Lingus did not control the
plaintiffs movements. The court went on to state that "It is not clear what tests should be used to
determine whether plaintiff was in the operation of disembarking. Some courts have looked solely
to the victim's location at the time of the accident ... Other courts have looked to several factors,
including the victim's location at the time of the accident, what he was doing when he was injured
and whether he was acting under the control and at the direction of the airline .... I need not
decide which test to apply because I conclude that defendant would not be liable to plaintiff under
either test."
In Rabinowitz v Scandinavian Airlines 741 F Supp 441 (SDNY 1990), the same court observed:
"Here, too, the plaintiffs allegation that an SAS employee directed them toward the moving
sidewalk does not give rise to any level of control by SAS. Where the Curran court deemed there
to be no airline control in formal customary practice of directing and assisting passengers upon
arrival, plaintiffs in this case were plainly not under SAS control. Plaintiffs asked someone whom
they believed to be an SAS employee in which direction to head for connection with their
departing flight and that employee pointed the way. Such a responsive instruction does not satisty
the control factor set forth in Day."
433 Compare Knoll v Trans World Airlines Inc 610 F Supp 844 (DC Colo 1985) the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado held that a passenger who had sustained injuries when
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the potential possible relevance of the element of control in the
context of Article 17. In the present case, however, there is no
evidence that the defendants had any right whatever to instruct
the plaintiff to use the travelator on which the accident occurred,
and the judge's findings of fact as to control were plainly right.
Her activity at the relevant time was merely that of proceeding
towards immigration in accordance with UK immigration
requirements, and she was doing so as a free agent.
As is pointed out in Shawcross 434 modern conditions
governmg

embarkation

and

disembarkation

at

different

international airports may well differ widely. While not
minimising the importance of foreign decisions in this context,
the courts should be cautious before placing a gloss on the
words of Article 17 and that in any case such as the present, the
ultimate question is whether, on the wording of that Article, the
passenger's movements through airport procedures (including
his physical location) indicates that he was at the relevant time
engaged upon the operation of embarking upon or disembarking
from the particular flight in question.
Although be viewed as English courts applied location
she slipped when approaching the immigration area at Heathrow Airport did not fall while
disembarking the aeroplane, saying: "The courts have consistently refused to extend coverage of
the Warsaw Convention to injuries incurred within the terminal, except in those cases in which
plaintiffs were clearly under direction of the airlines."
434
See supra note 61, para 155.
.
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criterion solely, the English Court of Appeal however concluded:
" ... the judge in the present case was right to conclude that the
plaintiff at the time of her accident was not still engaged upon
the operation of disembarkation. Of the two tests which have
been suggested to us, I find it unnecessary to express a view as
to whether the MacDonald test or the tripartite Day is to be
preferred. Indeed, I am not sure that they are inconsistent with
one another. I merely say that on an application of the tripartite
test, which is more favourable to the defendants, or indeed any
other test, I would uphold the judge's finding that the plaintiff
when she fell was not "in the course of any of the operations of
disembarking" within the meaning of the words of Article 17."
As a final comment to this section, although there is no
authority on the issue of "embarking" in English case law,
according to the criteria set force in the Adatia case, the author
believes that the most likely point to start embarkation followed
by the UK approach is when a passenger hand in the boarding
pass, of course, this consideration under further observation of
future English case law.

3-6. The civil law jurisdictions' approaches
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Other than the US and UK common law approaches, no
matter which test the courts adopted, locational or tripartite, in
considering the interpretation and application of the Warsaw
Convention Article 17, the civil law jurisdictions' courts adopted
,'II!

similar but different approaches. They frequently pay some
regard to the question whether the relevant accident related to
the activity of aviation, in another word, whether there is any
aviation risk. They also attach considerable importance to the
question whether at the relevant time the passenger was under
the control of the carrier. The following cases may serve as
some examples.

Mache v Cie Air France

435

In this case the French court held that the physical injuries
received as a result of the passenger falling into a manhole when
crossing the apron to customs did not take place in the course of
disembarkation since there is no aviation risk.

Air-Inter v. Sage et al.

436

A passenger slipped and fell in an airport entrance hall,
while he was in front of the check-in counter before proceeding
17 RFDA353, 20 RFDA228, (1966); 21 RFDA343, (1967); 24 RFDA311, (1970) Cour de
Cassation.
436
Cour d' Appel de Lyon (France), February 10, 1976; RFDA 266.
435
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to the departure lounge. The fall was caused by the passenger
slipping over a pool of whisky split on the ground by a previous
traveler. The French court held that the fall could not be blamed
on the carrier, since the airport entrance hall is a public place
,'II'

and not subject to the carrier's control and management.
Consequently, the preparatory stage of air transport could not be
considered as having commenced.

Consorts Zaoui v. Aeroport de Paris

437

The French Court of Appeal has, for good reason, rejected
the request for compensation from an airline for injuries
sustained by passengers who used the escalator situated in the
airport entrance hall; it noted that the people applying for
compensation were, at the time when the accident occurred, in
airport buildings used by different airline companies and where
the carrier's agents had not yet taken over responsibility for
those persons.

Blumenfeld v BEA

438

Unlike the French approach illustrated above, the German
court adopted a rather extensive interpretation as to the Warsaw
437
438

Cour de Cassation (lre Ch. Civ.), May 18, 1976; [1976] RFDA 394.
(Federal Republic of Germany), March 11, 1961; [1962] ZLW 78.
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Convention Article 17. In this case, an aircraft of the defendant
airline had been unable to take off on schedule due to thick fog,
so the passengers had to wait for some time. When the flight
was finally called the plaintiff, who alone with other passengers
hurried down the steps of the air terminal building in order to
board the aircraft, slipped and fell; she boarded the aircraft with
bruises on her leg and ankle. The plaintiff then claimed and
received compensation for the accident, because the court ruled
that when the airline company calls its passengers to board the
aircraft it takes full charge of the passengers.

Adler v Austrian Airlines

439

In this case, the Brussels Court of Appeal held that where
the passenger who slipped on ice disembarking from a bus in
order to embark on the aircraft was in the course of embarking.

3-7. "From embarking to disembarking" vis-a-vis "from
entering to alighting"

It is a general understanding that insurance is closely
associated with international air carriers' risk management, air

439

[1986] 1 S & B A v R VIII191 (Brussels CA).
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carrier's liability to passengers is one of them. As to the duration
of form what time to what time a air carrier should liable, while
the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention Article 17
requires "from embarking to disembarking", the London
Aircraft Insurance Policy (which is a world wide standard policy)
section 3.1 and the other similar aviation insurance policies
around the world provide:
"The Insurers will indemnify the Insured ... in respect of accidental bodily injury
(fatal or otherwise) to passengers whilst entering, on board, or alighting from the
Aircraft ... "

Like the Warsaw Convention, the London Aircraft
Insurance Policy did not draw the exactly line as to when the
"entering" starts and when the "alighting" ends. And there is no
case law to interpret "entering"; however, there is a case concern
about the meaning of "alighting".
In

the

case

of

Gustafson

v

National

Insurance

Underwriters,440 the court held that the allegations in the

petition of Nancy Bischofs (the injured person) allege she was in
very close proximity to the airplane, and a minimum of time had
elapsed from her being on the plane and the accident. Nancy
Bischofs' allegations in her petition establish conclusively that
she had taken no action to leave the proximity of the airplane,
nor completed the acts normally performed by average person in
440

517

s.w. 414,1974 Tex. App.
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getting away from an airplane.
Accordingly, the word of "alighting" means close to the
aircraft, and "entering" may the same approach. So, there is a
gap between "from embarking to disembarking" and "from
entering to alighting", the Warsaw Convention's scope is
broader than the London Aircraft Insurance Policy. This may
result future conflicts as to who, the air carrier or the insurer,
should pay the compensation to the injured passenger.
Nevertheless, every day's practice shows no urgent necessity to
solve this problem. Air carriers and insurers sympathize with
status in quo as to insurers pay the compensation to the
accidents which happened really close to the aircraft, at the
mean time, for the accidents which happened not so close to the
aircraft (but close enough for air carriers to liable) hit air carriers
themselves.
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CHAPTER FOUR

What Constitutes "BODILY INJURY"
Under the Warsaw - Montreal System

258

4-1. Introduction

A passenger is required to satisfy three conditions to
recover damages for any injury or death under the Warsaw Montreal system: 441 (1) the passenger suffered an 'accident'; (2)
The accident occurred aboard the international flight or in the
course of embarking or disembarking the international flight; (3)
The accident caused the passenger to suffer 'death or
wounding ... or any other bodily injury.' Having examined the
first

two

conditions in previous

chapters, this

chapter

concentrates on the third condition.
Although 'death' has its clear meaning, whether 'bodily
injury' encompasses emotional distress under the Warsaw Montreal liability regime becomes one of the heaviest debated
issues within the field. Courts have attempted for years to
interpret and solidify the meaning of ambiguous phrasing and
terminology, and the debate has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.
Ever since the Warsaw Convention was opened for
signature seventy-seven years ago, dissatisfaction has been so
widespread that there have been numerous multilateral attempts
to amend, supplement, and modify the convention's sometimes

441

Warsaw Convention 1929, Art. 17. See also Montreal Convention 1999, Art. 17.
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unreasonable provisions. 442 One of these areas of dissatisfaction
deals with whether compensation for damages arising from
emotional distress is available under the Warsaw Convention. A
number of decisions, most notably Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd443 , have indicated that there can be no recovery for purely
mental injuries. 444 In Floyd, for example, the Supreme Court

."

.lli
'"

not only rejected the view that there can be any recovery for
purely mental injuries under the limited liability provisions of

Ji,

the Warsaw Convention, but also concluded that unless a
passenger was made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical
manifestation of injury," an air carrier could not be held
liable.

445

However, while Floyd effectively served to rule out
recovery for purely mental injuries, the court expressly declined
to state its views concerning whether passengers could recover
for mental injuries accompanied by physical manifestations of
447
injury.446 This left the court in Carey v. United Airlines
to
Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan 1. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 Harv. L. Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967).
443 Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
444 See Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1998)
(characterizing the plaintiffs injuries as "purely psychic injuries that do not qualify as bodily
injuries under the Warsaw Convention"); Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170,
178 (S.D.NY 2001) (absent any "physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or
inability to concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not compensable").
445
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
446 See Id.
447 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).

442
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attempt to answer "the question of whether such physical
manifestations satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement" of the
Warsaw Convention's Article 17. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit determined that physical manifestations of
emotional distress do not satisfy the bodily injury requirement,

..

and the Warsaw Convention, therefore, leaves the plaintiff
WIt. h out reme dy. 448
In reaching its conclusion, however, the Carey court failed
to make any clear distinction between the plaintiffs physical
manifestations of emotional distress and other cases wherein
recovery was available to plaintiffs unable to demonstrate
claims flowing from a physical injury, but were able,
nevertheless, to satisfy the bodily injury requirement.

449

Consequently, while the court's decision purports to resolve this
issue, the debate continues.
On the issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court, apart
from Carey case, several district courts have held that merely
claiming that physical injuries led to psychological damages in
the aftermath of an accident occurring in the course of
international transportation is insufficient for recovery under the

448
449

Id, at 1053.
Id, at 1053-54.
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Warsaw Convention. 45o For example, the Alvarez court adopted
a similar reasoning requiring that a passenger, who suffers
psychological injuries accompanied by physical injuries, prove a
strong causal nexus between mental and physical injuries. Other
federal courts refuse to hold that psychological injuries that are
coupled with physical injuries, but not caused by them, are not
recoverable under the Warsaw Convention. 451 Instead, these

Iii"
'"
III

courts hold that recovery for psychological injuries, even if
unrelated to the physical trauma, is allowed as long as there are
some physical injuries.

"1
I

~I

'II' '

452

,,[l

The following sections of this chapter will analyze those
reported cases in which courts have considered whether, and to
what extent, recovery for psychological injury is available under
the Warsaw Convention.

4-2. Article 17 and the 'bodily injury' requirement

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 provides:
"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the
accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking." (The Montreal

See Alvarez v. American Airlines, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1999).
See, e.g. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994,954 F. Supp.
175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
452 See id.

450
451
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convention 1999 Art. 17 is substantially the same).

From its inception the 'bodily injury' requirement has
proved contentious in its application as courts adjudicating
claims under Article 17 have conservatively interpreted the
phrase "bodily injury" as either pure physical injury or mental
suffering accompanied by physical injury where the latter was a
causative factor in bringing about the former.

"~ II

,

,',

Ii

453

Most courts have applied this standard and have been
unwilling to venture beyond the requirement that a passenger be
made to "suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation
of injury" before permitting recovery against an airline for
bodily injury under the Warsaw Convention.

454

Only recently

have courts attempted to answer the question of whether mental
injuries' accompanied by physical manifestations of injury are
within the purview of Article 17.

455

Part of the difficulty arises from the tendency of courts to
try to determine the intention of the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention and the meaning of the French term 'lesion
corporelle'

(translated

into

English

as

"bodily

injury")

incorporated into the original treaty document. 456 The Carey
453

Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L.

& Com. 225, 225 (2000).
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
455
Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051-52.
456 Gregory C. Fisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive
Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 Tex. Int'l LJ. 12 (1990).

454
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court, for example, relied heavily on the conclusions drawn in
1§rrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.,457 wherein the
court agreed with the Floyd analysis that 'lesion corporelle' was
correctly translated as 'bodily injury' and held that because the
plaintiff could not demonstrate direct, concrete, bodily injury, it
did not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Warsaw
. 458
ConventIOn.
Despite the contention arising from the language of Article

..
"I,

17, the majority of proposed changes and amendments to the
1"·"1

Warsaw Convention have dealt with the liability limitations of
Articles 20 and 22. 459 The limited debates addressing the
language of Article 17 have not centered on the bodily injury
requirement, but on the distinction between the application of
the term "accident" as opposed to such alternate terms as
"occurrence" or "event. ,,460 Nevertheless, early drafts of the
Montreal Convention's Article 17 would have expressly
included liability for mental injury. 461 Later drafts even
introduced the element of personal injury designed to

Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 FJd 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052. It should be noted that many of these conclusions were drawn, in turn,
from Floyd.
459 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 20 and 22.
460 Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances Under the Warsaw
Convention, 16 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 891,914-19 (2001).
461 Blanca 1. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66 1. Air L. & Com. 21,
36 (2000).

457
458
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encompass both physical and mental injuries. 462 For example,
the provision (then Article 16) of the first draft of the Montreal
Convention corresponding to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention read:
"The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury or mental
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger.,,463

,..'

Other drafts of the convention even included the term
II.

"personal injury"; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO
)1
1,1

removed both "mental injury" and "personal injury" from the
provision, choosing, instead, to leave the language virtually
unchanged.

4-3. Recovery for pure emotional injury

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Floyd, courts were
split as to whether a plaintiff could recover for pure psychic
injuries. In one of the earlier cases, Rosman v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,464 New York's highest court considered the
claims of passengers involved in the hijacking of a flight from
Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L.
Com. 225, 225 (2000).
463 Id. at 226-27 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the
Warsaw System, Aviation Q., July 1997, at 286,313) (emphasis added).
464 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
462

&
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Tel Aviv to New York. The claims were brought under Article 17
for emotional injury accompanied by physical injury. The plane
was hijacked on September 6, 1970, and plaintiffs were held
hostage for six days by guerillas armed with rifles and hand
grenades.
Plaintiffs claimed that they suffered "severe psychic
trauma" and that they were damaged "by the physical
circumstances of their imprisonment aboard the aircraft." 465
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that they suffered physical injury
as a result of the forced immobility, inadequate sanitary facilities,
and scarcity of food and water. The alleged physical injuries
included backache, swollen feet, boils, skin irritation, weight
loss, dehydration, and sleep deprivation. 466 The defendant
airline argued that the liability scheme of the Warsaw
Convention did not allow recovery because physic injury, "with
or without palpable physical manifestation," is not 'bodily
injury' within the meaning of Article 17, and that 'the physical
injuries claimed did not result from any impact and in any case
are so slight as not to amount to compensable bodily injury. ,467
The court began by examining the meaning of Article 17 in
its original French and found that there was no dispute that the
465
466
467

Id, at 850.
Id.
Id, at 852.
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words "mort, de blessure, ou de toutes autres lesion corporelle"
were properly translated as "death or wounding or any other
bodily injury.,,468 For purposes of the plaintiffs' claims, the
meaning

of "bodily

injury"

was

at

issue.

The

court

acknowledged that the French legal usage of the term lesion
corporelle should be considered, but declined to apply French
law to determine the meaning of the term. The first step in the
court's analysis was to determine whether "the treaty's use of the
word 'bodily,' in its ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to
include 'mental. ",469
The court found that the ordinary meamng of the term
"bodily injury" connotes "palpable, conspicuous physical injury,
and excludes mental injury with no observable 'bodily,' as
distinguished form 'behavioral,' manifestations. ,,470 Given the
plain meaning of the term, the court concluded that "the
compensable injuries must be 'bodily' but there may be an
intermediate causal link which is the 'mental' between the cause
_ the 'accident' - and the effect - the bodily injury.,,471 Once the
causal link is established, the court reasoned, damages sustained
as a result of the 'bodily injury' - whether mental or physical -

468
469
470
471

Id.
Id, at 855.
Id.
Id, at 857.
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are compensable under the Warsaw Convention. The court
found that the airline was liable for the palpable, objective
bodily injuries, "including those caused by the psychic trauma
of the hijacking," and for the damages caused by them, but not
"for the trauma as such or for the non-bodily or behavioral
manifestations of that trauma. ,,472
On the other hand, in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,473 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase
"lesion corporelle" in the authentic French text of Article 17
encompassed purely emotional distress. 474 Similarly, a host of
trial courts interpreted the Convention to permit damages for
purely emotional injury.475
Although the Supreme Court had decided cases under the
Warsaw Convention several times before,476 it was not until its
review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines,477 that the Court established the framework for the
recovery of emotional injuries under the Warsaw Convention.
The case was brought by passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight
Id.
Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
474 Id, at 147l.
475 See Karfunke1 v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971,977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Husser! v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Krystal v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
476 See EIAI Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999); Zicherman v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 218 (1996); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
477 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
472

473
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from Miami to the Bahamas.
Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines lost oil pressure
and, as part of the normal emergency protocol, the flight crew
shut down the engine and returned to Miami. The two remaining
engines then failed, and the flight crew informed the passengers
that the plane would be "ditched" in the Atlantic Ocean. As the
plane was descending, the crew was able to restart one of the
engines and the plane landed safely at Miami International
Airport. 478 The passengers brought suit to recover damages
solely for their mental distress. The district court concluded that
pure psychic injury was not compensable under the Warsaw
Convention. 479 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the
phrase "lesion corporelle" encompassed "purely emotional
distress. ,,480
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and the New York Court
of Appeals decision in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines.

481

The

Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ultimately holding
that recovery for pure psychic injury was not permitted under

Id.
In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,629 F. Supp. 307
(S.D. Fla. 1986).
480
Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480.
481 See Rosman, 314 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that purely psychic trauma is not compensable under
Article 17).

478

479
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the Warsaw Convention.
The Court applied long-accepted methods of treaty
interpretation, considering the text of the treaty, its context, as
well as the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties. ,,482 The narrow
issue reviewed by the Supreme Court was whether mental or
psychic injury alone satisfies the requirements of 'lesion
corporelle. ,483
'i

The Court examined the French text and its English

",

, '

translation. French dictionaries, the English translation of the
treaty as ratified by Congress, and the United Kingdom's
translation of the term all define the term "lesion corporelle" as
"bodily injury.,,484 In the absence of disagreement as to its
proper English translation, the Supreme Court next turned to the
French legal interpretation of the text. The Court applied the
same principles that would have been applied by contemporary
French lawyers to interpret the text - "(1) legislation, (2) judicial
decisions, and (3) scholarly writing.,,485 The Court found that
the term "lesion corporelle" was not in use in French legislative
486
Second, the
texts at the time of the Warsaw Convention.
482
483
484
485
486

Floyd, 499 u.s. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
More recent French cases have used the term "lesion corporelle," generally, in the context of
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Court found no French court decisions explaining the meaning
of the phrase. Third, the Court found no supplemental materials
or scholarly writing prior to the Convention discussing the
meaning of the term "lesion corporelle. ,,487 Since neither Article
17 nor the traditional methods of interpretation suggested that
the term "lesion corporelle" should be translated as anything but
"bodily injury," the Court then examined the negotiating history
of the Convention.
The protocol established by the Paris Convention in 1925
·"1

would have held air carriers liable for a broad range of injuries,
including emotional distress. 488 At the Warsaw Convention,

I

I·

CITEJA drafted the more narrow provision that was ultimately
adopted, although the negotiating history does not provide an
explanation as to why the language was revised or of the
meaning of the term "lesion corporelle." The Floyd Court's
review of the documentary record "confirms - and courts and
commentators appear universally to agree - that there is no
evidence that the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw
Convention specifically considered liability for psychic injury or
automobile accidents. Id. at 538. The Court found that the recent cases "tend to support the
conclusion that, in French legal usage, the term "lesion corporelle" refers only to physical
inJuries." Id. at 538.
48 Although some scholarly writings discussed "lesion corporelle" subsequent to the Convention,
the Court found the analysis unpersuasive. Id.
488 Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for
French Legal Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 Tex. Int'l LJ. 127, 142 (1990)).
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the meaning of 'lesion corporelle. '" The Court was persuaded by
the "unavailability of compensation for purely psychic injury in
many common and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw
Convention. On balance, the evidence of the post-1929 'conduct'
and interpretations of the signatories . . . supports the narrow
translation of 'lesion corporelle.'" After examining subsequent
amendments to the Convention as well as case law from other
Signatory States, the Court concluded that there was no support
'i'

for a broader reading of the term. The Court ultimately held that
"an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an
accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical
injury or physical manifestation of injury," but expressed "no
view as to whether passengers can recover for mental injuries
that are accompanied by physical injuries. ,,489
In cases subsequent to Floyd, courts have consistently
found that pure emotional distress is not actionable. In Fishman
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,490 plaintiffs--an infant child and her
mother--brought an action against an airline for damages
sustained by the infant when a stewardess applied a cup
containing a warm cloth over the child's ear to alleviate the
child's pain from changes in air pressure. When the stewardess
489
490

Floyd, 499 u.s. at 552.
Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
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applied this to the child's ear, scalding water dripped onto the
child, causing burns. 491 The crew declined to administer first
aid upon arrival, and eventually, the child was rushed to the first
aid station at the airport and was treated. The court's primary
focus was whether the alleged torts arose from an "accident"
under the Warsaw Convention and whether the statute of
limitations was tolled during the child's infancy. Relying on the
Supreme Court's Decision in Air France v. Saks,492 the court
'i

found that the claim fell within the scope of the meaning of
accident as the injury was caused "by an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger.,,493
In an attempt to bring, her claim outside of the Warsaw
Convention, the child's mother argued that her claims were
solely for emotional harm and, therefore, outside the scope of
Article 17.494 Because the claim arose out of an accident, it was
within the ambit of Article 17. In fact, the court found that all
claims for both infant and mother were accident claims under
the Warsaw Convention. 495 However, because the mother's
claims were solely for emotional distress they were not
compensable under the Warsaw Convention.
491

492
493
494
495

Id.

Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
Fishman, 132 F.3d at 141 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
Id. at 142.

Id.
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In Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.,496 an individual brought
a putative class action under Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention497 on behalf of himself and other similarly situated
passengers on a flight from New York to London. The flight was
delayed and eventually cancelled, and the plaintiff alleged a
variety of "inconveniences" under Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention arising from the delay. The inconveniences he
suffered included: "(1) having to remain in the holding area
without

adequate

food,

water,

restroom

facilities

and

information; (2) having to stay in a substandard motel; (3)
having to 'be subjected' to misinformation about the flight status;
(4) having to obtain alternative means of transportation; and (5)

losing out on a refreshing, memorable vacation."
While acknowledging that economic damages arising from
delay were compensable under Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention,498 the court found that the plaintiffs alleged
damages were nothing more than pure mental injuries arising
"from discomfort, annoyance, and irritation" suffered as a result
of the delay. As such, the Lee court relied on Floyd and Daniel v.
Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., (N.D. Tex. 2002).
Warsaw Convention Article 19 provides that "the carrier is liable for damage occasioned by
delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage, or goods."
498 "Because the Warsaw Convention is premised upon a 'contract' between the passenger and the
airline, courts permit recovery of economic damages arising out of the delay itself (i.e., rental,
hotel accommodation, taxis, etc.) under Article 19." See Pakistan Arts & Entm't Corp. v. Pakistan
Int'IAirlines Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 741,743 (NY App. Div. 1997).
496

497
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Yirgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,499 and concluded that plaintiff
could

not

recover

for

mental

injuries

under

the

Warsaw

.
500
ConventIOn.
In another Article 17 case, Croucher v. Worldwide Flight
Services, Inc.,501

the court reviewed a

claim for emotional

distress resulting from a passenger coming into contact with
biomedical waste in an air sickness bag that was allegedly left
from a prior flight. The plaintiff also alleged emotional distress
from the fear of contracting a disease from the waste. Plaintiff
'1,

alleged no bodily injury, and the court rejected the plaintiffs
arguments as having no basis in law.

502

In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng

503

"I'

, where a

former passenger claimed that an intrusive 15-minute search left
her sick and upset during the flight, emotionally traumatized and
499 Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992- 93 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(dismissing claims of emotional distress including anxiety, exhaustion, frustration, humiliation,
mental anguish and physical discomfort arising out of a flight delay).
500 Under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, courts have allowed recovery for inconvenience
as a result of delay. See Daniel, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 994 ("Damages for inconvenience do not fall
within the rubric of 'emotional distress.' Time is money, after all, and the Court fmds that the
inconvenience of being trapped for hours in an unfamiliar airport is a compensable element of
damages for delay in air travel under the Warsaw Convention and domestic law, even in the
absence of economic loss or physical injury. "); see also Pakistan Arts & Entrn't Corp., 232 A.D.2d
at 32 (holding that "damages resulting from the delay in transporting a passenger are the type
permitted to be recovered under the Convention"); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provided a cause of action for
delay where plaintiffs were "bumped" from their scheduled flight and the airline did not provide
transportation for six days).
Notably, the cases that have rejected recovery under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention for pure
emotional injury arising from delay have relied on Floyd, which denied recovery under Article 17
of the Convention based on the meaning of "lesion corporelle," a term that is not used in Article
19.
501 Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.N.J. 2000).
502 Id. at 507.
503 525 U.S. 155, 119 S. Ct. 662,142 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1999).
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disturbed during her month-long trip in Israel, and resulted in
medical and psychiatric treatment, the Court noted that she was
not entitled to compensation under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention because she sustained no bodily injury and could
not recover for her solely psychic or psychosomatic injuries.
In Li v. Quraishi, 504 the court accepted the airline's
argument that the Warsaw Convention bars recovery for purely
psychological damages even if caused by intentional misconduct,
then dismissed the claims of a former passenger for severe
emotional and psychological damage to herself and her infant
that resulted from being urinated upon by an intoxicated
passenger.
After examined the case law, the conclusion could be draw
like that pure emotional distress is not recoverable under the
Warsaw - Montreal liability system of the modem aviation.

4-4. Emotional injury manifested in physical injury

Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether
emotional injury that manifests itself in physical injury is
compensable under Article 17, lower federal courts have

504

780 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
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generally agreed that, like pure emotional injury, emotional
injury that manifests itself in physical injury is not compensable
under Article 17.
For instance, in Hermano v. United Airlines

505
,

the plaintiff

brought an action for unlawful arrest, defamation, and negligent
infliction of severe emotional distress. The plaintiff checked
several bags--some of which contained motorcycle parts--on a
flight from Los Angeles to Miami with a connecting flight to
Brazil. While on board the aircraft, the plaintiff was approached
by a uniformed airline employee and questioned about whether
he had any firearms in his checked bags. After denying the claim,
the plaintiff was asked to deplane the aircraft, which he did.
After the bags were re-examined and no firearms were found,
the airline employee located another flight for the plaintiff and
the rest of his trip proceeded without further incident. Plaintiff
sought damages for "severe and enduring mental distress and
anguish, emotional shock to his nervous system, and monetary
expenditures for medical treatment." Relying on Floyd and
Tseng, the court found that plaintiffs "physical manifestations of
alleged emotional distress" were insufficient to constitute bodily
injury under the Convention.
505
506

506

Hermano v. United Airlines, (N.D. Cal. 1999).
See id.
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Similarly, in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. 507,
a passenger sought damages for extreme emotional distress, post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and anorexia. During her
flight to London, the captain became aware of a bomb threat
against the plane; it was classified as a "nonspecific warning
which could be related to one or more targets but where there
could be doubt as to its credibility or the effectiveness of
existing security measures.,,508 In accordance with the airline's
protocol, the captain informed the passengers of the threat, and
the plane landed safely as scheduled in London. 509
There was no dispute that the event constituted an
"accident" under Article 17, and the only question was whether
plaintiffs injuries were compensable under the Convention. 510
The plaintiff relied on a sentence at the very end of the Floyd
opinion, which states: "We conclude that an air carrier cannot be
held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury,

or physical

manifestation of injury. ,,511

In light of the last phrase, "physical manifestation of
injury," the plaintiff asserted that her injuries were compensable
507
508
509
510
511

Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 109 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id, at 108.
Id, at 109.
Id,at11O.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added).
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under the Convention. Rather than claim that PTSD was the
physical manifestation of injury, the plaintiff relied on her
weight loss as the actual physical manifestation of the injury.
The Terrafranca court rejected the plaintiffs argument, relying
on the central holding of Floyd - that a passenger cannot recover
absent bodily injury.512 The court concluded that the text of
Article 17 requires "bodily injury" as "a precondition to
recovery" and that the plaintiff "must demonstrate direct,
concrete, bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear
or anxiety.,,513 Since the plaintiffs claims of post traumatic
stress disorder complicated by anorexia and weight loss were
found to be purely psychic, they did not qualify as "bodily
injuries" under Article 17.

514

In Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 515 a plaintiffs
pocketbook was stolen prior to boarding a flight to Costa Rica.
The pocketbook contained plaintiffs medication, Xanax, which
plaintiff regularly took to treat panic attacks, anxiety, and
nervousness.

Plaintiff boarded the aircraft, but became

concerned that the medication would wear off during the flight,
and asked the flight attendant if she could disembark. The flight
Terrafranca, 151 F.3dat 111.
Plaintiff's psychiatrist classified plaintiffs injuries-- fear, anxiety and isolation--as emotional.
Id. at 112.
514 Id.
515 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.NY 2001).

512

513
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attendant denied her request, despite the fact that they had not
yet pushed back from the gate. After her third request was
denied, plaintiff began to feel terrified. She started to sweat and
as alleged, began to "feel dizzy, nauseated, and short of breath."
She had a rapid heartbeat and pain in her stomach. 516 The
plaintiff dialed "911" from her cell phone and eventually the
police contacted the pilot and the aircraft returned to the gate.
An airline employee "announced over the loudspeaker that an
'unruly' passenger wished to leave; some fellow passengers then
greeted plaintiff with hisses and jeers." The plane returned to the
gate, and the plaintiff disembarked, where she was treated by
EMS technicians and transported to a nearby psychiatric
emergency room. 517
Plaintiff claimed she suffered "embarrassment, humiliation,
loss of liberty, psychological injury, pain, suffering emotional
distress and mental anguish." 518 She also claimed that she
suffered post traumatic stress, psychological injury and pain,
and that she continued to suffer physical manifestations

519

after

her release from the hospital, including "insomnia, restlessness,

Id, at 173.
Id.
518 Id, at 174.
519 Evidence of plaintiffs diagnosis by her psychiatrist was confusing, as she made two different
diagnoses - acute stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, each with different
manifestations. Id.
516

517

280

inability to concentrate, and unexplained aching in her arms and
legs. ,,520
The court reasoned that, in Floyd, although not expressly
alleged, many of the plaintiffs suffered what "we may call
'psychosomatic' sequelae (such as insomnia or weight loss) as a
result of their acute fear while airborne. ,,521 The court reasoned
that Floyd bars recovery for "physical manifestations" of
emotional distress where the accident causes "no direct physical
injury but rather merely terrifies the passengers (even when the
terror later leads to physical symptoms, such as weight 10SS).,,522
The court determined that this reading is bolstered by the
Supreme Court's narrow reading of lesion corporelle, which
respected the Convention's primary purpose of limiting the
liability of air carriers and maintaining uniformity.523 The court
held that to "the extent that plaintiff throughout her ordeal did
not receive any physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or
any alteration in the structure of an internal organ, then any
subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or inability to
concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is
not compensable. ,,524
520
521
522
523
524

Id.
Id, at 175.
Id, at 177.
Id. (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 547).
Id, at 178.
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The Turturro court also considered sua sponte whether the
accident caused the plaintiff to develop PTSD. In its review, the
court acknowledged new medical advances that make it possible
to document the physical effects of PTSD, including changes to
brain cell structure, and "that under some circumstances a
diagnosis of chronic PTSD may fall within the Convention's
definition of 'bodily injury. ",525 While ultimately concluding
that the plaintiff did not adequately plead PTSD, as she did not
proffer "reliable evidence beyond her purely subjective
experience of panic, ... somatic complaints, ... and conflicting
diagnoses," the court held that plaintiff's claims are not
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. The court's
conclusion may represent a significant development in the
ability of plaintiffs to recover for PTSD under Article 17 since
the court recognized that its finding might open the "floodgates
of litigation" unless claims ofPTSD are carefully scrutinized. 526
In more recent cases, plaintiffs have begun bringing claims
that PTSD is tantamount to physical injury, based on new
medical technologies that suggest that injuries traditionally
considered "purely psychic" or "purely emotional" parallel
physiological manifestations. However, most of the cases were
525
526

Id at 179.
Id.
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unsuccessfully established that PTSD is tantamount to physical
injury except the Weaver case, infra.
In Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines

527

, plaintiffs alleged that

they suffered emotional injuries and physical manifestations of
emotional trauma during a flight through severe turbulence
related to a hurricane. Plaintiffs generally alleged that PTSD,
like other stress-related disorders, "causes 'biochemical and
structural changes' in the brain." 528 The court divided the
alleged injuries into several categories, none of which were
compensable under Article 17. First, several injuries were
"patently and purely emotional" and, as such, they were
529
non-compensable under Floyd's construction of Article 17.
The second category of injury included "manifestations of
emotional injury--either physical (nausea, cold sweats) or
mental (nightmares, lack of concentration).,,530 The court found
531
that these claims were expressly precluded by Terrafranca ,
which required direct, concrete, bodily injury. While evidence
was offered to suggest that severe turbulence could directly
cause physical symptoms such as nausea and cold sweats,
plaintiffs did not allege that such symptoms were a direct result
527

528
529
530
531

Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines,
Id, at 322.
Id, at 325.

232 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.N.J. 2002).

Id.

See supra note 67.
283

of the severe turbulence encountered by the aircraft. Plaintiffs
also alleged that the mere experience of G-forces amounted to
bodily injury under the Convention. The court rejected this
argument, noting that "while such forces may of course cause
injury, experiencing them does not in itself constitute bodily
.'

lllJUry.

,,532

The Bobian court also declined to apply the reasoning in
Turturro, instead relying on Terrafranca and concluding that
PTSD is purely an emotional injury, despite plaintiffs' attempt to
re-characterize PTSD in terms of its effect on the brain.
However, unlike Terrafranca where the plaintiff did not allege
physical injury from her PTSD, in Bobian, the plaintiffs
presented evidence that PTSD and other stress-related disorders
are associated with biochemical and structural changes in the
brain. 533 The plaintiffs in Bobian presented general evidence
that PTSD and other emotional disorders are tantamount to
physical injuries, but they did not present specific evidence such
as MRIs or other medical evidence of their particular injuries.
Other lower courts presented with such evidence have allowed
the actions to proceed.

532
533

Bobian, at 326.
Id.
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For example, in Weaver v. Delta Airlines,534 the District
Court for the District of Montana awarded damages to a plaintiff
whose emotional injury resulted in a simultaneous brain injury.
In Weaver, the defendant airline made an emergency landing
during a flight from London. The plaintiff alleged that she was
terrified during the emergency landing and had to subsequently
seek treatment for emotional and physical injuries attributable to
the accident. 535 She was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD.
The plaintiff argued that recent developments in medicine have
determined that "extreme stress causes actual physical brain
damage, i.e., physical destruction or atrophy of portions of the
hippocampus of the brain. ,,536 Plaintiff also presented evidence
sufficient to meet her burden of showing "an absence of any
factual issue that the emergency landing physically impacted"
her brain, while the defendant did not raise a genuine issue that
the plaintiffs injury was non-physical. 537 As such, no material
issue of fact existed and the court focused on whether the
plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The
Weaver court concluded that,

because plaintiffs PTSD

manifested as a brain injury, she sustained a bodily injury within
534
535
536
537

Weaver v. Delta Airlines,
rd. at 1190-91.
rd. at 1191.
rd. at 1192.

56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999).
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the meaning of Article 17. Cognizant, as was the Turturro court,
that its decision could open the "floodgates of litigation," the
court reasoned that because claims must be based on a "definite
diagnosis of a disorder that arises from a physical injury that is
medically verifiable," there would be no flood of litigation
arising out of its holding.

538

In Carey v. United Airlines

539,

the Ninth Circuit

distinguished Weaver. In Carey, a passenger brought a claim
against an airline arising out of a confrontation with a flight
attendant. The passenger was seated in first class, while his three
daughters were seated in coach. During the flight, two of his
daughters experienced ear aches and attempted to seek their
father's assistance in first class. A flight attendant prevented
them from reaching their father. The father alleged that the flight
attendant refused to assist him and humiliated him in front of the
other first-class passengers. 540 The passenger alleged emotional
and mental distress and claimed that he suffered "physical
manifestation

including

nausea,

cramps,

perspiration,

nervousness, tension and sleeplessness." The lower court
concluded that the passenger's sole remedy was under the
Warsaw Convention and that the alleged InJunes were not
538
539
540

Id.
Carey v. United Airlines, 255 FJd 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id, at 1046.
.
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compensable. This is consistent with the holding in Weaver and
~hendrimada v. Air India,541 although the lower court in Carey

did not require medical evidence of "physical injury" of the
emotional injury in order to sustain the action.
On appeal, the Carey court affirmed the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Terrafranca that the physical manifestations of the
passenger's emotional distress and mental distress - nausea,
perspiration, cramps, nervousness, tension and sleeplessness did not satisfy the Article 17 "bodily injury" requirement. As in
Terrafranca, the passenger did not demonstrate "'direct, concrete
bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or
anxiety. ",542 The Carey court relied on the reasoning in Floyd
with respect to the purpose of the Convention, i.e., to limit the
543
liability of air carriers to foster industry growth.
The court
544
to
also referenced dicta in EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng
support its conclusion that the "Supreme Court would hold that
physical manifestations purely descended from emotional and
mental distress do not satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement of
Article 17.,,545 Although other cases, including Terrafranca, cite
to this same statement in Tseng, the issue of recovery for
541
542
543
544
545

Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052 (citing Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 11 0).
Id. at 1052-53.
mAl Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.
.
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emotional distress was not before the Tseng Court. 546 Again, as
the plaintiffs did not provide concrete physiological medical
evidence of their emotional injuries, the court was hard pressed
to find that the emotional injuries constituted "bodily injury"
under Article 17.
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,547 the Ninth Circuit reviewed
a passenger's claim with facts very similar to those in Carey. The
passenger brought a claim for emotional distress under Article
17 based on his confrontation. with a flight attendant. The

plaintiff did not allege bodily harm, but alleged that intentional
infliction of emotional distress "is not preempted because the
Convention does not govern the commission of intentional and
malicious torts that cause non-bodily harm." 548 The court
analogized this case to Carey and held that the "Warsaw
Convention creates 'no exception for an injury suffered as a
result of intentional conduct. ",549 As the injuries were purely
emotional, the passenger's claim was barred.
In re Air Crash at Little Rock Arkansas, on June 1, 1999550 ,
by rejecting a $6,500,000 jury award, the court found that
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.
Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, (9th Cir. May 30,2002) (unpublished opinion).
Id.
549 Id. (citing Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051).
550 291 F.3d 503, 59 Fed. R. Evid. Servo 236, 196 A.L.R. Fed. 695 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 974, 123 S. Ct. 435, 154 L. Ed. 2d 331 (2002).
546

547
548
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physical manifestation of mental injuries such as weight loss,
sleeplessness, or physical changes in the brain resulting from
chronic posttraumatic stress disorder are not compensable under
the Warsaw Convention. The court held that even had the former
passenger submitted sufficient evidence at trial of brain changes
resulting from posttraumatic stress disorder, these physical
manifestations of the mental injury would not be compensable
under the treaty.
In re Air Crash Off Point Mugu, California, on January 30,
2000,551 the court noted in dictum that claims for physical
injury purely descended from emotional distress are prohibited
by the Warsaw Convention.

4-5. Emotional injury accompanied by but unrelated to
physical injury

The majority of courts have not allowed plaintiffs to
recover for emotional injury that is unrelated to physical harm.
In Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc. 552, plaintiff sought
compensation for physical and mental injuries related to an
emergency evacuation. Plaintiff suffered physical injuries during
551
552

145 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., (S.D.NY 1999) ..
289

the evacuation, including bruises and pain. In addition, plaintiff
began having anxiety attacks in situations that were similar to
those occurring just before the evacuation. The plaintiff did not
allege a casual connection between the physical injuries and the
mental injuries. The court concluded that only plaintiffs
physical injuries were compensable.
The Alvarez court adopted the majority view that in order
to recover for psychological injuries, there must be a "causal
link between the alleged physical injury and the alleged
psychological injury." The court looked to the Second Circuit's
decision in Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc.

553

and

compared the language in Article 25, which required causation,
with the liability provisions in Article 17, which did not. The
court found that "under Article 17, a relatively intimate link is
required between the liability-triggering event (the accident) and
plaintiffs' damages because the liability-triggering event is not
necessarily culpable." In other words, whereas a liability event
is necessary to trigger liability under Article 25 (which is
necessarily culpable), Article 17 imposes strict liability for
"bodily injury," and the standard for imposing strict liability
should be more stringent.

553

Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Contrasting a similar case, Longo v. Air France, Inc. 554,
where the plaintiffs alleged bodily injuries (bruises during
evacuation) and related emotional injuries (fear of death), but
failed to allege that their fear of death flowed from their bruises,
the Alvarez court concluded that:
"The Convention's goal of 'reasonable and predicable' recoveries, would be
undennined if similarly situated passengers were treated differently from one another
on the basis of an arbitrary and insignificant difference in their experience. The
happenstance of getting scratched on the way down the evacuation slide ... [should]
not enable one passenger to obtain a substantially greater recovery than that of an
unscratched co-passenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash. In sum, in a
case governed by Article 17, a plaintiff may recover compensation for psychological
and emotional injuries only to the extent that these injuries are proximately caused by
his or her physical injuries. Psychological and emotional injuries that are merely
accompanied by physical injuries are not compensable."

Not all courts have so hastily granted summary judgment in
cases where psychic injury accompanies physical injury. In In re
Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana 555, actions were
,

brought against airlines for pre-impact fear damages arising out
of an air crash in which all passengers perished. In allowing
damages for pre-impact fear, the court emphasized what Floyd
did not address--the question of whether passengers could
recover for mental injuries that were accompanied by physical
injuries and the decision that "there could never be any recovery
for purely psychic injuries." 556 The court pointed out that
nothing in Floyd "states that once [the bodily injury]
554
555
556

Longo v. Air France, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
Id, at 178.
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precondition is met, and physical injury or death

IS

present,

damages for mental distress are not available. ,,557
The court distinguished other lower court decisions that
have extended Floyd to "create a partial bar to recovering for
emotional distress under the Warsaw Convention." In these
cases, courts found that the "emotional distress claims flowing
from the accident (as opposed to some physical injury sustained
in the accident) are unrecoverable." The Alvarez court declined
to adopt the reasoning in these cases, where "Article 17 itself
expressly requires a causal link only between 'damage sustained'
and the accident. ,,558 In holding that plaintiffs could recover for
their pre-impact pain and suffering, the court in In re Roselawn
noted that its decision, "which permits those passengers who
sustained physical injury in the accident to recover for any
pre-impact terror they may have experienced, is no more unfair
than the rule recognized in Floyd, which permits only
passengers with physical injuries to recover at all.,,559
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September
1, 1983

56°, the court granted damages for emotional injury that

was accompanied but not caused by simultaneous physical
557
558
559
560

Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept.

1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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injury. Survivors sought damages for pre-death paIn and
suffering by passengers on a Korean Air Lines flight that
crashed after being shot down by a Soviet missile. 561 The court
found that passengers were alive and conscious for about eleven
minutes after the initial missile strike.

562

Acknowledging that,

under Floyd, 563 damages for mental anguish were not
recoverable "absent physical injury," 564 the court awarded
damages for the decedents' mental anguish because the evidence
showed that they did sustain physical injury due to rapid air
decompression. According to the court, the facts that the
emotional injury was "accompanied by physical injury" and that
the decedents' suffering was "likely considerable" made the case
"vastly different" from Floyd. 565

I~ Chendrimada v. Air India,566 plaintiffs brought an action
for injuries that occurred on a trip to Bombay, India. Plaintiffs'
first flight from New York was canceled due to a bomb scare,
and plaintiffs were rescheduled on a flight the following day. 567
The flight made a scheduled stop in Delhi, but due to weather
conditions, the flight remained at Delhi for eleven and a half
561
562
563
564
565
566
567

Id, at 594.
Id, at 598.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. at 598.
Id.
Chendrirnada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.NY
Id, at 1090.
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1992).

hours, during which plaintiffs were not allowed to deplane nor
were they provided with any food. Plaintiffs alleged that they
suffered "bodily injuries" by being confined without food for
that period - including nausea, severe cramps, pain and anguish,
malnutrition and mental injury.568 The court found that the
plaintiffs' allegations of bodily injury satisfied the requirements
of Floyd to survive summary judgment--namely that they
alleged a "physical injury or manifestation of a physical
injury." 569 The court concluded that the manifestation of
physical injury "need not result from a suddenly inflicted trauma,
but may, as is alleged here, result from other causes for which
the carrier is responsible." The court's conclusion, while
consistent with the decision in Weaver, relaxes the requirement
that the emotional injury be related to physical injury.

4-6. Mental injury flowing form physical injury

In cases following the Floyd decision, most courts have
found that recovery for emotional injuries is permitted so long
as the emotional injury "flows from" the bodily injury.

In In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc.
568
569

Id, at 1092.
Id. (emphasis added).
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h-ircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1986 570 ,
("TWA"), survivors brought an action against an airline for
physical and psychic injury arising out of a bomb explosion in
which four people were killed and others were injured. One of
the passengers alleged physical and psychic injuries. Mr. Ospina,
a passenger, seated directly over the bomb, was blown out of the
plane. Expert testimony established that Mr. Ospina's body had
been nearly severed by the blast and that he probably lived for
five to ten seconds after the blast and was aware of what was
happening to him.
The court focused on the term "dommage survenue,,571 and
began by acknowledging that while the term encompasses many
forms of harm, it cannot include "purely mental injury
uncomiected to physical harm.,,572 The TWA court found that
the Floyd decision implied that "psychic damage accompanying
physical injury is recoverable." The court distinguished Floyd
based on the type of mental suffering experienced. In Floyd, the
passengers were terrified, but no one was physically harmed
from the event, while the airline's misconduct573 in TWA caused
570 In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on
Apr. 2, 1986,778 F. Supp. 625 (SD.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ospina v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
571 Translated in English as "damage sustained." Id. at 640.
572 Id,at637.
573 TWA's failure to follow established security protocol was found to be willful misconduct by
the jury. As such, the liability limits of Article 17 did not apply. See id. at 638.
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plaintiffs to suffer "while in pain from his wounds, falling to
certain death after the bomb tore through his body as he was
ejected from the aircraft." Because Mr. Ospina suffered bodily
injury that then caused him psychic harm, the court found the
award of damages to be appropriate.
The court recognized that some courts574 have objected to
permitting recovery for pain and suffering subsequent to
physical injury because any de minimus physical injury, such as
a scratch or bruise, could give rise to recovery for psychic
trauma. The court reasoned that in this case, the psychic injuries
arose directly from the bodily injury, and both types of injury
were severe. As such, the court distinguished the case from ones
where the passenger first experienced psychic injury followed
by bodily injury or death, and ones where death occurred
simultaneously with the psychic injury. In upholding the jury's
award of damages for the conscious pain and suffering between
the time of the explosions and Mr. Ospina's death, the court
found:
"Survival damages for pain and suffering comports with the main policy goals of
general tort law--full deterrence and compensation--without interfering with the goals
of the Warsaw Convention. These goals are compatible--in fact, almost identical. Both
are designed to provide full compensation for hann suffered and deterrence when the
statutory limit of $75,000 does not apply.,,575

574
575

See Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *5.
TWA, 778 F. Supp. at 641.
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In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,576 plaintiffs aboard a
flight from New York to San Francisco experienced an "aborted
takeoff, crash and fire." All passengers survived, but many
suffered minor physical injuries and were traumatized. Several
passengers had international tickets, and their sole remedy was
through the Warsaw Convention. Roughly half of the plaintiffs
alleged only emotional injuries, while the other plaintiffs alleged
577
emotional distress in addition to minor physical injuries.
The
court defined "physical manifestations" as "those bodily injuries
or illnesses (such as skin rashes and heart attacks) that result
from the distress one experiences during or after an accident,"
and emotional distress as "psychic trauma that one experiences
either during or after the accident . . . (e.g., fear of flying or
claustrophobia. . . or embarrassment about disfigurement or
concern that an injury will develop complications)." 578 The
court found that the failure of the Warsaw Convention to use the
term "caused by" in Article 17 may indicate that the recoverable
damages "need not be caused by the bodily injury, and may
instead be those caused by the accident. ,,579 The court examined
four possible approaches under Article 17 for recovery of
576

577
578
579

Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
Id, at 663.
Id, at 664.
Id, at 665.

854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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emotional distress. The first is to disallow recovery for
emotional distress. The second approach is to allow recovery for
all emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs. The
third possibility is to allow emotional distress as damages for
bodily injury, including distress about the accident. Lastly, a
court can allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing
from a bodily injury.
1. Disallow recovery for emotional distress.

First, the court examined the approach that would allow no
recovery for emotional distress, even if accompanied by bodily
injury. Under this approach, an injured passenger could recover
only pecuniary loss, such as medical expenses and lost income.
This approach is in accord with the Floyd Court's narrow
reading of Article I7's reference to bodily injury. Denying
emotional distress damages is also appropriate in light of the
state of the law in many countries at the time of Warsaw
Convention. 580 And, because this approach is so restrictive on
passengers' rights, it furthers the pro-airline industry goals of the
Convention.

581

This approach

IS

unacceptable, however, because it

provides such minimal compensation for passengers who may
In Floyd, the Court noted that "such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most, jurisdictions
in 1929." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545.
581 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665.
580
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have suffered traumatic injuries, either physical or mental. The
drafters of the Warsaw Convention attempted to strike a balance
between passengers and airlines; this approach is too one sided.
Further, even though many jurisdictions denied recovery for
mental distress in 1929, the number of the countries which do
not recognize recovery for mental distress nowadays is limited
since most of the countries adopt the theory that mental distress,
like physical injuries, is recoverable. Even at the time of 1929,
France recognized such claims, as did other countries, when
accompanied by physical impact or manifestation. Because of
the numerous problems with this approach, American courts
have not adopted it.
2. Allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a
bodily injury occurs.

The second approach is to allow recovery for all emotional
distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs, regardless of the
connection between the distress and the bodily injury. Thus, a
passenger with a scratched arm could recover for the trauma and
fear due to the plane crash; the bodily injury opens the door to
liability for emotional distress.
In Chendrimada v. Air-India582 , supra, the court adopted

582

See supra note 541.
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this approach. There, because the plaintiffs alleged physical
injury, the court denied Air-India's motion for summary
judgment. 583 This approach is consistent with a broad reading of
Article I7's imposition of liability for "damage sustained in the
event of ... bodily injury. ,,584 Significantly, the drafters did not
use the phrase "damage caused by ... bodily injury," which
would have served as a signal that any mental distress must be
connected to the bodily injury. This approach is also supported
by the fact that the Floyd Court did not mention a need for a
causal connection between bodily injury and emotional distress.
Further, this approach is in line with the approach to mental
distress taken in early tort cases, where a physical impact or
manifestation was a prerequisite to recovery.585
However, this approach is undesirable for two reasons.
First of all, this approach treats mental distress as an
583 One paragraph of the court's opinion is of particular relevance:
"As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in the Floyd case that a passenger cannot recover
for purely emotional or mental injuries absent physical injury or manifestation of physical injury.
Therefore, to survive Floyd, plaintiffs must allege a physical injury or a manifestation of physical
injury. The Court fmds that plaintiffs allegations satisfy this requirement. It should be understood
that the Court is not ruling that as a matter of law being held on an airplane for over eleven hours
without food is a physical injury in and of itself. If a passenger in the same position as plaintiffs
had not exhibited any physical manifestation of injury as a result of being held without food, but
only alleged emotional injury, no action would lie. Of course, plaintiffs must still prove their
alleged physical injuries at trial to recover, but plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is a genuine
issue of material fact in dispute which cannot be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. In
reaching this conclusion we of course have determined that the 'manifestation of physical injury'
which is a prerequisite to an action under Floyd need not result from a suddenly inflicted trauma,
but may, as is alleged here, result from other causes for which the carrier is responsible."
Id, at 1092 (emphasis added).
584 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
585 Under early tort law, the physical impact or manifestation was seen as proof that the emotional
distress was not faked.
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independent cause of action, which

IS

inconsistent with

precedent that dictates that the Warsaw Convention creates a
cause of action, not just a limit on remedies. 586 And, secondly,
this approach treats mental distress as damages resulting from
the accident, not the injury. 587
3. Allow emotional distress as damages for bodily injury,
including distress about the accident.

Emotional distress is considered an element of the damages
for bodily injury under the third approach. Under this approach,
the distress does not need to be about the injury to be
compensable. This approach is different from the second
approach in that the distress must occur at the same time or later
than the bodily injury; one cannot, therefore, recover for the fear
before the impact and bodily injury under this approach.
The courts in the cases concerning the downing of Korean
Air Lines Flight KE 007 on September 1, 1983, supra, while the
plane was in route from New York to Seoul, adopted this
586 The dispute did not arise until the 1970s because American courts did not originally view the
Warsaw Convention as creating a cause of action. See Sheila Wallace Holmes, Casenote, 58 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1205, 1207 (1993). Rather, courts fIrst interpreted the Convention as simply
limiting monetary damages on otherwise applicable law. Id. Courts thus viewed the treaty as
creating only a presumption of liability, instead of an independent cause of action. Id. at 1209-10.
It was not until the late 1970s that courts began to construe the Warsaw Convention as the
"universal source of a right of action." Id. at 121 0 (quoting Benjamins v. British European
Airways, 572 F.2d 913,919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)).
587 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666. This is problematic under the wording of Article 17 of the
Convention and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985),
where the Court noted that "'the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the
passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury. '" Jack, 854 F. Supp. at
666 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 398).
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approach. 588 There, the plane strayed into Soviet airspace and
was intercepted and destroyed by Soviet military aircraft over
589
the Sea of Japan; all 269 passengers were killed.
The numerous actions filed around the country for
wrongful death of the deceased passengers were consolidated
for common pre-trial proceedings and the trial of the common
issue of liability.590 After a jury found that Korean Air Lines
engaged in willful misconduct that proximately caused the
deaths, the individual cases were returned to the various
jurisdictions where they had been filed in order to determine
591
compensatory damages for each plaintiff.
One court first noted that the 269 passengers aboard the
plane were alive and conscious for ten or eleven minutes after
the plane was hit by the missile and before it hit the sea, and
possibly for a period thereafter. 592 The court then recognized
that the passengers probably endured a considerable amount of
emotional and physical (due to rapid decompression) pain
during that period which ended in the death they were
anticipating. Consequently, the court held, "This is pain and
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 814 F. Supp. 605, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), modified, 43 F.3d
18 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
589 Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 606.
590 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 575 F. Supp. 342 (J.P.M.L. 1983).
591 Zicherman, 814 F. Supp. at 606. The jury also awarded punitive damages, but on appeal they
were set aside as non-recoverable in aWarsaw Convention Case. Id. See In re Korean Airlines
Disaster, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991).
592 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. 592,598 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
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suffering accompanied by physical injury, and logically must be
permitted by Floyd.,,593
The logic behind the third approach is best illustrated by
the comments of the court in In re Air Crash Disaster Near
··594
Hono 1u1u, Hawall :
"The Convention itself does not specify the elements of damages which a plaintiff
might recover under Article 17. Instead, 'commentators and case law are in accord
that the Convention leaves the measure of damages to the intemallaw of parties to the
Convention. ",595

Grafted onto the common law tradition, and recognizing
the Warsaw Convention's adoption of "intemallaw" with respect
to the measure of damages, Article 17 must be read to create a
cause of action which encompasses the remedies traditionally
provided by common law in personal injury actions, wrongful
death actions, and survival actions.

596

Although there is little federal common law on emotional
distress, federal courts have indicated that emotional distress
damages would be allowed for distress about the plane crash,
not just the distress about the injury.597 This approach --

See also In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 807 F. Supp. 1073 (SD.N.Y. 1992).
783 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
595 Id. at 1264 (quoting In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 928 F.2d 1267, 1283 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991)).
596 Id. at 1265.
597 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654, 667 (N.D. Cal. 1994). See, e.g., Hall v.
Ochs, 817 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1987) (allowing emotional distress damages for the trauma involved
in aracially motivated arrest, not just for the minor injuries); Lentz v. MN Eastern Grace, CIv
No. 85-1078-FR, (D. Or. Dec. 2,1988) (awarding emotional distress damages for a seaman's
discomfort around boats after an accident in which his boat was hit, although he suffered only
bumps and bruises in the accident). Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 667.

593

594
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analogizing to other areas of federal common law

IS

unsatisfactory because of the umqueness of the Warsaw
Convention's
distress.

exclusion of recovery for pure

emotional

598

4. Allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from
a bodily injury.
Under the fourth approach, emotional distress flowing from
the bodily injury is an element of damages allowed for the
bodily injury. Thus, damages are allowed for emotional distress
598 See Dafna Yoran, Comment, Recovery of Emotional Damages Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention: The American Versus the Israeli Approach, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 811, 814 (1992).
The US Supreme Court in Floyd stated, "We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case and the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Rosman v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., which held that purely psychic trauma is not compensable under
Article 17." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 534. The Court also noted, "The only reports of French cases we
did find that used the term 'lesion corporelle' are relatively recent and involve physical injuries
caused by automobile accidents and other incidents. These cases tend to support the conclusion
that, in French legal usage, the term 'lesion corporelle' refers only to physical injuries." Id.
(footnote omitted). Then, the Court dismissed the fact that in 1929 France, unlike many other
countries, permitted recovery for mental distress. Id. at 539. The Court found that "this general
proposition of French tort law does not demonstrate that the specific phrase chosen by the
contracting parties-- 'lesion corporelle'--covers purely psychic injury." Id. To follow up on this, the
court stated its task: "'to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared
expectations of the contracting parties.'" Id. at 540 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399
(1985)).
See also Dale M. Eaton, Note, Recovery for Purely Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: Narrow Construction of Lesion Corporelle in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 1993
WIS. L. REV. 563, 569. The Floyd Court explained: In 1951, a committee composed of 20
Warsaw Convention signatories met in Madrid and adopted a proposal to substitute "affection
corporeUe" for "lesion corporelle" in Article 17. The French delegate to the committee proposed
this substitution because, in his view, the word "lesion" was too narrow, in that it "presupposed a
rupture in the tissue, or a dissolution in continuity" which might not cover an injury such as
mental illness or lung congestion caused by the breakdown in the heating apparatus of the aircraft.
The United States delegate opposed this change if it "implied the inclusion of mental injury or
emotional disturbances or upsets which were not connected with or the result of bodily injury," but
the committee adopted it nonetheless. Although the committee's proposed amendment was never
subsequently implemented, its discussion and vote in Madrid suggest that, in the view of the 20
signatories on the committee, "lesion corporelle" in Article 17 had a distinctively physical scope.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546-47.
See also Luis F. Ras, Warsaw's Wingspan Over State Laws: Towards a Streamlined System of
Recovery, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 587 (1994). Addressed the question of whether the Warsaw
Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries sustained during international
flight.
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only to the extent the emotional distress is caused by the bodily
injury. A passenger may, therefore, recover for fear related to his
broken leg, but not for fear related to the plane crash. Under this
approach, emotional distress can also have a separate role as the
causal link between the accident and the bodily injury; a
passenger may, for example, recover for a heart attack caused by
the distress of the plane crash.

599

In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

6oo

, the court adopted

this approach. Jack involved the aborted takeoff and crash of
TWA Flight 843 when departing New York's John F. Kennedy
Airport for San Francisco. 601 All the passengers survived
despite the fact that fire completely destroyed the plane. During
the aborted takeoff and evacuation, many of the passengers
suffered minor physical injuries; many were traumatized by the
accident. The passengers filed suit, seeking damages for
physical injuries and emotional distress, and TWA filed motions
for summary judgment.
599 The comments of the court in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 1974), help to illustrate the reasoning behind this position: The compensable injuries must be
'bodily' injuries but there may be an intermediate causal link which is 'mental' between the
cause--the accident-- and the effect--the 'bodily injury'. And once that predicate of liability-- the
'bodily injury'--is established, then the damages sustained as a result of the 'bodily injury' are
compensable including mental suffering .... However, only the damages flowing from the 'bodily
injury', whatever the causal link, are compensable .... We hold, therefore, that defendant is liable
for plaintiffs palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of
the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma as
such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma.
600 854 F. Supp. at 654.
601 The case fell under the Warsaw Convention because many of the passengers held tickets for
international flights.
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The court held that the plaintiffs with impact injuries could
recover for their impact injuries, the emotional distress flowing
from their impact injuries and any physical manifestations of
their emotional distress. Further, the court decided that the
plaintiffs with physical manifestations could recover for the
manifestations and any distress flowing from the manifestations,
but that they could not recover damages for the emotional
distress that led to the manifestations. The court was careful to
note that, in both instances, the emotional distress was limited to
the distress about the physical impact or manifestation (the
bodily injury) and that recovery was not allowed for the distress
about the accident itself. 602
Of the four approaches discussed above, this fourth one is
the most desirable for a number of reasons. First, this approach
prevents serious inequities among the passengers subject to the
Warsaw Convention. Getting scratched on the way down an
evacuation slide should not enable one passenger to obtain a
much greater recovery than an unscratched fellow passenger
who was equally terrified by the plane crash, and the fourth
approach achieves this result. And, this approach is consistent
TWA's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the 27 plaintiffs who complained of
psychic trauma but did not complain of impact injuries or physical manifestations of emotional
distress; TWA's motion for summary judgment was denied as to the 33 plaintiffs who claimed
impact injuries and/or physical manifestation of their emotional distress. See Jack, 854 F. Supp. at
668.

602
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with the intentions of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention by
making passengers' recoveries more reasonable and predictable.
This approach also allows for greater recovery with more severe
injuries, presuming that more distress flows from more serious
injuries. Further, this approach even permits recovery in
wrongful death cases. 603
The fourth approach does, however, have one drawback.
The difficulty is that emotional damages might not be allowed in
a case like that involving the Korean Air Lines plane that was
shot down in Soviet airspace. For, if no impact injuries were
suffered until the plane hit the water, no recovery would be
allowed for the ten or eleven minutes of pre-crash terror.
The author believes that the numerous benefits of the fourth
approach outweigh its one drawback. Courts should, therefore,
adopt it and allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing
from a bodily injury.
In a more recent case, In re Air Crash at Little Rock,
Arkansas 604 , the Eighth Circuit reviewed a jury verdict in favor
of passenger damages in the amount of $6.5 million

605

for a

Survivors may recover for physical manifestations of their grief at the loss of a loved one.
In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002).
605 International Air Transport Association (illATA") inter-carrier agreements entered into by
America made the action a contract, rather than tort action. The agreements serve to waive the
Warsaw Convention's liability limits. So, while the action was brought under Article 17, the
liability limits of Article 17 were not applicable, h<::nce the large jury verdict. Id. at 506-07 fn. 2.
603

604
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claim ansmg under the Warsaw Convention. The passenger
suffered physical injury (punctured leg, traumatic quadriceps
tendinitis) during an air crash in Little Rock, Arkansas. 606
Nearly a year later, she sought treatment from a psychiatrist for
her psychic harm. She was diagnosed with PTSD and depression,
and her psychiatrist testified that her leg injuries were a factor in
her PTSD and depression, although later admitted that the
passenger would likely have suffered from PTSD regardless of
the physical injury. While testimony was offered that PTSD
causes physical injury to the brain, no testimony was offered to
show damage to the passenger's brain. Indeed, no diagnostic
medical tests were performed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's ruling that any physical injury is
sufficient to trigger recovery of emotional damages, regardless
of their cause, and followed what it termed the more
"mainstream" view that "damages for mental injury must
proximately flow from physical injuries caused by the
accident." 607 The Fifth Circuit found that the approach was
"consistent with Floyd, yet provides full compensation for the
victim

within

the

bounds

established

by

the

Warsaw

Although the passenger was on a domestic flight, she was returning home from a trip to
Germany. Id. at 506.
607 Id, at 510.

606
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. ,,608
ConventlOn.
In its holding, the court drew a line between the emotional
injuries that were directly caused by the passenger's physical
injuries to her legs and those that were directly caused by the
accident--the damages were compensable in the first case, but
not in the second. 609 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
October of 2002. 610

4-7. International approaches

While the United States is the primary source of aviation
law decisions under the Warsaw Convention, few other
countries have addressed the issue of recovery for purely
emotional damages (but not emotional damages accompanied
with physical injuries, which issue leaved unanswered outside
the US) under the Warsaw Convention. Those countries that
have addressed the issue almost uniformly adopted the view that
no such recovery is available.
For UK, in King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,611 the House
of Lords dealt with two cases where passengers suffered
608
609
610
611

Id.
Id. at 511-12.
537 U.S. 974 (2002).
King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd.,

1Lloyd's Rep. 745, (H.L. 2002).
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psychiatric injury with no physical injury as a result of accidents
on board aircraft. In the first case,612 plaintiff King was a
passenger on a helicopter transporting workers off of a North
Sea oil platform. Both of the helicopter's engines failed suddenly,
causing the aircraft to plunge thirty-five feet back onto the
oilrig's deck. King suffered post traumatic stress disorder with
symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of
flying. He claimed the accident also caused or contributed to an
existing peptic ulcer. In the second case,613 the plaintiff was an
underage girl, Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala
Lumpur to Amsterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male
passenger sitting next to her. She presented evidence at trial that
she suffered from clinical depression consisting of a single
episode of a major depressive illness. She claimed only mental
anguish damages.

614

The House of Lords heard a consolidated

appeal because the same legal issue was presented in both
cases.

615

The House of Lords held that compensation could be
awarded for physical manifestations of a mental injury so long
as a casual link can be established by showing that the mental
612
613
614
615

rd.
rd.
rd.
rd.

(citing King v. Bristow, 1Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)).
(citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A.
at 746.
at 747.
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2002)).

injury causing the physical symptoms itself was caused by the
accident. However, no recovery is available for mental injury
absent physical symptoms. In this consolidated appeal, the
holding meant that plaintiff King could recover only for his
ulcer, and plaintiff Morris was entirely denied recovery.
In their analysis, their Lordships turned to the leading
authorities from the United States. In particular, they followed
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd 616 and EI Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng 617 , but paid close attention Weaver v. Delta Airlines,
Inc. 618 Lord Steyn noted that, in addition to any legal rationale
for not following Weaver, the policy reason for not following
Weaver was that "the extension of the Warsaw system to include
mental injury and illnesses is too controversial to command
sufficient international support. ,,619 This rationale for rejecting
Weaver is important in that their Lordships expressed a strong
preference in establishing international uniformity in Warsaw
Convention interpretation. 62o Lord Hobhouse disagreed and
thought Weaver was correctly decided and naturally followed
from Floyd. 621 Lord Hope took a third position. He suggested

616
617
618
619
620
621

E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 155.
Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
King, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 755.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 783-84.
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that bodily injury is that which is capable of being demonstrated
by a physical examination using the most sophisticated means
available. 622 He then stated that he did not think such an
examination happened in Weaver and, in fact, that no evidence
of a physical injury had been presented at all in that case. Based
on these differing viewpoints, the United Kingdom's position
regarding Weaver is unclear.
The House of Lords had been previously confronted with
the issue of damages for purely mental injuries in Sidhu v.
British Airways623. That case involved a consolidated appeal
arising from passengers being taken hostage in Kuwait by
invading Iraqis during the first Gulf War. The plaintiffs claimed
to have suffered psychological and bodily injury including
624
weight loss, eczema and excessive menstrual bleeding.
In the
trial, however, plaintiffs submitted that their claims likely did
not fall into the category of "bodily injury" as their claims were
for psychological injury. Before the House of Lords, plaintiffs
suggested that psychological

injury

should provide

for

recovery.625 Their Lordships regarded the issue as not germane
to their decision and avoided discussion of the issue. 626
622
623
624
625
626

Id. at 771.
Sidhu v. British Airways, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1997).
Id. at 77. The other consolidated plaintiff alleged only psychological injury.
Id. at 80.
The issue was whether damage suffered in the· course ofintemational carriage by air is
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Interestingly, it appears that the type of physical injury claimed
in Sidhu would have allowed for recovery under the standard set
forth by the House of Lords in King.
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether
recovery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd. 627, the Court of Appeal
of New South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental
anguish arising from an in-flight tum-back after an engine
fire.

628

Following Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily

injury" did not include purely psychological injury, but noted
that the decision in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery
be available where psychological injury is accompanied by
. I"InJury. ,,629
PhYSlca

The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish
without physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel
Supreme Court. 630 In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was
confronted with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish
damages suffered while being held captive by hijackers.

631

The

court reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any
governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention. The House of Lords held that it was and
dismissed the case on limitations grounds. See Sidhu, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 87.
627 Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997).
628 Id. at 319.
629 Id. at 323.
630 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141 (1984)).
631 Id.at769.
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physical injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the
Warsaw Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today,
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been
contemplated.

This

approach

has

been

criticized

as

impermissibly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase
"bodily injury" by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal
and medical advances instead of interpreting the Convention as
written.

632

To date, no other jurisdictions have followed

Daddon.

4-8. Conclusion

While there is very little disagreement about the literal
translation of "lesion corporelle," its meaning and application in
the context of a variety of mental or psychic injuries is less clear.
There is widespread disagreement about whether - and to what
extent - the term encompasses emotional injury. Court decisions
since Floyd allow recovery for a range of claims involving
emotional injury under Article 17; in some cases there is no
recovery, while in others there is full recovery, depending on the

632

Id. at 770.
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allegations and the nexus between the alleged injury and any
related or accompanying physical injury. Courts are in
agreement that pure emotional injury is not compensable under
the Convention.

633

Most courts agree that emotional injury is

not compensable in those cases where it has resulted only in
physical manifestations such as weight loss or sleeplessness. At
the same time, most courts generally agree that emotional injury
is compensable if it proximately flows from a physical injury.
The troubling cases are those involving emotional injury
accompanied by unrelated physical injury, i.e., where the
physical injury has not been shown to have caused the emotional
injury. These cases are typically resolved on a case-by-case
basis. There is no consistent rule to guide the parties, although
the trend in the decisions seems to disfavor recovery for
emotional injury with unrelated physical harm. Thus, the case
law suggests that a plaintiff is more likely to prevail if he or she
can allege and prove a link between the physical and mental
InJunes.
In the future, certain advances in medicine may blur, or
perhaps even clarify, the distinction between purely "physic"
and physical injury. Currently, the majority of courts have not
See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530; Rosman, 214 N.E.2d at 848; Fishman, 132 F.3d at 140; Croucher,
111 F. Supp. 2d at 501.

633
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accepted that PTSD alone can be characterized as a physical
injury. Defendants should expect, however, even under the new
Montreal Convention of 1999, that plaintiffs will continue to
push the envelope with the backing of experts and application of
advances in science and medicine for more rulings to the effect
that PTSD is itself a physical injury or lesion corporelle. On the
other hand, although science may change or advance, the
analysis of facts in cases involving a claim of emotional injury
is unlikely to change significantly with the introduction of the
Montreal Convention. Accordingly, parties involved in future
cases with claims of mental injuries must be well-versed in the
body of case law cited in this chapter. As discussed herein, the
application of the "lesion corporelle" concept in context of
allegations of emotional harm is not entirely resolved and is an
important area for development of the law in international air
carrier litigation.
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CHAPTER FIVE

The Warsaw - Montreal System and China
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5-1. Introductory note

CAAC 634 was established in the year of 1950 as the central
~---'------'

administrative body of civil aviation in China. It has developed
rapidly since the Chinese Reformation in 1980.

I

635

Today, China

has more than one hundred international flight lines covenng
almost the entire world.
Compared to the high speed development of the Chinese
civil aviation industry, Chinese legislation has not kept up with
the pace. China only has "Civil
Avia1!Q1:!1'!w
China
(1995)",
',.-_.-------- -----_._--_of
_._--_.-_
...

.. --_.-

,//

promulgated on October 30 1995 and effective as of March 1,
I,F

1996, which is out of date. Importantly, does not deal with the
~

issue of international airlines' liability to passengers. Only in
one article of the "Civil Aviation Law of China", Article
.-------184
~

.. "~.,

provides:
"Where the provisions of international treaty concluded or acceded to by the People's
Republic of China ... the provisions of that international treaty shall apply ... "

However, this provides no

means

to

interpret an

international convention. This situation creates uncertainty for
Chinese courts, airlines, lawyers. No one is clear what exactly
the law is, or how to apply international conventions when deal
634

Civil Aviation Administration of China, now known as General Administration of Civil

Aviation of China.
635 Before Chinese Reformation, CAAC was state-owned property, even under the military
organization system.
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with international issues. Fortunately, this is not a dead end, for
the Civil Aviation Law of China, Article 184 paragraph 2
provides:
"In respect of cases which are not provided by the law of the P.R. China or by the
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the P.R. China, international
practices may apply."

This constitutes the foundation of the present dissertation.
Examining the cases around the world in this area will solve or
at least provide references to legal problems in China.
The problems have been clearly pointed out in recent air
disasters at Pusan
Airport in South Korea-----.------on -----_._---------April 5, 2002 and
.---__

___________

~

___ •

~

r

~

over the sea near Dalian, Cbina on May 7, 2002 have raised
_ _ _ _ _ •___ _

questions about how compensation claims are handled in China.
Though China is a contracting party to relevant international
conventions 636 and has enacted domestic laws and regulations
governing compensation for passengers killed or injured in air
accidents,

d~_~~~ts

in the country's legislation have been revealed.

How to apply the articles of the international conventions and
domestic laws to the air calamities that have occurred in
different jurisdictions, and how to determine the damages are
serious challenges faced by China's judges when claims for
compensation are brought to trial.
636 China made the accession to the Warsaw Convention 1929 on 20/07/58, so the convention
came into force in China on 18/1 0/58.
China made the accession to the Hague Protocol 1955 on 20/08/75, so the protocol came into
force in China on 18/11/75.
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Since China is a contracting party to both the Warsaw
Convention, signed October 1929, and the 1955 Hague Protocol
' -

'1

--1

that amended the Warsaw Convention. In accordance with
article 1 of the conventions, these conventions apply to
i!!t~DJ(l!Lo1).(;lLcaniages,

which is defined as:

"any carriage in which, according to the agreement between the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage
or a transshipment, are situated either within the territory of two High Contracting
Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed
stopping place within the territory of another state, even if that state is not a High
Contracting party.,,637

So, in case of an aircraft that departed from within China
and suffered air crash in a state of destination which is a
signatory country of eith~TJh~JY,!~~a~ ~onvention or the Hague
Protocol,

the

relevant

convention

shall

apply

to

the

compensation arising from the air accident.
The Chinese Aviation Law expressly introduces the
concept of 'i!l~ternational carria~e' as it is used in the
conventions, and thus the Chinese law also distinguishes
between international -- -and -_.----"non-international carriage. For
.---~ .. -.~---.-~---~.-~------

-"

international flights to or from China, the conventions will
prevail, and the local rules will deal with ~0I?-~~nt~!:!l:~~~~!!al
flights.

637

See Warsaw Convention 1929, Article 1.
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For domestic carriage, Article 128 of the Chinese Aviation
Law stipulates: 'The limits of carrier's liability in domestic air
transport shall be formulated by the competent civil aviation
authority under the State Council and put in force after being
approved by the State Council.' This is a delegated legislation

clause. However, the Civil Aviation Authority (CAAC) did not
formulate a new regulation as per the law on this matter but let
the pre-existing 'The Provisional Regulations on Compensation
to Passenger Killed or Injured in Domestic Air Transport' (that

entered into force January 1, 1994) continues to apply. Under
these regulations, air carrier's liability for passengers is limited
to Rmb70,000 (about US$8,400). For checked baggage,

I!

according to the revised 'Domestic Transport of Passengers and
Baggage by China Civil Aviation Rules' formulated by CAAC

on June 28, 1996, the limitation is Rmb50 (US$6) per kilo, and

!

for carry-on baggage is at Rmb2,000 (US$240).
The air carrier's liability to passengers under Warsaw
Convention is 125,000 French francs and Hague Protocol
doubled this to 250,000 francs. The Chinese Aviation Law
introduces the Special Drawing Right (SDR) contained in
Montreal Additional Protocol No.2, 1975, rather than the French
francs. Article 129 of the Chinese Aviation Law places an air
321

!

I

carrier's limits on passenger liability for international flights at
16,600 SDR, on checked baggage at 17 SDR per kilo and
carry-on baggage at 332 SDR for each passenger.
Over the past three decades, civil aviation industry around
the world have seen higher limits in air carriers' liability. Since
the lATA Intercarrier Agreement (IIA) of 1995, supplemented
by the measures to implement the lATA Intercarrier Agreement
(MIA), many airlines in developed countries have incorporated
new limits into their Conditions of Carriage and increase the
ceiling to 100,000 SDR. In 1998, EC regulation on air carrier
liability entered into force. Airlines form Japan, meanwhile,
lifted the limits voluntarily. The Montreal Convention came into
being in 1999. 638
All of these efforts aim to modernize the Warsaw system
with higher limits, and ultimately aim to abolish the limits.
When looking at China's liability limitation regulations, we find
that the limit for domestic carriage (Rmb70,000) is much lower
than the international limit of 100,000 SDR, and even lower
than the original Warsaw system. China's calculation was based
on the economic situation in 1993, but with fast GDP growth

China has ratified the Montreal Convention 1999 on 01106/05, so the convention came into
force in China on 31107/05.

638
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over the past decade and taking inflation into account the
amount needs to be raised. A positive sign that things are
changing is China Northern Airline's increase of the limited
amount for families of the Dalian (May 7, 2002) crash victims
killed to Rmb 133,000 (US$16,000) per passenger; with
additional compensation (for checked and carry-on baggage),
the amount in total will be about Rmb194,000 (US$23,458).
This roughly equals the level of Hague Protocol and the amount
for international flights under the Chinese aviation law. It is
believed this compensation policy has been approved by the
CAAC.
Therefore, under the framework of China's aviation
legislation, there exist five regimes that govern carrier's limits
for passenger liability: the Warsaw convention 1929, the Hague
Protocol 1955, the Montreal Convention 1999, the Chinese
Aviation Law for international carriage and the CAAC rules for
domestic carriage.

5-2. How to interpret "Accident" in China?

Beside the problem of "how much" an international aIr
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carner should liable to its passengers, how to interpret the
international conventions is another major problem, especially
the pre-conditions of a carrier should liable in the crucial Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal
Convention 1999.
Article 17 of the conventions require there is an "accident"
to trigger the airline's liability, however, no definition of
"accident" has been given in the conventions.
The theory that the goal in the interpretation of any
convention is to effectuate the intent of the parties is also
accepted in China. According to the Vienna Convention,639 'a
treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose. ,640 The basic rules include
the need to uphold the purposes of the treaty and give
meaningful effect to the signature or intent behind the treaty.
Notions of liberality and good faith 641 are also commonly
invoked.
Notably, the draft convention initially presented to the
Warsaw delegation by CITEJA made air carriers liable 'in the
Viellila Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
Viellila Convention].
640 Viellila Convention, supra note 639, art. 32.
641 Id.
639
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23, 1969,

1155 U.N.T.S.
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[hereinafter

case of death, wounding or any other bodily injury suffered by a
traveler,' 'in the case of loss, damage or destruction of goods or
baggage,' or 'the case of delay suffered by a traveler, goods, or
baggage.' The liability scheme did not textually include any
requirement of causation and made no mention or reference to
'accident.' Liability was likewise the same for personal injuries
and damage to goods or baggage.

642

The minutes to the Convention establish that the term
'accident' itself was never discussed, but simply appeared in
final form as revised by the drafting committee at the
Convention. 643 While there is no information as to why or when
this occurred, the wording remains exactly the same today as it
was then.
Surely Warsaw Convention Article 17 is 'stark and
undefined.' The plain or ordinary meaning of 'accident' or,
'l'accident', is certainly similar under both English and French
usage, and references an unexpected, fortuitous, or untoward
event or happening. What it includes within its ambit, however,
remains in question.

See International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Second International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, Minutes, Oct. 4- 12, Warsaw 1929, at 264-265 (R.
Horner ed. & D. Legrez transl., 1975) [[hereinafter 1929 Warsaw Minutes], (listing liability of the
carrier as adopted by CITEJA in May 1928).
643 See 1929 Warsaw Minutes, supra note 642, at 267 (using the term 'accident' in discussing the
liability of third party carriers).

642
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Fortunately, followed the basic principles, there is one
universal accepted definition of "accident" generally, which
given by the US Supreme Court in Air France v Saks,644 where
Ms. Saks was a passenger on an international flight between
France and Los Angeles, California. 645 As the aircraft
descended, Ms. Saks felt extreme pressure and pain in her left
ear

646

and suffered permanent deafness as a result.

647

Ms. Saks

claimed that the normal pressurization changes during descent
caused her deafness and constituted an accident under Article

17. 648 She argued that "accident" should be defined as a "hazard
of air travel," and that her injury had indeed been caused by
such a hazard. The US Supreme Court rej ected her claim and in
this landmark case, defined "accident" as an "unexpected or
unusual event or happening external to passenger".
This definition has been accepted by UK, in the case of
Chaudhari v British Airways plc,649 the UK Court of Appeal
determined that a passenger, who was already suffering from a
left-sided paralysis and who was injured when he fell as he tried
to leave his seat, did not suffer an "accident" that fell within

644
645
646
647
648
649

470 U.S. 392, 105 S. Ct. 1338,84 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1985).
See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
See id.
Id.
See

id, at 395.
[1997] Times 7May 1997 (Apr. 16, 1997).
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Article 17 of the Convention. Leggatt LJ emphasized that the
word "accident" focused attention on the cause, rather than the
effect of the accident, and should be contrasted with Article 18
of the Convention (covering loss and damage to baggage) which
refers to the "occurrence" which caused the damage. The word
"accident" was not to be construed by reference to the
passenger's peculiar condition, but was properly to be defined as
something external to the passenger.
This definition has also been accepted by Australia, in the
case of Povey v Qantas Airways Ltd 650, the High Court of
Australia held that "accident" is a concept which invites two
questions: first, what happened on board (or during embarking
or disembarking) that caused the injury of which complaint is
made, and secondly, was what happened unusual or unexpected.
Same as Canada, in the case of Quinn v. Canadian Airlines
Int'l Ltd. 651, Canadian court relying on Saks' holding that
turbulence was not considered an accident under the Warsaw
Convention.
China has not encountered a trail case concerned with the
definition of "accident" in Article 17 of Warsaw Convention.
2005 WL 1460709 (HCA 2005), affirming QANTAS Ltd v. Povey, 2003 WL 23000692 (VCA
2003), Special leave to appeal granted by, 2004 WL 3222486 (HCA 2004) and Affirmed by, 2005
WL 1460709 (HCA 2005).
651 [1994] 18 O.R.3d 326.

650
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The reason is due to the extremely unwillingness of prosecution,
Chinese people rarely sue in courts, the quantity of cases (at
least in this area) is so limited, this is particularly true when
compare with the US legal practice. However, there is no reason
to reject the worldwide accepted definition in Saks, the only
doubt as to this worldwide standard interpretation of "accident"
in the Warsaw Convention is the "external" requirement. Will
China accept the "external" requirement? The most likely
answer will be affirmative.
Prior to the decision of the US Supreme Court in Saks, a
number of courts expressed the view that an "accident," as that
term is used in Article 17, must be an unexpected or unusual
happening without requiring the event to be external to the
passenger. 652 And the Australia Povey case expressed this
concern as well. Some experts argue that the US Supreme Court
insisted that the "accident" must be external, however, there is
not a lot of textual support in the Warsaw Convention for this
conclusion. On the contrary, the text of Article 17 uses the word
"accident" as the necessary cause of the "damage so sustained."
Thus, arguably, if such "damage" were sustained by an internal
"accident" (should that be possible) so long as it happened "on
See Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also
Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 445, 471 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup 1983).

652
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board the aircraft" or "in the course of' the specified
"operations," that would be enough. Under this view, the
happening or event in such special and temporal circumstances
would be sufficient to attract the liability of the carrier.
By aware that even in the Saks, why an event must be
"external" to qualify as an "accident" has not been clearly
reasoned. There are some positive aspects under this approach,
this "external" prerequisite of Article 17 accident arises from the
court's desire to reduce the trouble of proof, which Chinese
courts usually welcome, since under the modem science, it is
extremely difficult to prove "internal accident" which connects
to the air travel, such as the DVT cases.
The next issue is should China interpret "accident" broadly
or narrowly? The most likely answer is broadly. Given the
significant exclusivity of the Warsaw and the Montreal
conventions, the world, include China, certainly under the
pressure of interpret the word "accident" broadly since recovery
for personal injury in the scope of international air carriage if
not allowed under Article 17 of the Conventions, is not available
at all. This is more so that in light of the traditions of Chinese

~

j

j

laws, regulations, and policies always encourage comfort the
people.

The question usually will be "how much
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is

appropriate?" rather than "will that be an accident?".
Based on the issues discussed so far, the following will be a
detailed examination of what will constitute "accident" under
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Convention in China, or will not.
1. Can intentional misconduct constitute an "accident"
within the meaning of Article in China? The answer

IS

affirmative. There is nothing in the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Convention exclude intentional misconduct to be an
"accident", instead, according to the inter-relationship of the
Article 17 and Article 25 653, intentional misconduct will
definitely fall in the scope of Article 17's "accident".
2. Whether inaction may constitute an "accident" within
the meaning of Article in China? The Chinese approach would
be pure inaction will not be an "accident" but an event lead by
an inaction could be an "accident".
In the case of Olympic Airways v Husain 654, the US
Supreme Court held that the term accident is not limited to
653 Warsaw Convention 1929, Article 25 provides:
"(1) The carrier shall not be entitle to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default
on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered
to be equivalent to willful misconduct;
(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage
is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment."
654 540 U.S. 644, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1146,4 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 709 (2004).

j
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affirmative acts. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
court rejected the defendant airline's argument that a flight
attendant's failure to act, by refusing to assist a passenger
sensitive to second-hand cigarette smoke in moving farther from
the smoking section, could not constitute an "accident" because
it was not an affirmative act. The court declared that the relevant
"accident" inquiry was whether there was an unexpected or
unusual event or happening and the rejection of an explicit
request for assistance would be an event or happening under the
ordinary and usual meaning of those terms. Moreover, the court
thought that Article 25, providing that Article 22's liability cap
does not apply in the event of willful misconduct or such default
[emphasis added by the court] on the carrier's part that may be
the equivalent of willful misconduct, suggested that an airline's
inaction could be the basis of liability.
Chinese courts will hardly accept this case. It is true that
rej ection of a request can be considered an event, but inaction
itself would not be. Inaction itself is nothing, not even an event,
how could it be an accident? The US Supreme Court conclusion
that an airline's pure inaction could be the basis of liability
would most likely not be acceptable in China.
3. Should service of food or beverages could be an
331

"accident" in China? Normally, the answer will be yes. In one
complaint to Eastern Airline, a passenger flew from Hong Kong
to Shanghai, one hour after disembarkation, he felt very
uncomfortable and was diagnosed with food poisoning. The
airline agreed that if the food poisoning was caused by the food
during the flight, it is an accident for which the airline should
liable. However, in this complaint, the passenger failed to prove
that his food poisoning was caused by the in flight meal.
4. Can detention or search of a passenger be an "accident"
in China? Probably yes, the reasonable expectation is that courts
will interpret detention or search of passenger as a Warsaw
Convention Article 17' s "accident" as long as the detention or
search is unexpected or unusual. If the detention or search is a
normal or routine one according to the airport or airline security
procedures, then there will be no accident.
5. Can removal of passenger from aircraft be an accident in
China? There is no clear answer, a court has to look into every
case's facts. Normally, a court will focus on whether the
removal is justified, if yes, it is the passenger's responsibility to
follow the removal order, if the passenger refuses to be removed
and caused injury to himself during the force removal, the
airline should not liable. On the contrary, if the removal is not
332

justified, it is an unexpected and unusual event, then airline
should liable to the injury to the passenger.
6. Can a passenger's pre-existing medical condition be an
accident in China? Probably not, because if the passenger is
aware of his medical condition, such as heart disease, he should
know that may cause damage during international flight, there
will be no unexpected or unusual event external to the passenger,
then there will be no accident. Even if the passenger is not
aware of his medical condition, the problem is already there, this
could not trigger the airline's liability. Since there is no case in
China concentrate on this issue, the following US case may
provide reference.
In Ra;cooar v. Air India Ltd. 655, the US court held that the
death of a passenger, who suffered a heart attack during layover
in an airport transit lounge utilized by several carriers and
restricted to passengers who cleared customs and security

---

under Article 17
checks, was not the result of an "accident"
--------~ ...

because a heart attack,
under the definition of that term by the
__
r-·-------~

Supreme Court in Saks, was not an event external to the
passenger.

655

89 F. Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
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7. Can a carrier's personnel response to passenger's
medical emergency be an accident in China? The answer is yes.
In an unreported complaint to Air China, one passenger felt
uncomfortable during an international flight, the air stewardess
offered him airsickness medicine, after the flight arrived at its
destination, the passenger suffered medicine hypersusceptibility.
The airline agreed that this is an accident under the Warsaw
Convention Article 17 and paid the passenger compensation.
Similarly, in one US case, Fishman by Fishman v Delta
Airlines, Inc. 656 , the US court adopted the same approach. The

court of appeals held that the scalding of a child by a stewardess
attempting to alleviate the passenger's earache was caused by an
"accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention. On the defendant carrier's international flight from
Tel Aviv, Israel to New York City, the child, who had a cold,
suffered from the change of air pressure. The stewardess
suggested that a cup containing a warm cloth be placed over the
ear and, when the poultice was applied to the child's ear,
scalding water in the cup dripped on the child's neck and
shoulder, causing bums.

656

132 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1998).
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In an effort to take their claim outside the Warsaw
Convention and avoid the result of the district court's ruling,
dismissal of the claims because the two-year limitations period
for bringing suit under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention
had expired, the plaintiffs attempted to cast their claims chiefly
in terms of the tortious refusal of medical care that happened
afterward and argued that the claims did not arise out of the
normal operation of aircraft, and in any event were not
accidental in nature. The appellate court approved the district
court's reasoning that the underpinning of the claims was the
scalding of the child by the flight attendant, an unexpected event
that was external to both plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs
contended that the child suffered serial colds and ear infections
and had narrow eustachian tubes, all of which predisposed her to
earaches caused by a change of pressure on the aircraft, the
appellate court agreed with the district court's reasoning that the
injury in the instant case was not the child's earache, but rather
the application of scalding water to treat it. The appellate court
thus found that, although the earache was caused by a change in
air pressure, which was part of the normal operation of the

1

J

aircraft and not an accident, all the harm alleged by the plaintiffs
flowed from the scalding, which was easily seen as accidental.
335

5-3.

How

should the phrase "From Embarking to

Disembarking" be interpreted in China?

After analyzing how to interpret "accident" in China, the
next issue is how to interpret "from embarking to disembarking"
in China. This is the second pre-condition to trigger an aIr
carrier's liability under the Warsaw-Montreal system.
It makes no difference that the negligence occurred or that

I

~

,

the carriage contract was formed prior to embarkation, for the
Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention Article 17
refer to the place where the .accident causing injury must
Lrci/V/
occurred in order for that article to cover the case and establish
the pres~mption
9fJi~l>iliJy_for
the injury.
The actual, ultimate
-..
---------.------~-

....----~--

---"

cause of the accident is irrelevant for purposes of Article 17. As
long as, and only if, the accident which caused the injury 'took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking,' the action is covered
by Article 17.
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The general understanding of the scope of "from
embarking to disembarking" is narrower than from the moment
See Hussed v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 13 CCH Avi 17603 (S.D. NY
1975).
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) the passenger entered the airport of departure until the passenger
.) left the terminal at his destination; but broader than from when
I

~

the passenger entered the aircraft until exiting the aircraft.
At the 1929 Warsaw Conference, the delegates were faced
with two general proposals concerning the extent of carrier
liability. One point of view was that liability attached from the
moment the passenger entered the air terminal and extended
until the passenger left the terminal at his destination. A more
restrictive view was advanced which would have extended
liability from the time the passenger boarded the aircraft until
the time of deplaning. The broader plan of liability was rejected
in favor of the language presently contained in Article 17. 658
Perhaps the restrictive one toO. 659 The equivalent phrase of
Article 17 in the French text reads: "Au cours de toutes
operations d'embarquement et de debarquement'l • It is thus plain

that

the

draftsman

contemplated

that

the

process

of

disembarking, as well as that of embarking, may in some
circumstances be capable of including at least some activities
beyond the mere actual assent or descent of the steps of an
658 For useful background discussion of the views expressed at the 1929 Conference, see Martinez
Hernandez v Air France (1976, CAl Puerto Rico) 545 F2d 279, cert den 430 US 950, 51 LEd 800,
97 S Ct 1592. Infra.
See also Note: Warsaw Convention--Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within
a Tenninal. 45 Fordham L Rev 369.
659 See Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31,36 ALR Fed 477, cert den
429 US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US 1124, 51 LEd 574, 97 S Ct 1162. Infra.
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aircraft or use of an equivalent device. Problems, however, may
arise in determining what other location should be treated as the
point where the process of embarkation begins or the process of
disembarking ends.
Since the Guatemala Conference, in 1971, the use of the
words "embarking" and "disembarking" were re-examined in the
light of the absolute liability regime which had been established
by the Montreal Interim Agreement, but it was apparently the
consensus of opinion of the delegates that the wording needed
no change. 66o Even in the new Montreal Convention 1999, the
words are still the same.
There are three major approaches about this issue around
the world today, namely the location test, the aviation risk test,
and the tripartite test.
1. The location test. In UK, the determine factor is the
location. In Adalia v Air Canada

661

,

the English Court of Appeal

expressed the opinion that location is the crucial factor, if not the
only factor to determine the extent of from embarking to
disembarking.
The plaintiff arrived at Heathrow Airport from Toronto and
As to discussion of "embarking" and "disembarking" by the delegates of the Guatemala
Conference, see Minutes of the International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City (1971),
ICAO Document 9040--LC/167-1, pp 31 et seq.
661 Adatia v Air Canada, May 21, 1992. Lloyds Aviation Law, vol. 11, No. 13, July 1, 1992.
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suffered injury on the moving walkway while proceeding from
the aircraft to the immigration and customs hall. The English
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the County Court that
the plaintiff had not suffered the injury in the course of
disembarkation.
As the judge said, the point to be resolved was whether the
plaintiff's injuries, which sustained on the travelator, were
caused "in the course of any of the operations of
disembarking" . There was no

English

authority which

specifically deals with the meaning of those words. In the
absence of such authority, the judge concluded: "One has to
construe them in their ordinary English meaning and
disembarking, either from a ship or aircraft, in my judgment
means leaving the ship or aircraft and actually stepping on to
dry land or that part of the non-movable part of the airfield or
aerodrome or terminal." The judge derived support for this
conclusion from an American authority, MacDonald v Air
Canada. 662
As is pointed out In Shawcross 663 modem conditions
governIng

embarkation

and

disembarkation

at

different

international airports may well differ widely. The courts should
MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1970).
This case law is helpfully analysed in paragraphs 155, 155.1 and 1552. of Shawcross &
Beaumont on Air Law (4th Edition).
662

663
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be cautious before placing a gloss on the words of Article 17 and
that in any case the ultimate question is whether, on the wording
of that Article, the passenger's movements through airport
procedures (including his physical location) indicates that he
was at the relevant time engaged upon the operation of
embarking upon or disembarking from the particular flight in
question.
2. Aviation risk test. The civil law jurisdictions' courts
when deal with the issue of the scope of "from embarking to
disembarking" frequently pay some regard to the question
whether the relevant accident related to the activity of aviation,
in another word, whether there is any aviation risk. They also
attach considerable importance to the question whether at the
relevant time the passenger was under the control of the carrier.

In Mache v Cie Air France 664 , the French court held that
the physical injuries received as a result of the passenger falling

I

into a manhole when crossing the apron to customs did not take
place in the course of disembarkation since there is no aviation

( risk.

In Air-Inter v. Sage et al. 665 , where a passenger slipped and
fell in an airport entrance hall, while he was in front of the
17 RFDA353, 20 RFDA228, (1966); 21 RFDA 343, (1967); 24 RFDA 311, (1970) Cour de
Cassation.
665 Cour d' Appel de Lyon (France), February 10,1976; RFDA 266.
664
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check-in counter before proceeding to the departure lounge. The
fall was caused by the passenger slipping over a pool of whisky
split on the ground by a previous traveler. The French court held
that the fall could not be blamed on the carrier, since the airport
entrance hall is a public place and not subject to the carrier's
control and management. Consequently, the preparatory stage of
air transport could not be considered as having commenced.
In Consorts Zaoui v. Aeroport de Paris 666, the French Court
of Appeal has, for good reason, rejected the request for
compensation from an airline for injuries sustained by
passengers who used the escalator situated in the airport
entrance hall; it noted that the people applying for compensation
were, at the time when the accident occurred, in airport
buildings used by different airline companies and where the
carrier's agents had not yet taken over responsibility for those
persons.
In Blumenfeld v BEA 667, unlike the French approach
illustrated above, the German court adopted a rather extensive
interpretation as to the Warsaw Convention Article 17. In this
case, an aircraft of the defendant airline had been unable to take
off on schedule due to thick fog, so the passengers had to wait
666
667

Cour de Cassation (Ire Ch. Civ.), May 18, 1976; [1976] RFDA 394.
(Federal Republic of Germany), March 11, 1961; [1962] ZLW 78.
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for some time. When the flight was finally called the plaintiff,
who alone with other passengers hurried down the steps of the
air terminal building in order to board the aircraft, slipped and
fell; she boarded the aircraft with bruises on her leg and ankle.
The plaintiff then claimed and received compensation for the
accident, because the court ruled that when the airline company
calls its passengers to board the aircraft it takes full charge of
the passengers.
In Adler v Austrian Airlines 668, the Brussels Court of
Appeal held that where the passenger who slipped on ice
disembarking from a bus in order to embark on the aircraft was
in the course of embarking.
3. The tripartite test. Taking the position that the physical
location of a passenger was not a sufficient sole criterion on
which to determine whether a passenger was in the course of
"embarking" or "disembarking" within the meaning of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention, the US courts will look at the
following factors: the location, the activity of the passenger, and
the control over the passenger by the carrier.
In Dav v Trans World Airlines. Inc. 669, where injured
passengers and the executrix of a passenger who died in a
[1986] 1 S & B A v R VIII191 (Brussels CA).
Day v Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1975, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 31, 36ALR Fed 477, cert den 429
US 890, 50 LEd 172, 97 S Ct 246, reh den 429 US· 1124, 51 LEd 574,97 S Ct 1162.
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terrorist attack, filed an action against airline company in which
they claimed that the TWA was liable for the injuries and the
death under the Warsaw Convention. The TWA contended that
the application of Article 17 should be determined by reference
only to the area where the accident occurred. Liability under the
Convention should not attach while the passenger is inside the
terminal building. The very earliest time at which liability can
commence is when the passenger steps through the terminal
gate.
The facts disclose that at the time of the terrorist attack, the

~

plaintiffs had already surrendered their tickets, passed through
passport control, and entered the area reserved exclusively for
those about to depart on international flights. They were
assembled at the departure gate, ready to proceed to the aircraft.
The passengers were not free agents roaming at will through the
terminal. They were required to stand in line at the direction of
TWA's agents for the purpose of undergoing a weapons search
which was a prerequisite to boarding. The US Supreme Court
held that whether one looks to the passengers' activity (which
was a condition to embarkation), to the restriction of their
movements, to the imminence of boarding, or even to their
position adjacent to the terminal gate, driven to the conclusion
343

that the plaintiffs were 'in the course of embarking.'
The US Supreme Court believes a relatively broad
construction of Article 17, affording protection to the plaintiffs
under the Warsaw liability umbrella, is in harm0ny with modem
theories of accident cost allocation. The airlines are in a position
to distribute among all passengers what would otherwise be a
crushing burden upon those few unfortunate enough to become
'accident' victims.

670

Equally important, this interpretation

fosters the goal of accident prevention. 671 The airlines, in
marked contrast to individual passengers, are in a better posture
to persuade, pressure or, if need be, compensate airport
managers to adopt more stringent security measures against
terrorist attacks.
The US Supreme Court believes that the Warsaw drafters
wished to create a system of liability rules that would cover all
the hazards of air travel. 672 The rigid location-based rule
suggested by TWA would ill serve that goal. Under TWA's test,
many claims relating to liability for the hazards of flying would
be excluded from the Warsaw system and would be governed by
local law. Rather than serving the drafters' intent of creating an
See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents at 39--45 (1970).
See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569--70 (9th Cir. 1974).
672 See Sullivan, The Codification of Air Carrier Liability by International Convention, 7 J. Air. L.
1, 20 (1936); Calkins, The Cause of Action under .the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.Air.L. 217 (1959).
670

671
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inclusive system, TWA's proposal would frustrate it.
Moreover, the US Supreme Court also believes that the
result it has reached furthers the intent of the Warsaw drafters in
a broader sense. The Warsaw delegates knew that, in the years to
come, civil aviation would change in ways that they could not
foresee. They wished to design a system of air law that would be
both durable and flexible enough to keep pace with these
changes.
Having analyzed the three major approaches about the
scope of "from embarking to disembarking", then which one
should China adopt, I believe is the tripartite approach. While
there appears to be no relevant Chinese authority, the problem
has given rise to extensive case law in other jurisdictions. The
object of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention
as thereby described is "the unification of certain rules relating
to international carriage by air". So far as possible, therefore, in
interpreting and applying Article 17, should have due regard to
the case law in other jurisdictions. This view also supported by
Chinese Aviation Law Article 184. 673
Beside the advantages of the tripartite approach which
discussed above, let us analyzing the other two approaches in
673 The Civil Aviation Law of China Article 184 provides: "In respect of cases which are not
provided by the law of the P.R. China or by the international treaty concluded or acceded to by the
P.R. China, international practices may apply."

j
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the view of why they are not the best. The location approach is
too hidebound which could not catch up with the modem change
of embarking or disembarking a flight. Such as the situations in
the Day case, it is really hard to disagree that the passenger were
embarking, I could not even answer a simple question, if they
were not embarking, what were they doing? The aviation risk
approach has its disadvantages too. Aviation risk is relative, but
not decisive. As one passenger walking on the steps of a life
shaft which connect with the aircraft, the real risk is people
walking on steps may fall down, rather than any risk of fly in the
air, will a passenger who fall down on a life shaft which connect
with the aircraft not embarking? The answer is no.

5-4. How to interpret "Bodily Injury" in China?

The final issue is how to interpret "bodily injury" in China,
which is the third pre-condition to trigger an air carrier's

I

liability under the Warsaw-Montreal system. In[afllother word;y~
,j'
wi1l7mental distress included in the word @tl"bodily injury'iin
China?
Whether 'bodily injury' encompasses emotional distress
under the Warsaw - Montreal liability regime is one of the
346
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heaviest debated topics within the field. Courts have attempted
for years to interpret and solidify the meaning of ambiguous
phrasing and terminology, and the debate has yet to be resolved.
A number of decisions around the world except one
decision in Israel have held that there can be no recovery for
purely mental injuries. For example, in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Floyd674 , the US Supreme Court not only rejected the view that
there can be any recovery for purely mental injuries under the
limited liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention,675 but
also concluded that unless a passenger was made to "suffer
death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury," an
air carrier could not be held liable. 676 The case was brought by
passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to the
Bahamas. Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines lost oil
pressure and, as part of the normal emergency protocol, the
flight crew shut down the engine and returned to Miami. The
two remaining engines then failed, and the flight crew informed
the passengers that the plane would be "ditched" in the Atlantic
Ocean. As the plane was descending, the crew was able to
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
See Terrafranca v. Virgin AtIantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1998)
(characterizing the plaintiff's injuries as "purely psychic injuries that do not qualify as bodily
injuries under the Warsaw Convention"); Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170,
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (absent any "physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or
inability to concentrate may safely be characterized as psychosomatic and is not compensable").
676 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
674
675
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restart one of the engines and the plane landed safely at Miami
International Airport. 677 The passengers brought suit to recover
damages solely for their mental distress. The district court
concluded that pure psychic injury was not compensable under
the Warsaw Convention. 678 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the phrase "lesion corporelle" encompassed "purely
emotional distress. ,,679 By applying long-accepted methods of
treaty interpretation, considering the text of the treaty, its context,
as well as the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the
practical construction adopted by the parties." The US Supreme
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ultimately holding that
recovery for pure psychic injury was not permitted under the
Warsaw Convention.
In King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,680 the UK House of
Lords dealt with two cases where passengers suffered
psychiatric injury with no physical injury as a result of accidents
on board aircraft. In the first case,681 plaintiff King was a
passenger on a helicopter transporting workers off of a North
Sea oil platform. Both of the helicopter's engines failed suddenly,
Id.
In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,629 F. Supp. 307
~S.D. Fla. 1986).
79 Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480.
680 King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., 1Lloyd's Rep. 745, (H.L. 2002).
681 Id. (citing King v. Bristow, 1Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)).
677
678
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causIng the aircraft to plunge thirty-five feet back onto the
oilrig's deck. King suffered post traumatic stress disorder with
symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of
flying. He claimed the accident also caused or contributed to an
existing peptic ulcer. In the second case,682 the plaintiff was an
underage girl, Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala
Lumpur to Amsterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male
passenger sitting next to her. She presented evidence at trial that
she suffered from clinical depression consisting of a single
episode of a major depressive illness. She claimed only mental

~

anguish

damages.

683

The

House

of Lords

held

that

compensation could be awarded for physical manifestations of a
mental injury so long as a casual link can be established by
showing that the mental injury causing the physical symptoms
itself was caused by the accident. However, no recovery IS
available for mental injury absent physical symptoms.
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether
recovery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd. 684, the Court of Appeal
of New South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental
anguish arising from an in-flight tum-back after an engme
682
683
684

Id. (citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A. 2002)).
Id. at 746.
Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997).
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fire. 685 Following Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily
injury" did not include purely psychological injury, but noted
that the decision in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery
be available where psychological injury is accompanied by
physical injury. ,,686
The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish
without physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel
Supreme Court. 687 In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was
confronted with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish
damages suffered while being held captive by hijackers. 688 The

~

court reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any
physical injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the
Warsaw Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today,
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been
contemplated.

This

approach

has

been

criticized

as

impermissibly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase
"bodily injury" by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal
and medical advances instead of interpreting the Convention as
written.
685
686
687
688
689

689

To date, no other jurisdictions have followed

Id. at 319.
Id. at 323.
1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141 (1984)).
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.
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Daddon.
China certainly will not allow recovery for purely mental
injuries under the Warsaw-Montreal liability regime, because if
the contracting parties of the Conventions wish to do so, they
will expressly incorporate the word "mental injury" in the
Article 17, instead, the words "bodily injury" have remained the
same since 1929. For my own opinion, contrary to Israel
Supreme Court's reasoning, supra, if the Conventions would
allow recovery for pure mental injury, a lot of countries will not
sign it. The following example will be clear reference.
Early drafts of the Montreal Convention 1999 Article 17
would have expressly included liability for mental injury. 690
Later drafts even introduced the element of personal injury
designed to encompass both physical and mental injuries. 691 For
example, the provision (then Article 16) of the first draft of the
Montreal Convention corresponding to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention read:
"The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury or mental
injury of a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking. However, the carrier is not liable if the death or injury
resulted solely from the state of health ofthe passenger.,,692
Blanca I. Rodriguez, Recent Developments in Aviation Liability Law, 66 J. Air L. & Com. 21,
36 (2000).
691 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Mental Distress in Aviation Claims-- Emergent Trends, 65 J. Air L.
& Com. 225, 225 (2000).
692 Id. at 226-27 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur on the Modernization and Consolidation of the
Warsaw System, Aviation Q., July 1997, at 286, 313) (emphasis added).
690
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Other drafts of the convention even included the term
"personal injury"; however, after further deliberations, the ICAO
removed both "mental injury" and "personal injury" from the
provision, choosing, instead, to leave the language virtually
unchanged.
Having solved the problem of pure mental distress, the next
question is whether mental distress accompanied by bodily
injury is recoverable. There are four approaches:
1. Disallow recovery for emotional distress accompanied
by bodily injury. Under this approach, an injured passenger
could recover only pecuniary loss, such as medical expenses and
lost income. Denying emotional distress damages is appropriate
in light of the state of the law in many countries at the time of
Warsaw Convention. 693 And, because this approach is so
restrictive on passengers' rights, it furthers the pro-airline
industry goals of the Convention. 694 However, this approach is
unacceptable because it provides such minimal compensation
for passengers who may have suffered traumatic injuries, either
physical or mental. The drafters of the Warsaw Convention
attempted to strike a balance between passengers and airlines;
this approach is too one sided. Further, even though many
693 In Floyd, the Court noted that" such a remedy was unknown in many, if not most, jurisdictions
in 1929." Floyd, 499 U.S. at 545.
694 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 665.
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jurisdictions denied recovery for mental distress in 1929, the
number of the countries which do not recognize recovery for
mental distress nowadays is limited since most of the countries
adopt the theory that mental distress, like physical injuries, is
recoverable.
2. Allow recovery for all emotional distress, as long as a
bodily injury occurs. This approach is to allow recovery for all
emotional distress, as long as a bodily injury occurs, regardless
of the connection between the distress and the bodily injury.
Thus, a passenger with a scratched arm could recover for the
i

~

trauma and fear due to the plane crash; the bodily injury opens
the door to liability for emotional distress.
This approach is consistent with a broad reading of Article
17's imposition of liability for "damage sustained in the event
of ... bodily injury. ,,695 Significantly, the drafters did not use
the phrase "damage caused by ... bodily injury," which would
have served as a signal that any mental distress must be
connected to the bodily injury.
However, this approach is undesirable for three reasons.
First of all, this approach treats mental distress as an
independent cause of action, which is inconsistent with

695

Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp" 654, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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precedent that dictates that the Warsaw Convention creates a
cause of action, not just a limit on remedies. 696 Secondly, this
approach treats mental distress as damages resulting from the
accident, not the injury.697 And, thirdly, this approach create
significant unfair. One passenger luckily scratched his finger
would obtain a much greater recovery than an unscratched
fellow passenger who was equally terrified by the plane crash.

3. Allow emotional distress as damages for bodily injury,
including distress about the accident. Emotional distress is
I

~

considered an element of the damages for bodily injury under
the third approach. Under this approach, the distress does not
need to be about the injury to be compensable. This approach is
different from the second approach in that the distress must
occur at the same time or later than the bodily injury; one cannot,
therefore, recover for the fear before the impact and bodily
injury under the second approach, but one can recover it under
the third one. Only some US courts adopted this approach, and
696 The dispute did not arise until the 1970s because courts did not originally view the Warsaw
Convention as creating acause of action. See Sheila Wallace Hohnes, Casenote, 58 J. AIR L. &
COM. 1205, 1207 (1993). Rather, courts frrst interpreted the Convention as simply limiting
monetary damages on otherwise applicable law. Id. Courts thus viewed the treaty as creating only
apresumption ofliability, instead of an independent cause of action. Id. at 1209-10. It was not
until the late 1970s that courts began to construe the Warsaw Convention as the "universal source
ofa right of action." Id. at 1210 (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913,
919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979».
697 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 666. This is problematic under the wording of Article 17 of the
Convention and the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985),
where the Court noted that "'the text of Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the
passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the passenger's injury.'" Jack, 854 F. Supp. at
666 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 398).
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these courts went too far. In my opinion, this approach is very
close to allow pure mental injuries which definitely against the
contracting states' intention of the Warsaw Convention and the
Montreal Convention.
4. Allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from
a bodily injury. Under this approach, emotional distress flowing
from the bodily injury is an element of damages allowed for the
bodily injury. Thus, damages are allowed for emotional distress
only to the extent the emotional distress is caused by the bodily
injury. A passenger may, therefore, recover for fear related to his
broken leg, but not for fear related to the plane crash. Under this
approach, emotional distress can also have a separate role as the
causal link between the accident and the bodily injury; a
passenger may, for example, recover for a heart attack caused by
the distress of the plane crash. 698
Of the four approaches discussed, China should adopt the
fourth one for a number of reasons. First, this approach prevents
serious inequities among the passengers subject to the Warsaw
698 The comments of the court in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App.
N.Y. 1974), help to illustrate the reasoning behind this position: The compensable injuries must be
'bodily' injuries but there may be an intermediate causal link which is 'mental' between the
cause--the accident-- and the effect--the 'bodily injury'. And once that predicate of liability-- the
. 'bodily injury'--is established, then the damages sustained as a result of the 'bodily injury' are
, compensable including mental suffering .... However, only the damages flowing from the 'bodily
\ injury', whatever the causal link, are compensable .... We hold, therefore, that defendant is liable
for plaintiffs palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by the psychic trauma of
the hijacking, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the trauma as
such or for the nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma.
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Convention. Such as getting scratched on the way down an
evacuation slide should not enable one passenger to obtain a
much greater recovery than an unscratched fellow passenger
who was equally terrified by the plane crash. And, this approach
is consistent with the intentions of the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention by making passengers' recoveries more reasonable
and predictable. This approach also allows for greater recovery
with more severe injuries, presuming that more distress flows
from more serious injuries. Further, this approach even permits
recovery in wrongful death cases.

699

Further more, let us analyze this issue in a simple way
which is usually overlooked by some experts. Disallow recovery
for emotional distress accompanied by bodily injury is against
the modem understanding of a bodily injury is not fully
recovered if the mental distress of that injury has not been
compensated. Allow recovery for all emotional distress as long
as a bodily injury occurs would create significant unfair. Allow
emotional distress as damages for bodily injury, including
distress about the accident is went too far against the contracting
states' intention. Then what is left and the reasonable approach
is allow recovery only for emotional distress flowing from a

699

Survivors may recover for physical manifestations of their grief at the loss of a loved one.
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bodily injury.

5-5. Conclusion note

As a successful international convention regulating aIr
carrier's liability around the world, the Warsaw Convention and
the Montreal Convention will play a very important role in air
transport. Chinese aviation law regulations need to be
modernized to correspond with global developments In the
industry. As a first target, the low limitation of air damage

~

recovery needs change, and more detailed implementing
regulations are needed to determine the extent and quantum of
damagt:(s caused by air accident. China needs to unify limits on
liability regarding international carriage with those existing in
other countries. This will certainly benefit both the aviation and
insurance industries.
Apart from the problem of low limitation, another
important task is to clarify the interpretation of Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention 1929 and the Montreal Convention 1999,
which is crucial to international air carrier's liability to
passengers. This is the main purpose of the present dissertation.
By suggesting that (1) China should interpret "accident"
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broadly to provide more, but reasonable protections to
passengers; (2) China should adopt tripartite approach to
interpret "from embarking to disembarking" to catch up with
modem changes of civil aviation, and (3) China should not
allow recovery for pure mental injuries but only to allow
recovery of mental distress which flowing from a bodily injury
to best serve the purpose of the Conventions. The author wishes
to clarify some uncertainties of legal practice in the area of
international air carrier's liability to passengers in China.
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